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  Abstract.	  
Aristotle	  proposes	  two	  different	  accounts	  of	  akrasia	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  and	  in	  De	  Anima.	  According	   to	   what	   may	   be	   called	   the	   ignorance	   account,	   akrasia	   involves	   a	   cognitive	   failure.	  According	  to	  what	  may	  be	  called	  the	  motivational-­‐conflict	  account,	  akrasia	  involves	  a	  conflict	  of	  desires.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  try	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Aristotle's	  ignorance	  account	  and	  motivational-­‐conflict	  account	  are	  not	  irredeemably	  incoherent.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  akratic's	  ignorance	  consists	  in	  a	  failure	  of	  phantasia,	  and	  that	  this	  failure	  is	  also	  the	  source	  of	  the	  akratic's	  desire	  to	  perform	  a	  blameworthy	  action	  that	  goes	  against	  her	  best	  decision.	  In	  order	  to	  support	  this	  argument,	  I	  first	  analyse	   the	   role	   of	  phantasia	   in	  Aristotle's	   theory	   of	   desire	   formation	   in	  De	  Anima	   and	   in	   the	  
Rhetoric.	   Second,	   I	   provide	   an	   explanation	   of	   Aristotle's	   syllogistic	   account	   of	   akrasia	   in	   the	  seventh	  book	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  in	  light	  of	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  a	   failure	   of	   phantasia.	   In	   conclusion,	   I	   note	   that	   if	   my	   interpretation	   is	   correct	   it	   can	   clarify	  further	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   virtuous,	   the	   vicious,	   the	   akratic	   and	   the	   enkratic	   in	  Aristotle's	  Ethics.	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Introduction	  
	   In	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  Aristotle	  gives	  an	  account	  of	  akrasia	  (lack	  of	  self	  control)	  as	  well	  as	  an	  interesting	  classification	  of	  the	  different	  forms	  it	  can	  assume:	  he	  distinguishes	  between	  weak	  and	  impetuous	  akrasia,	  and	  between	  akrasia	  caused	  by	  thumos	  and	  akrasia	  caused	  by	  bodily	  desires.	  	  One	   type	   of	   akrasia	   is	   impetuosity,	   while	   another	   is	   weakness.	   For	   the	   weak	   person	  deliberates,	   but	   then	  his	   feeling	  makes	  him	  abandon	   the	   result	   of	   his	  deliberation;	  but	  the	  impetuous	  person	  is	  led	  on	  by	  his	  feelings	  because	  he	  has	  not	  deliberated.1	  
Akrasia	   about	   thumos	   is	   less	   shameful	   than	   akrasia	   about	   bodily	   desires.	   For	   thumos	  would	  seem	  to	  hear	  reason	  a	  bit,	  but	  to	  mishear	  it.	  It	  is	  like	  overhasty	  servants	  who	  run	  out	  before	  they	  have	  heard	  all	  their	  instruction,	  and	  they	  carry	  them	  out	  wrongly.2	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  a	  philosopher	  like	  Aristotle,	  concerned	  with	  giving	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  vice,	  virtue	  and	  human	  flourishing,	  devoted	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  to	  akrasia.	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  he	  was	   certainly	   aware	   of	   the	   different	   outlooks	   of	   his	  most	   prominent	   predecessors	   on	   that	  phenomenon.	   Socrates	   believed	   that	   akrasia	   was	   impossible,	   for	   no	   one	   can	   deliberate	   that	  action	  x	  is	  better	  than	  action	  y	  and	  subsequently	  do	  action	  y.3	  Plato,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  allowed	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  akrasia,	   interpreting	  it	  as	  a	  victory	  of	  the	  desiderative	  or	  of	  the	  “spiritual”	  part	   of	   the	   soul	   over	   the	   rational	   part.4	   Second,	   Aristotle	   recognized	   that	   akrasia	   occupies	   a	  middle	   ground	   between	   vice	   and	   virtue,	   thus	   granting	   it	   a	   relevant	   role	   in	   his	   fascinating	  research	  concerning	  the	  human	  good.	  	  What	  has	  seemed	  surprising,	  even	  puzzling,	   to	  both	  modern	  and	  ancient	  commentators	   is	   that	  Aristotle	  provides	  an	  explanation	  of	  akrasia	  which	  appears	   incoherent.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   in	  De	  
Anima	  and	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  Aristotle	  proposes	  what	  may	  be	  dubbed	  the	  motivational	  
conflict	  account	  of	  akrasia5:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1NE1150b20-­‐23.	  Translations	  of	  the	  NE	  are	  based	  on	  those	  of	  Irwin	  1999,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated.	  I	  left	  the	  term	  akrasia	  untranslated.	  2	  NE	  1149a	  25–30.	  3	  Plato,	  Protagoras,	  352c	  4-­‐7	  and	  358d	  1-­‐2.	  NE1146	  24-­‐26	  4	  Plato,	  Republic	  439	  a-­‐440b.	  5	  see	  Moss	  2009,	  who	  calls	  it	  the	  struggle	  account.	  P	  120	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Sometimes	  desire	  overcomes	  and	  moves	  rational	  desire,	  as	  one	  sphere	  moves	  another;	  or	  desire	  influences	  desire,	  whenever	  akrasia	  occurs.6	  In	  the	  akratic	  and	  in	  the	  self-­‐controlled	  (enkrates)	  we	  praise	  the	  reason,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  [part]	  of	  their	  soul	  that	  has	  reason,	  because	  it	  exhorts	  them	  correctly	  and	  towards	  what	  is	   best;	   but	   they	   evidently	   also	   have	   in	   them	   some	   other	   [part]	   that	   is	   by	   nature	  something	  apart	  from	  reason,	  clashing	  and	  struggling	  with	  reason.7	  The	  motivational	   conflict	   account	   is	  derived	   from	  Plato,	   and	   represents	  akrasia	   as	   involving	   a	  conflict	  of	  desires	  or	  a	  struggle	  between	  rational	  and	  irrational	  impulses.	  In	   another	   passage	   of	   the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,8	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  Aristotle	   seems	   to	   adopt	   a	  more	  Socratic	  approach	  to	  akrasia,	  according	  to	  which	  it	  necessarily	  involves	  ignorance:	  Clearly,	  then,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  akratic	  people	  have	  knowledge	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  these	  people	  (the	  mad,	  the	  drunk,	  etc.).	  Saying	  the	  words	  that	  come	  from	  knowledge	  is	  no	  sign	  [of	  fully	  having	  it].	  For	  people	  affected	  in	  this	  way	  even	  recite	  demonstrations	  and	  verses	  of	  Empedocles,	   and	   those	  who	  have	   just	  begun	   to	   learn	   something	  do	  not	   yet	   know	   it,	  though	  they	  	  string	  the	  words	  together;[…]	  so	  we	  must	  suppose	  that	  those	  who	  are	  acting	  akratically	  also	  say	  the	  words	  in	  the	  way	  that	  actors	  do.9	  According	  to	  this	  second	  account,	  which	  we	  can	  call	  the	  ignorance	  account,10	  the	  akratic	  seems	  to	  suffer	  a	  cognitive	   failure.	  When	  she	  sighs	   ‘I	   shouldn’t	  be	  eating	   this’	  as	   she	  reaches	   for	  a	   third	  piece	  of	  cake,	  she	  does	  not	  really	  know	  what	  she	  means	  by	  her	  utterance.	  	  The	   ignorance	   account	   and	   the	  motivational	   conflict	   account,	   at	   first	   sight,	   seem	   to	   contradict	  each	  other.	  How	  can	  the	  akratic	  be	  torn	  between	  two	  conflicting	  desires,	  if	  she	  is	  unaware	  that	  she	   is	   doing	   something	   wrong?	   In	   other	   words,	   if	   the	   akratic’s	   ignorance	   corresponds	   to	   an	  intellectual	   impairment,	  she	  cannot	  be	  urged	   ‘towards	  what	   is	  best’	  by	  the	  rational	  part	  of	  her	  soul.	  Hence	  she	  does	  not	  experience	  any	  motivational	  struggle,	  but	  only	  an	  irrational	  desire	  for	  what	  is	  not	  best.	  To	   resolve	   this	   incoherence	   in	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   akrasia,	   ancient	   and	   contemporary	  commentators	  have	  adopted	  different	  strategies.	  In	  light	  of	  Aristotle’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance,	   many	   have	   argued	   that,	   despite	   appearances,	   Aristotle	   held	   a	   Socratic	   view	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  DA	  III.11	  434a12–14.	  Translations	  of	  DA	  are	  based,	  sometimes	  loosely,	  on	  Hett	  1936,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated	  7	  NE	  1102	  b15-­‐19.	  8	  NE	  VII	  3.	  (EE	  VI	  3)	  9	  NE	  1147a	  20-­‐25.	  10	  See	  	  Moss	  2009,	  119–156.	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practical	  reasoning.	  Thus	  they	  have	  either	  neglected	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account11,	  or	  they	  have	  tried	  to	  explain	  it	  away,	  arguing	  that	  the	  akratic	  experiences	  a	  struggle	  of	  desires,	  although	  her	   intellectual	   faculties	   are	   impaired.12	  Many	   others,	   however,	   have	   considered	   this	   Socratic	  version	  of	  Aristotle’s	  view	  deeply	  unappealing,	  and	  have	  therefore	  tried	  to	  downplay	  the	  role	  of	  ignorance	   in	  Aristotle’s	   explanation	   of	  akrasia.	   In	   order	   to	   explain	  Aristotle’s	   reference	   to	   the	  akratic’s	   ignorance,	   these	   commentators	  have	  usually	  pursued	  one	  of	   the	   following	   strategies.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   some	  have	  claimed	   that	  Aristotle	   is	  mistaken	   in	  mentioning	   ignorance	   in	  his	  account	  of	  akrasia,	  and	  they	  have	  attempted	  to	  construct	  a	  plausible	  account	  that	  explains	  why	  Aristotle	  made	  this	  error.13	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  others	  have	  provided	  a	  speculative	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance	  according	  to	  which	  it	  consists	  not	  in	  an	  intellectual	  failure,	  but	  in	   a	   failure	   to	   desire	  what	   is	   best.14	   Hence	   they	   sketched	   a	   desire-­‐based	   picture	   of	   Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  practical	  reasoning,	   in	  which	  the	  differences	  in	  valuational	   judgements	  between	  the	  akratic	  and	  the	  virtuous	  man	  are	  explained	  by	  the	  differences	  between	  their	  desires.15	  	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  suggest	  a	  different	  solution	  to	  the	  alleged	  incoherence	  of	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  I	  will	  try	  to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  reconcile	  the	  ignorance	  account	  with	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	   if	  we	   interpret	   the	  cognitive	   failure	  of	   the	  akratic	  as	  a	   failure	  of	   the	   faculty	  of	  
phantasia,	  and	  not	  as	  a	   failure	  of	   the	   intellect.	  This	  solution,	  which	  derives	   from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  De	  Anima	  and	  De	  Motu	  Animalium,	  is	  meant	  to	  occupy	  a	  middle	  ground	  between	  the	  desire-­‐based	  account	  and	  the	  Socratic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  In	  order	  to	  introduce	  my	  	  positive	   solution	   to	   the	   apparent	   incoherence	   of	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   akrasia,	   in	   the	   first	  chapter	   of	   the	   thesis	   I	  will	   try	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   an	   interpretation	   of	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	  
akrasia	  which	  is	  neither	  desire-­‐based	  nor	  Socratic	  is	  both	  plausible	  and	  needed.	  In	  the	  second	  chapter	  I	  will	  introduce	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  
phantasia.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  akratic	  is	  “ignorant”	  in	  so	  far	  as	  she	  has	  a	  non-­‐doxastic	  mistaken	  representation,	  which	  coexists	  with	  her	  correct	  beliefs	  about	  what	  she	  should	  or	  shouldn’t	  do.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  her	  mistaken,	  non-­‐doxastic	  phantasiai	  and	  her	  correct	  beliefs,	  then,	  that	  she	  experiences	  a	  conflict	  of	  motives	  and	  eventually	  doesn’t	  abide	  by	  her	  deliberation.	  Hence,	  her	  ignorance	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  her	  desire	  to	  perform	  the	  akratic	  action,	  and	  the	  ignorance	  account	  is	  the	  necessary	  counterpart	  of	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account.	  If	  this	  interpretation	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  Mele	  1999	  12	  Cf.	  Moss	  2009	  	  and	  Lorenz	  2006.	  13	  Wiggins	  1980b.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  underline	  that,	  although	  he	  explains	  away	  the	  ignorance	  account,	  Wiggins	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  purely	  desire-­‐based	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  	  14	  Charles	  1984.	  15	  See	  Ibidem,	  162	  for	  this	  definition	  of	  the	  desire-­‐based	  account.	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plausible,	  then	  the	  ignorance	  account	  and	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	  are	  not	  incoherent,	  but	  necessarily	  complete	  one	  another.	  In	   the	   third	   chapter	   I	   will	   justify	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   akratic’s	   mistaken	   non-­‐doxastic	  representation	   is	   the	   product	   of	   her	   malfunctioning	   phantasia.	   I	   will	   analyze	   the	   role	   of	   the	  faculty	   of	   phantasia	   in	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   desire	   formation,	   arguing	   that	   phantasiai	   are	  significantly	   different	   	   from	   beliefs,	   and	   that	   they	   can	   sufficiently	   cause,	   as	   well	   as	   being	  constitutive	  elements,	  of	  desires.	  I	  will	  also	  clarify	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  phantasia	   is	  an	  evaluative	  failure,	  and	  not	  a	  descriptive	  failure.	  In	  the	  fourth	  and	  conclusive	  chapter	  I	  will	  employ	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  a	   failure	   of	   phantasia	   to	   explain	   Aristotle’s	   syllogistic	   account	   of	   akrasia.	   In	   virtue	   of	   this	  explanation,	  I	  will	  conclude	  that	  if	  the	  interpretation	  of	  akrasia	  I	  proposed	  is	  correct,	  it	  suggests	  that	  we	  should	  turn	  to	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  moral	  habituation	   in	  order	   to	  determine	  whether	  the	  akratic	  could	  ever	  become	  virtuous.	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Chapter	  1:	   the	  Socratic	   Interpretation	  and	   the	  desire-­‐based	   Interpretation	  of	  Akrasia	  	  
	  1.1	  Introduction	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   try	   to	   demonstrate	   why	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   akrasia	   resists	   both	   the	  desire-­‐based	   interpretation	   and	   the	   Socratic	   interpretation.	   Thus,	   I	   will	   firstly	   criticize	   the	  Socratic	  account,	  underlining	   that	   it	   contradicts	  Aristotle’s	   remarks	  on	   the	  weak	  akratic	   in	   the	  
Nicomachean	  Ethics.	   In	  order	   to	  pursue	  my	  critique,	   I	  will	   focus	  on	   the	  version	  of	   the	  Socratic	  account	  Jessica	  Moss	  proposes	  in	  “Akrasia	  and	  Perceptual	  Illusion”.16	  Secondly,	  I	  will	  point	  out	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  accounts	  that	  “downplay”	  the	  role	  of	  ignorance	  in	  Aristotle’s	   account	   of	  akrasia.	  Hence,	   I	  will	   discuss	  David	  Charles’	   view	  and	  David	  Wiggins’	  view.	  Indeed,	  while	  Wiggins	  argues	  that	  Aristotle	  introduced	  ignorance	  in	  his	  account	  of	  akrasia	  because	  he	  was	  misled	  by	  his	   analysis	  of	   human	   flourishing	   (eudaimonia),	   Charles	  proposes	   a	  view	  according	  to	  which	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  a	  desiderative	  failure.	  	  	  If	  my	  critiques	  against	  these	  views	  are	  consistent,	  they	  will	  help	  envisage	  the	  possibility	  for	  an	  alternative	   solution	   of	   the	   problem	   that	   akrasia	   poses	   in	   Aristotle's	   philosophy.	   The	   “logical	  space”	   for	   a	   third	   way	   between	   the	   desire-­‐based	   and	   the	   Socratic	   interpretation	   has	   been	  proposed	  by	  David	  Charles	  in	  a	  series	  of	  recent	  articles.17	  Hence,	  I	  will	  conclude	  my	  analysis	  by	  highlighting	   a	   problematic	   feature	   of	   Charles’	   third	   way:	   its	   inability	   to	   explain	   Aristotle’s	  apparent	   endorsement	   of	   the	   view	   that	   ignorance	   is	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   akratic's	   blameworthy	  desire.	  	  	  	  1.2	  The	  “Socratic”	  solution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  former	  section,	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  commentators	  who	  are	  inclined	  towards	  a	  Socratic	  account	  of	  akrasia	  tend	  either	  to	  disregard	  Aristotle’s	  remarks	  on	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  desires	  of	  the	   akratic18,	   or	   to	   “explain	   them	   away”.	   The	   first	   strategy	   is	   obviously	   problematic,	   for	   it	  contradicts	  textual	  evidence	  not	  only	  in	  De	  Anima,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  Moreover,	  Aristotle	  presents	  the	  ignorance	  account	  of	  akrasia	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  but	  doesn’t	  refer	  to	   it	   in	   the	  De	  Anima.	  Hence,	  against	   the	  Socratic	  reading,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   in	  De	  Anima	  Aristotle	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Moss	  2009	  17	  Charles	  2011,	  	  2007	  and	  2009.	  18	  See	  for	  example	  Mele	  1999,	  199	  ff	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stresses	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  motivational	   conflict	   account,	   and	  he	   doesn’t	   abandon	   it	   in	   his	  Ethical	   works.	   The	   first	   reference	   to	   akrasia	   in	   the	   Nicomachean	   Ethics	   refers	   clearly	   to	   the	  motivational	  struggle	  experienced	  by	  the	  akratic:	  they	   (the	   akratics)	   evidently	   also	   have	   some	   other	   [part]	   that	   is	   by	   nature	   something	  apart	  from	  reason,	  clashing	  and	  struggling	  with	  reason19	  It	   seems	   highly	   unlikely,	   therefore,	   that	   Aristotle	   would	   have	   completely	   neglected	   the	  motivational	   conflict	   account	   later	   on	   in	   the	   very	   same	   work,	   where	   he	   claims	   that	   akrasia	  involves	   ignorance	   and	   concludes	   that	   “the	   results	   Socrates	   was	   looking	   for	   seem	   to	   come	  about”20.	  What	   an	   advocate	   of	   the	   Socratic	   account	   should	   do,	   therefore,	   is	   try	   to	   explain	   away	   the	  motivational	  struggle	  of	  the	  akratic	  in	  order	  to	  render	  it	  compatible	  with	  her	  intellectual	  failure.	  Jessica	  Moss	  pursues	   this	   line	  of	   reasoning	   in	  her	  paper	   “Akrasia	   and	  Perceptual	   illusion”21.	   In	  order	   to	  explain	   the	  motivational	   conflict	  account,	  Moss	  draws	  a	  parallel	  between	  akrasia	   and	  perceptual	   illusion	   referring	   to	  De	  Anima	   III.10.	   She	   then	   explains	   that,	   if	  we	   accept	   the	   latter	  parallel,	   the	   ignorance	   account	   must	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   completion	   of	   the	   motivational	   conflict	  account,	   because	   it	   provides	   an	   explanation	   of	   how	   the	   non-­‐rational	   desire	   overpowers	   the	  rational	   one	   by	   “undermining	   its	   cognitive	   basis”22.	   In	   order	   to	   analyze	   it,	   I	   will	   divide	  Moss’	  argument	  in	  two	  parts:	  firstly	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  various	  features	  of	  the	  parallel	  between	  akrasia	  and	  perceptual	   illusion,	  which	   consists	   in	  presenting	   the	   struggle	   of	  motives	   as	   if	   it	   coincided	  with	   the	   conflict	   between	   perception	   and	   beliefs	   in	   experiences	   of	   “perceptual	   illusion”.	  Secondly,	  I	  will	  	  propose	  some	  objections	  that	  Moss'	  view	  seems	  to	  face.	  In	  De	  Anima	  III.	  3	  428b	  2-­‐4,	  Aristotle	  describes	  perceptual	  illusory	  experiences	  as	  follows:	  	  but	  we	  may	  have	  a	  false	  appearance	  about	  things	  about	  which	  we	  have	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  true	  supposition;	  for	  instance	  when	  the	  sun	  appears	  to	  measure	  a	  foot	  across,	  but	  we	  are	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  inhabited	  globe.23	  	  These	  experiences	  seem	  to	  present	  a	  cognitive	  dissonance	  between	  how	  things	  appear	  and	  what	  one	  believes.	   In	  Aristotle’s	   terms,	   this	  dissonance	   is	   explained	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  appearance	  (phantasia)	   and	   the	   belief	   are	   the	   product	   of	   two	   different	   cognitive	   faculties:	   phantasia	   and	  rational	   thought.	  The	  starting	  point	  of	  Moss’s	  explanation	  of	  akrasia,	   then,	  consists	   in	  claiming	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  NE	  1102b	  20	  20	  NE	  1147b	  16	  21	  Moss	  2009.	  22	  Ibidem,	  122	  23	  DA	  428b	  2-­‐4	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that	  in	  De	  Anima	  III.10	  we	  see	  Aristotle	  applying	  the	  distinction	  between	  these	  two	  faculties	  to	  the	   practical	   realm,	   or	   to	   practical	   cognition.24	   The	   result	   of	   this	   application	   is	   a	   complex	  explanation	  of	  how	  reason	  and	  desire	  cause	  action.	  Moss	  suggests	  that	  Aristotle	  understands	  the	  interaction	   of	   reason	   and	   desire	   in	   a	   “non-­‐Humean	  way”.	   This	   is	   to	   say	   that	   Aristotle	   doesn’t	  believe	  that	  desire	  sets	  the	  goal	  towards	  which	  our	  action	  is	  directed	  and	  reason	  determines	  the	  means	  with	  the	  help	  of	  which	  this	  goal	  is	  achieved.	  Rather,	  reason,	  both	  the	  form	  of	  the	  intellect	  and	  phantasia,	  plays	  a	  fundamental	  role	   in	  setting	  the	  action’s	  goal:	  the	  intellect	  and	  phantasia	  contribute	   in	   recognizing	   things	   as	   good	   or	   not	   good,	   and	   thereby	   incline	   us	   to	   pursue	   or	   to	  avoid	   them.25	   However,	   in	   Moss’	   interpretation,	   whilst	   phantasia	   represents	   only	   “apparent	  goods”,	   the	   intellect	   is	   directed	   towards	   genuine	   goods.26	   Therefore,	   as	   it	   happens	   in	   cases	   of	  perceptual	  illusion,	  phantasia	  and	  the	  intellect	  can	  conflict,	  representing	  the	  very	  same	  thing	  as	  good	  and	  not	  good	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  produces	  conflicting	  desires	  in	  the	  agent.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  Moss’s	  account	  of	  the	  conflict	  of	  desires	  the	  akratic	  experiences,	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	   look	  back	  at	  the	  “glutton	  example”	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction.	   In	  Moss’	  view,	  the	  glutton	  akratic	  may	  apprehend	  (by	  means	  of	  her	  phantasia)	  the	  third	  piece	  of	  cake	  as	  being	  good	  and	  desirable	  while	  also	   representing	   it	   (using	  her	   intellectual	   faculty)	  as	  unhealthy	  and	  undesirable.	  Moss,	  therefore,	  is	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  reason	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance	  in	  light	  of	  the	  parallel	  between	  akrasia	  and	  perceptual	   illusions.	  When	  an	  agent	  experiences	  a	  perceptual	  illusion,	  insofar	  as	  she	  can	  exercise	  both	  rational	  thought	  and	  phantasia,	  she	  would	  undoubtedly	  know	  that	  she	  should	  follow	  the	  indications	  of	  the	  former	  rather	  than	  the	  latter:	  we	  see	  the	  sun	  as	  being	  a	  foot	  wide,	  but	  we	  would	  never	  act	  on	  this	  appearance,	  for	  example,	  by	  trying	  to	  catch	  it	  with	  a	  net.27	  Indeed,	  our	  intellect	  or	  rational	  thought	  “tells	  us”	  that	  the	  sun	  is	  wider	  than	  the	  earth,	  and	  makes	  it	  evident	  that	  the	  appearance	  produced	  by	  phantasia	  is	  illusory.	  What	  makes	  it	  the	  case,	  then,	  that	  we	  sometimes	  act	  on	  mere	  appearances,	  disregarding	  the	  advice	  of	  intellect?	  For	   the	   case	   of	   perceptual	   illusion,	   Moss	   argues,	   Aristotle	   seems	   to	   provide	   a	   very	   clear	  explanation	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  In	  De	  Anima	  429a5-­‐8,	  he	  writes:	  	  Animals	  do	  many	  things	  in	  accord	  with	  phantasia,	  some	  because	  they	  have	  no	  intellect,	  i.e.	   beasts,	   some	  because	   their	   intellect	   is	   sometimes	   covered	  by	  pathos	  or	  diseases	   or	  sleep,	  i.e.	  people.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Ibidem,	  124	  25	  Ibidem	  26	  Ibidem,	  p	  128	  27	  Ibidem,	  p	  131	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  Hence,	  we	   follow	  phantasia	  when	  our	   intellect	   is	   somehow	   impaired	  by	   some	  psychophysical	  affection,	  or	  by	  some	  pathos	  .	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  Moss’s	  interpretation,	  when	  we	  are	  in	  the	  grip	   of	   a	   pathos	   ,	   we	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   assent	   to	   the	   representations	   of	   phantasia:	   our	   rational	  faculty	  is	  blinded	  or	  impaired,	  and	  therefore	  simply	  silent	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  truth	  or	  falsehood	  of	  the	  appearance28.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  faculties	  of	  phantasia	  and	  rational	  thought	  are	  also	  applied	  to	  the	  practical	   realm,	   then,	  we	  have	  a	  good	  reason	   to	  maintain	   that	  Aristotle	  would	  provide	   the	  same	  sort	  of	  explanation	  of	  how	  it	  is	  possible,	  for	  a	  rational	  agent,	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  for	  the	  apparent	   rather	   than	   the	   genuine	   good.	   Indeed,	   even	   in	   the	   “practical	   case”,	   the	   intellectual	  faculty	  must	  be	  somehow	  impaired	  by	  a	  pathos	  ,	  thereby	  leaving	  “full	  scope”	  to	  phantasia	  and	  to	  the	  akratic	  behaviour.	  	  If	   the	   parallel	   between	   akrasia	   and	   perceptual	   illusion	   is	   sound,	   then	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   an	  evident	  connection	  between	  the	  “motivational	  conflict	  account”	  and	  the	  “ignorance	  account”	  of	  
akrasia.	   Indeed,	   as	   far	   as	   phantasia	   can	   take	   over	   rational	   thought	   only	   when	   the	   latter	   is	  obnubilated	   by	   a	   pathos	   ,	   it	   is	   clearer	   why	   akratic	   behaviour	   should	   involve	   “some	   sort	   of	  ignorance”.	  The	  akratic	  agent	  is	  ignorant	  because	  she	  is	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  an	  overwhelming	  pathos,	  and	   she	   is	   temporarily	   unable	   to	   discern	   what	   is	   genuinely	   good	   for	   her.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  impairment	   of	   the	   intellectual	   faculty	   is	   temporary	   is	   of	   great	   significance	   for	   this	   account.	  Indeed,	  insisting	  on	  the	  temporariness	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance,	  Moss	  is	  able	  to	  account	  for	  her	  motivational	  struggle.	  In	  her	  view,	  the	  struggle	  occurs	  before	  the	  agent’s	  intellect	  is	  overcome	  by	  a	  pathos	  ,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  prior	  to	  her	  intellectual	  failure.	  Hence,	  Moss	  solves	  the	  incoherence	  between	  the	  ignorance	  account	  and	  the	  struggle	  account	  emphasizing	  that	  they	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  stand	  as	  complete	  and	  mutually	   incompatible	  accounts	  of	  akratic	  behaviour.	  Rather,	   they	  refer	  to	  different	  stages	  of	   the	  akratic’s	  practical	  deliberation,	  and	  contribute	  together	  to	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  of	  her	  behaviour.	  The	  comparison	  with	  perceptual	  illusion	  leads	  Moss	  to	  emphasize	  the	  important	  role	  phantasia	  plays	  in	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  practical	  reasoning.	  Thus,	  she	  is	  able	  to	  explain	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	   the	   formation	  of	  desires	   in	  a	  way	  which	   is	  neither	  quasi-­‐Humean,	  nor	  purely	   intellectualist.	  The	  quasi	  Humean	  explanation	  is	  ruled	  out	  because	  as	  long	  as	  the	  intellect	  is	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	   formation	   of	   rational	   motives,	   its	   role	   cannot	   be	   confined	   to	   the	   mere	   determination	   of	  means	  towards	  an	  end	  which	  	  is	  set	  by	  desires.29	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  intellect	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  formation	   of	   rational	   desires.	   The	   purely	   intellectualist	   account,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	  undermined	  by	  the	  attention	  Moss	  devotes	  to	  phantasia.	  In	  her	  view,	  phantasia	  is	  a	  non-­‐rational	  cognitive	   faculty	   which	   produces	   “appearances”	   of	   the	   good,	   thereby	   carrying	   out	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibidem,	  p	  135	  29	  Ibidem,	  p	  131	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desire-­‐forming	  activity	  parallel	  to	  the	  one	  of	  the	  intellect30.	  Hence,	  her	  account	  prima	  facie	  seems	  immune	   to	   the	   objection	   of	   overstating	   the	   role	   of	   the	   intellect	   in	   Aristotle’s	   theory	   of	   desire	  formation.	  Indeed,	  as	  opposed	  to	  most	  “Socratic”	  interpreters,	  she	  doesn’t	  identify	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  desires	  with	  the	  “workings”	  of	  the	  intellectual	  faculty,	  but	  devotes	  the	  required	  attention	  to	  the	  non-­‐intellectual	  cognitive	  faculty	  of	  phantasia	  as	  well.31	  	  The	  very	  same	  analogy	  with	  perceptual	  illusions,	  however,	  seems	  to	  raise	  a	  number	  of	  worries	  for	  Moss’s	  account,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  which	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  intellect	  (nous)	  is	  an	  infallible	   faculty.	   	  The	  assumption	   that	   the	   intellect	   is	   infallible	  presents	   two	  parallel	   sides:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  involves	  the	  view	  that	  the	  intellect	  is	  always	  correct.	  	  As	  Moss	  notes,	  according	  to	   this	   view	   	  Aristotle	  would	   employ	   the	   term	   “intellect”	   as	   a	   “success	   term”.	  Hence,	  Aristotle	  would	  grant	  that	  “if	  one	  makes	  an	  error,	  one	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  have	  been	  exercising	  intellect,	  but	  mere	  thinking”32.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  infallibility	  of	  the	  intellect	  implies	  that	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  (healthy,	  or	  non-­‐impaired)	  intellect	  are	  always	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  to	  determine	  correct	  human	  action.	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  if	  an	  agent	  performs	  an	  action	  contrary	  to	  the	  correct	  reason,	  then	  her	  intellect	  must	  be	  dormant	  or	  impaired.33	  	  The	  assumption	  that,	  in	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  the	  intellect	  is	  always	  correct	  can	  be	  warranted	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perceptual	  illusion.	  There,	  the	  agent	  is	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  correct,	  scientific	  belief	  (doxa)	  that,	   for	   example,	   the	   sun	   is	   larger	   than	   the	   earth.	   When	   applied	   to	   the	   “practical	   realm”,	  however,	  this	  assumption	  is	  less	  plausible.	  Aristotle,	  after	  all,	  states	  that	  (practical)	  deliberation	  	  is	  not	  scientific	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  clearly	  some	  sort	  of	  correctness.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  correctness	  in	   scientific	  knowledge	  or	   in	  belief.	  For	   there	   is	  no	  correctness	   in	   scientific	  knowledge,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  error	  in	  it	  either.34	  	  Furthermore,	  Moss’s	  view	   that	   the	   intellect	   is	  always	  correct	   seems	   in	   tension	  with	  Aristotle’s	  response	  to	  the	  following	  sophistical	  refutation:	  	  foolishness,	  combined	  with	  akrasia	  is	  virtue.	  For	  akrasia	  makes	  someone	  act	  contrary	  to	  what	   he	   supposes	   [is	   right],	   but	   since	   he	   supposes	   that	   good	   things	   are	   bad	   that	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  do	  them,	  he	  will	  do	  good	  actions,	  not	  the	  bad35.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Ibidem,	  pp	  125-­‐126	  31	  See,	  for	  example,	  Nussbaum	  1994.	  32	  Moss	  2009,	  fn	  23	  33	  Ibidem,	  fn	  29	  34NE1142b	  	  10.	  See	  also	  DA	  433a	  25,	  where	  Aristotle	  writes	  that	  the	  mind	  	  (nous)	  is	  always	  correct.	  In	  the	  theoretical	  realm	  Aristotle	  may	  indeed	  grant	  that	  when	  one	  has	  a	  false	  scientific	  belief	  one	  has	  exercised	  not	  the	  intellect,	  but	  mere	  thinking.	  Since	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  	  practical	  reasoning	  is	  appetite,	  and	  appetite	  can	  be	  wrong	  	  the	  practical	  mind,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  theoretical	  one,	  can	  also	  be	  wrong.	  Hence,	  Moss’	  argument	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  rational	  cognition	  to	  hit	  the	  truth	  realm	  is	  implausible	  in	  the	  practical.	  Cf	  Moss	  2009,	  fn	  23	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Aristotle	   responds	   to	   this	   sophistic	   challenge	   discussing	   the	   case	   of	   Neoptolemus,	   one	   of	   the	  protagonists	   of	   Sophocles’	  Philoctetes.	   In	   the	   tragedy	  Neoptolemus	   is	   a	   honest	  warrior	  who	   is	  persuaded	   by	   Odysseus	   to	   deceive	   Philoctetes	   in	   order	   to	   steal	   his	   bow.	   At	   the	   beginning,	  Neoptolemus	   stands	   by	   his	   choice	   and	   tries	   to	   follow	   Odysseus’	   advice.	   Nevertheless,	   he	   is	  eventually	  overcome	  by	  the	  shame	  and	  regret	  he	  feels	  for	  having	  deceived	  the	  infirm	  Philoctetes,	  and	  fails	  to	  observe	  Odysseus’	  command.	   	  According	  to	  Aristotle,	  Neptolemus	  is	  not	  an	  akratic,	  although	   a	   pathos	   induces	   him	   to	   follow	   pleasure	   instead	   of	   reason.	   Indeed,	   although	   he	   is	  unable	  to	  follow	  the	  dictates	  of	  his	  intellect,	  he	  is	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  a	  noble	  pleasure,	  and	  therefore	  he	  is	  neither	  akratic	  nor	  blameworthy.36	  	  Moss’	   illusion	   account	   of	   akrasia	   would	   struggle	   to	   incorporate	   Aristotle’s	   view	   on	  Neoptolemus.	  Indeed,	  Moss’	  view	  can	  only	  allow	  two	  equally	  unpalatable	  interpretations	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Sophoclean	  hero.	  	  The	  first	  interpretation	  grants	  that	  Neoptolemus’	  intellect	  is	  mistaken,	   for	   it	  urges	  him	  to	   lie	   to	  Philoctetes.	  This	   interpretation,	  which	  seems	   to	  be	   the	  one	  Moss	   favors,	   contrasts	   however	  with	   her	   own	   assumption	   that	   the	   intellect	   is	   always	   right	   or	  infallible37.	  The	  second	  interpretation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  concedes	  that	  Neoptolemus’s	  intellect	  is	   right,	   but	   	   entails	   contra	  Aristotle	   that	  Neoptolemus	   is	   to	   be	   considered	   akratic.	   Indeed,	   he	  goes	   against	   his	   own	   best	   (and	   correct)	   judgement	   because	   his	   intellect	   is	   covered	   over	   by	   a	  
pathos	  .	  In	  the	  same	  way	  the	  assumption	  that	  an	  healthy,	  non-­‐impaired	  intellect	  is	  always	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	   to	  produce	  correct	  human	  action	   is	  plausible	   in	   the	  case	  of	  perceptual	   illusions.	   It	   is	  true	   that	  as	   long	  as	  her	   intellect	  qualifies	  an	  appearance	  as	   false,	   the	  agent	  wouldn't	  act	  on	   it.	  Returning	   to	  Moss'	   example,	  we	   see	   the	   sun	   as	   being	   a	   foot	  wide,	   but	   as	   long	   as	   our	   intellect	  qualifies	  this	  appearance	  as	  false	  we	  would	  never	  act	  on	  it,	  for	  example,	  by	  trying	  to	  catch	  it	  with	  a	  net.38	  In	  the	  "practical	  realm",	  however,	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  intellect	  is	  always	  necessary	  and	   sufficient	   for	   correct	   human	   action	   yields	   a	   result	   that	   seems	   to	   be	   in	   contrast	   with	   the	  textual	  evidence	   in	   the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics:	   the	  exclusion	  of	   the	  so	  called	   “clear-­‐eyed”	  akratic.	  The	  agent	  that	  Moss	  dubs	  clear-­‐eyed	  akratic	  is	  someone	  who	  acts	  akratically	  although	  she	  is	  not	  in	   the	   grip	   of	   a	   strong	   passion.	   The	   clear-­‐eyed	   akratic,	   therefore,	   is	   the	   specific	   subject	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  NE	  1146a	  29-­‐31	  36	  “οἷον	  ἐν	  τῷ	  Φιλοκτήτῃ	  τῷ	  Σοφοκλέους	  ὁ	  Νεοπτόλεμος:	  καίτοι	  δι᾽	  ἡδονὴν	  οὐκ	  ἐνέμεινεν,	  ἀλλὰ	  καλήν:	  τὸ	  γὰρ	  ἀληθεύειν	  αὐτῷ	  καλὸν	  ἦν,	  ἐπείσθη	  δ᾽	  ὑπὸ	  τοῦ	  Ὀδυσσέως	  ψεύδεσθαι.	  οὐ	  γὰρ	  πᾶς	  ὁ	  δι᾽	  ἡδονήν	  τι	  πράττων	  οὔτ᾽	  ἀκόλαστος	  οὔτε	  φαῦλος	  οὔτ᾽	  ἀκρατής,	  ἀλλ᾽	  ὁ	  δι᾽	  αἰσχράν.”	  NE	  1151b19-­‐24.	  37	  In	  Moss	  2009,	  fn	  29,	  Neoptolemus'	  case	  leads	  her	  to	  revise	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  intellect	  is	  always	  correct	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  intellect	  tends	  in	  most	  cases	  to	  be	  correct.	  But	  if	  the	  parallel	  with	  perceptual	  illusions	  is	  to	  be	  granted,	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  intellect	  is	  correct	  has	  to	  be	  at	  play.	  38	  Ibidem,	  p	  131	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Davidson’s	   and	   Austin’s	   investigations	   on	   akrasia,	   presented	   by	   the	   famous	   example	   of	   the	  bombe-­‐hogger:	  I	   am	   very	   partial	   to	   ice	   cream,	   and	   a	   bombe	   is	   served	   divided	   into	   segments	  corresponding	  one	  to	  one	  with	  persons	  at	  high	  table;	  I	  am	  tempted	  to	  help	  myself	  with	  two	   segments	   and	   do,	   thus	   succumbing	   to	   temptation	   and	   even	   conceivably	   going	   […]	  against	  my	  principles.	  But	  do	  I	  lose	  control	  of	  myself?[…]Not	  a	  bit	  of	  it.	  We	  often	  succumb	  to	  temptation	  with	  calm	  and	  even	  with	  finesse.39	  In	  “Akrasia	  and	  the	  Perceptual	  Illusion”,	  Moss	  writes	  that	  Aristotle’s	   akratic	   agent	   is	   closer	   to	   Socrates’	   than	  many	  have	   thought.	   She	   is	   far	   from	  ‘clear-­‐eyed’:	  her	  intellect,	  the	  eye	  of	  her	  soul,	  is	  not	  merely	  clouded	  but	  actually	  covered	  over.	   In	   the	   grips	   of	   the	  pathos	   	   she	   loses	   the	   ability	   to	   distinguish	   how	   things	   appear	  from	  how	  they	  are40.	  	  The	  exclusion	  of	  the	  clear-­‐eyed	  akratic	  is	  clearly	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  infallibility	  of	  the	  intellect,	  and	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  intellect	  are	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  to	   determine	   correct	   human	   action.	   If	   the	   intellect	   was	   always	   capable	   of	   contradicting	   and	  dominating	   the	   irrational	   desiderative	   motives,	   the	   victory	   of	   a	   non-­‐rational	   motive	   over	   a	  rational	  one	  could	  be	  made	  possible	  only	  by	  a	  cognitive	  failure	  of	  the	  intellect.	  This	  conclusion,	  however,	  is	  in	  great	  tension	  with	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  for	  he	  seems	  to	  admit	  the	  possibility	  of	  clear-­‐eyed	  akrasia.	  	  There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   passages	   in	   the	   Nicomachean	   Ethics	   where	   Aristotle	   allows	   for	   the	  possibility	   of	   clear-­‐eyed	   akrasia.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   of	   book	   VII	   in	   which	  Aristotle,	   following	   his	   usual	   method,	   defines	   the	   subject	   of	   enquiry	   (akrasia)	   and	   lists	   the	  opinions	  and	  the	  claims	  people	  make	  about	  it41.	  There,	  Aristotle	  notes	  that	  it	   is	  widely	  claimed	  that	  	   the	  akratic	  knows	  what	  he	  does	  is	  bad,	  but	  does	  it	  because	  of	  what	  affects	  him,	  while	  the	  self	   controlled	  person,	   knowing	   that	   his	   appetites	   are	  bad,	   because	  of	   reason	  does	  not	  follow	  them42.	  	  In	  order	  to	   judge	  whether	  Aristotle	  agrees	  with	  those	  who	  claim	  that	  the	  akratic	   is	  aware	  that	  her	  action	   is	  bad,	  or	   that	   the	  akratic	  acts	  knowingly	  against	  her	  own	  best	   judgement,	  we	  must	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Austin	  1961,	  p	  146	  	  40	  Moss	  2009,	  p	  153	  41	  "τὰ	  μὲν	  οὖν	  λεγόμενα	  ταῦτ’	  ἐστίν."	  NE	  1145b	  5	  42"καὶ	  ὁ	  μὲν	  ἀκρατὴς	  εἰδὼς	  ὅτι	  φαῦλα	  πράττει	  διὰπάθος,	  ὁ	  δ’	  ἐγκρατὴς	  εἰδὼς	  ὅτι	  φαῦλαι	  αἱ	  ἐπιθυμίαι	  οὐκ	  ἀκολουθεῖ	  διὰ	  τὸν	  λόγον."	  NE	  1145b	  11-­‐14	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therefore	   focus	   on	   the	   details	   of	   his	   own	   view,	   which	   is	   stated	   	   in	   the	   following	   chapters.	   In	  Chapter	   3,	   we	   find	   the	   first	   hint	   that	   Aristotle	   indeed	   agrees	   with	   the	   common	   assumption	  regarding	  the	  possibility	  of	  clear-­‐eyed	  akrasia.	  His	  aim	  in	  this	  section	  is	  to	  establish	  	  whether	  the	  akratic	   ‘acts	  with	   knowledge’43.	   Therefore,	   he	   compares	   her	  with	   the	   intemperate,	   and	  writes	  that	   the	   intemperate	   (ἀκόλαστος)	  believes	   that	   she	  should	  pursue	  pleasure	  and	  she	   therefore	  follows	   its	   dictates.	   It	   is	   the	   very	   belief	   concerning	   the	   opportunity	   of	   pursuing	   a	   certain	  pleasure,	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	  that	  differentiates	  the	  akratic	  and	  the	  intemperate.	  The	  akratic,	  indeed,	   thinks	   she	   shouldn’t	   pursue	   pleasure,	   but	   nevertheless	   follows	   it.44	   Furthermore,	  Aristotle	  seems	  to	  restate	  this	  assumption	  in	  NE	  1150	  b36-­‐37,	  where	  he	  writes	  that	  “an	  agent	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  his	  vice,	  whereas	  he	  is	  of	  his	  akrasia	  (ἀκρασία	  οὔ	  λανθάνει).	  But	  if	  Aristotle	  thinks	  that	   akrasia	   οὔ	   λανθάνει	   (literally	   that	   akrasia	   doesn’t	   hide,	   or	   doesn’t	   escape	   notice)	   the	  exclusion	   of	   the	   clear-­‐eyed	   akratic	   from	   Moss’s	   reconstruction	   of	   Aristotle’s	   view	   on	   akrasia	  seems	  very	  problematic.	  In	  this	  section,	   I	  argued	  that	  both	  the	  standard	  Socratic	   interpretation	  and	  Moss’	  sophisticated	  Socratic	   interpretation	   of	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   akrasia	   seem	   to	   be	   in	   tension	   with	   the	  
Nicomachean	   Ethics.	   What	   emerges	   from	   this	   discussion	   is	   that	   the	   Socratic	   accounts	  misrepresent	   akrasia	   because	   they	   give	   a	   questionable	   account	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   intellect	   in	  Aristotle’s	   conception	   of	   practical	   reasoning.	   Indeed,	   the	   standard	   Socratic	   view	   relies	   on	   a	  purely	  intellectualist	  account	  of	  desire	  formation,	  and	  therefore	  assumes	  that	  the	  akratic	  doesn’t	  act	  against	  her	  best	  judgement,	  but	  rather	  “changes	  her	  mind”	  and	  deliberates	  to	  do	  a	  wrong	  or	  blameworthy	   action.	   Moss’	   sophisticated	   view,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   doesn’t	   assume	   an	  intellectualist	  account	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  desires,	  but	  relies	  on	  the	  problematic	  assumption	  that	  the	  intellect	  is	  always	  correct,	  as	  well	  as	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  correct	  actions.	  In	  the	  next	  section	   I	   will	   consider	   the	   desire-­‐based	   account	   of	   Aristotle’s	   view	   on	   akrasia,	   trying	   to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  is	  as	  problematic	  as	  the	  Socratic	  one.	  	  	  1.3	  The	  desire-­‐based	  account.	  
In	  the	  introduction	  I	  noted	  that	  those	  who	  endorse	  the	  desire-­‐based	  	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  account	   of	   akrasia	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   motivational	   conflict	   account,	   whilst	  downplaying	   the	   role	  of	   the	   ignorance	  account.	   In	  parallel	  with	   the	  Socratic	  views,	   the	  desire-­‐based	   views	   usually	   pursue	   one	   of	   the	   two	   following	   strategies:	   either	   they	   consider	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  "οὖν	  σκεπτέον	  πότερον	  εἰδότες	  ἢ	  οὔ,	  καὶ	  πῶς	  εἰδότες."	  NE	  1146b	  9-­‐10	  44	  "ὃ	  μὲν	  (the	  intemperate)	  γὰρ	  ἄγεται	  προαιρούμενος,	  νομίζων	  ἀεὶδεῖν	  τὸ	  παρὸν	  ἡδὺ	  διώκειν·	  ὃ	  δ’	  οὐκ	  οἴεται	  μέν,	  διώκει	  δέ."	  NE	  1146b	  23-­‐26	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reference	   to	   ignorance	   in	   the	  Nicomachean	   Ethics	   	   as	   one	   of	   Aristotle’s	   mistakes,	   or	   they	   re-­‐interpret	   the	   ignorance	   account	   as	   a	  desiderative	   failure.	  What	   characterizes	   the	  desire-­‐based	  interpretations	  is	  that	  desires	  and	  motivational	  states	  are	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  order	  of	  explanation	  of	   akratic,	   continent	   (enkratic)	   and	   temperate	   action.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   interpreters	   who	  endorse	  this	  view	  rely	  on	  a	  desire-­‐based	  account	  of	  Aristotelian	  moral	  psychology,	  which	  leads	  them	  to	  provide	  a	  desire-­‐based	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  This	  approach	  is	  summarized	  very	  clearly	  by	  Charles,	  who	  defines	  the	  desire-­‐based	  account	  as	  one	  in	  which	  	  the	  “differences	  in	  motivational	  states	  (and	  not	  beliefs)	  explain	  differences	  in	  valuational	  thoughts,	   beliefs	   and	   intellectual	   perceptions	   and	   differences	   in	   action	   between	   the	  akratic,	  encrates	  and	  virtuous	  agent.”45	  	  In	   this	   section	   I	  will	   firstly	   question	  Wiggins'	   dismissal	   of	   the	   ignorance	   account	   of	  akrasia	   in	  ‘Weakness	  of	  the	  Will,	  Commensurability,	  and	  the	  Objects	  of	  Deliberation	  and	  Desire.’	  Although	  Wiggins	  doesn’t	  fully	  endorse	  the	  desire-­‐based	  account46,	  he	  argues	  that	  Aristotle	  was	  mistaken	  in	  introducing	  the	  ignorance	  account.	   If	  his	  argument	  is	  correct,	   therefore,	   it	  could	  provide	  the	  desire-­‐based	  views	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  disregard	  the	  ignorance	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  Secondly,	  I	  will	  turn	   to	   Charles’	   desire-­‐based	   interpretation	   in	   order	   emphasize	   the	   difficulties	   faced	   by	   his	  reduction	  of	  the	  akratic	  failure	  to	  a	  desiderative	  failure.	  If	  my	  remarks	  are	  correct,	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	   draw	   some	   conclusions	   from	   my	   discussion	   of	   the	   desire-­‐based	   and	   Socratic	   approach,	  making	  room	  for	  an	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  view	  on	  akrasia.	  	  In	  conclusion,	   therefore,	   I	  will	  note	  that	  Charles,	  after	  proposing	  a	  version	  of	   the	  desire-­‐based	  view,	   has	   acknowledged	   the	   need	   of	   a	   “third	  way”	   between	   the	   Socratic	   and	   the	   desire-­‐based	  account	  of	  akrasia.47	  Nonetheless,	  I	  will	  highlight	  that	  Charles'	  "third	  way"	  contradicts	  one	  of	  the	  assumptions	  Aristotle	  seems	  willing	  to	  preserve	  in	  his	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  Wiggins’s	   starting	   point	   in	   “Weakness	   of	   the	   Will	   Commensurability,	   and	   the	   Objects	   of	  Deliberation	   and	   Desire”	   is	   grounding	   what	   seems	   to	   be,	   at	   least	   prima	   facie,	   a	   correct	  description	  of	  akrasia.	  This	  description	  entails	  that	  	  when	  a	  person	  is	  weak-­‐willed,	  he	  intentionally	  chooses	  that	  which	  he	  knows	  or	  believes	  to	   be	   the	  worse	   course	   of	   action	  when	  he	   could	   choose	   the	  better	   course;	   and	   that,	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Charles	  1984,	  pp	  161-­‐162	  46	  Wiggins	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  “executive	  virtues”	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  difference	  in	  action	  between	  the	  akratic	  and	  the	  enkratic.	  See	  below.	  47	  Charles	  2009,	  	  2007	  and	  2011	  
	  	   	   17	  
acting	  this	  way,	  the	  weak-­‐willed	  man	  acts	  not	  for	  no	  reason	  at	  all-­‐	  that	  would	  be	  strange	  and	  atypical-­‐	  but	  irrationally48.	  	  Wiggins’s	   point,	   then,	   is	   that	   a	   correct	   account	   of	   akrasia	   shouldn’t	   revise	   this	   correct	  description,	  but	   recognize	   it	   and	  explain	   it.	  He	  believes,	   furthermore,	   that	  Aristotle	   came	  very	  near	  to	  giving	  the	  required	  correct	  account	  of	  akrasia	  when	  he	  noticed	  that	  it	  involves	  a	  conflict	  of	   desires.	   Indeed,	   in	  Wiggins’s	   view,	   Aristotle	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   a	   theory	   in	  which	   the	  struggle	  between	  rational	  and	  irrational	  desires	  involved	  neither	  a	  battle	  of	  “blind	  motives”,	  nor	  the	  assumption	  that	  rational	  desire	  always	  wins	  over	  irrational	  desire.	  Rather,	  he	  acknowledged	  that	   the	   akratic	   experiences	   a	   struggle	   of	  motives,	   and	   explained	   the	   victory	   of	   the	   irrational	  motive	  over	  the	  rational	  one	  referring	  to	  the	  akratic’s	  dispositions,	  or	  executive	  virtues.49	  Thus,	  Aristotle	   didn’t	   fall	   prey	   to	   the	   temptation	   of	   treating	  moral	   psychology	   as	   a	   discipline	  which	  predicts	  what	  different	  agents	  will	  do	  in	  different	  situations.	  Rather,	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  akratic	  experiences	  a	  struggle	  of	  motives,	  and	  explained	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  irrational	  motive	  over	  the	   rational	   one	   by	   referring	   to	   the	   akratic’s	   dispositions	   of	   character,	   or	   executive	   virtues.50	  Nevertheless,	  Wiggins	  maintains	  that	  Aristotle	  failed	  to	  complete	  his	  picture	  when	  he	  introduced	  the	   ignorance	   account	   in	   his	   explanation	   of	   akrasia.	   Indeed,	   he	   deems	   Aristotle’s	   ignorance	  account	  “inconsistent	  with	  common	  sense,	  and	  almost	  as	  inconsistent	  as	  Socrates’	  own	  account	  was	  with	  the	  account	  we	  should	  naturally	  give”51.	  	  Wiggins	  assigns	  to	  the	  akratic's	  dispositions	  of	  character,	  or	  executive	  virtues,	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  Aristotle's	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  What	  explains	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  blameworthy	  desire	  over	  the	  desire	  to	  avoid	  the	  akratic	  action	  is	  the	  akratic’s	  character,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  constituted	  by	  her	  upbringing,	  her	  habits	  and	  her	  natural	  dispositions.52	  Hence,	  Wiggins	  doesn't	  endorse	  a	  pure	  desire-­‐based	  interpretation:	  not	  only	  the	  akratic’s	  desires,	  but	  also	  her	  “executive	  virtues”	  explain	   her	   actions.	   Nonetheless,	   since	   he	   regards	   the	   ignorance	   account	   as	   one	   of	   Aristotle's	  mistakes,	  his	  view	  could	  offer	   to	   the	  desire-­‐based	   interpreter	  a	   reason	   to	  disregard	  Aristotle's	  claim	   that	   akratic	   agents	   are	   ignorant.	   Indeed,	  Wiggins	  maintains	   that	   although	   Aristotle	   had	  grasped	   the	   real	   nature	   of	   akrasia,	   he	   was	   prevented	   from	   explaining	   it	   correctly	   by	   his	  conception	   of	   happiness	   (eudaimonia).53	   Aristotle’s	   conception	   of	   eudaimonia,	   according	   to	  Wiggins,	   is	   a	   cluster	   of	   distinctive	   and	   compelling	   reasons	   for	   acting.	   Hence,	   once	   one	   has	  grasped	  the	  conception	  eudaimonia,	  she	  must	  understand	  its	  claims	  and	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  them.	   If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   however,	   akrasia	   is	   clearly	   in	   tension	   with	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Wiggins	  1980b,	  p	  251	  49	  Ibidem,	  §	  II	  50	  Ibidem,	  p	  258	  51	  Ibidem,	  p	  261	  52	  Ibidem,	  §	  II	  53	  Ibidem,	  p	  264	  ff	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eudaimonia.	  Indeed,	  the	  akratic	  understands	  “what	  is	  best”	  and	  she	  has	  the	  right	  understanding	  of	  “human	  excellence”.	  But	  if	  the	  akratic	  understands	  the	  compelling	  and	  distinctive	  reasons	  for	  acting	   that	   characterize	  eudaimonia,	   how	   can	   she	  possibly	   fail	   to	   do	  what	   is	   best?	   In	   order	   to	  resolve	  this	  puzzle,	  according	  to	  Wiggins,	  Aristotle	  had	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  akratic	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  ignorant,	  thus	  obscuring	  his	  initial	  insights	  concerning	  akratic	  behaviour.54	  Wiggins’s	  account	  of	  eudaimonia	  as	  a	  practical	  ideal	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  compelling	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle's	  moral	  philosophy.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  right	  in	  arguing	  that	  if	  an	  agent	  is	  
eudaimon,	   she	   cannot	   be	  akratic.	   Nevertheless,	   his	   suggestion	   that	   eudaimonia	   is	   a	   "cluster	   of	  reasons"	  we	  only	  need	  to	  intellectually	  grasp	  in	  order	  to	  become	  virtuous	  is	  questionable.	  At	  the	  beginning	   of	   the	  Nicomachean	   Ethics	   Aristotle	   describes	   eudaimonia	   as	   a	   state	   of	   the	   soul	   in	  accord	  with	   virtue55,	   a	   state	   in	  which	  we	  are	   good,	  know	  what	   is	   good	   and	  wish	   for	   the	   good.	  Then,	  he	  discusses	  how	  we	  can	  reach	  eudaimonia	  and	  virtue:	  “virtue,	  then,	  is	  of	  two	  sorts,	  virtue	  of	   thought	   and	   virtue	   of	   character.	   Virtue	   of	   thought	   arises	   and	   grows	  mostly	   from	   teaching.	  Virtue	  of	  character	  (ethos)	  results	  from	  habit	  (ethos);	  hence	  its	  name	  ethical,	  slightly	  varied	  from	  
ethos”56.	  Although	  Aristotle’s	  view	  on	  how	  we	  acquire	  virtue	  is	  the	  origin	  of	  many	  controversies	  and	  debates,	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  clear	  in	  these	  passages	  is	  that	  he	  doesn’t	  think	  that	  “grasping”	  or	  “learning”	  what	  is	  good	  is	  sufficient	  for	  becoming	  virtuous	  and	  happy	  (eudaimon).	  Indeed,	  virtue	  (and	   in	  particular	  ethical	  virtue)	   requires	  habituation	  as	  well	   as	  understanding57.	   If	   this	   is	   the	  case,	  however,	  Aristotle’s	  remarks	  on	  eudaimonia	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  justify	  his	  insistence	  on	  the	  ignorance	  of	   the	  akratic.	   Indeed,	   the	  akratic,	  who	  knows	  what	   is	  good	  but	  doesn’t	  attend	   to	   it,	  doesn’t	   necessarily	   constitute	   a	   problem	   for	   his	   picture	   of	   eudaimonia	   if	   the	   latter	   picture	  involves	  virtues	  of	  character	  as	  well	  as	  virtues	  of	  thought.	  It	  is	  perfectly	  possible	  for	  the	  akratic	  to	  grasp	  what	  is	  good	  and	  yet	  not	  be	  good	  or	  wish	  for	  the	  good.	  Hence,	  although	  Wiggins	  is	  right	  in	   emphasizing	   that	   taking	   into	   account	   Aristotle’s	   conception	   of	   euadaimonia	   can	   shed	   some	  light	  on	  his	  account	  of	  akrasia,	  his	  attempt	   to	  explain	  away	   the	   ignorance	  account	  referring	   to	  
eudaimonia	  seems	  to	  rely	  on	  an	  over-­‐intellectualist	  reading	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  In	  Aristotle’s	  Philosophy	  of	  Action,58Charles	   shares	  Wiggins’	   aim	   to	   explain	   away	   the	   ignorance	  account.	  Rather	  than	  considering	  it	  mistaken,	  however,	  Charles	  tries	  to	  interpret	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	   it	   compatible	   with	   his	   desire-­‐based	   interpretation	   of	   akrasia.	   	   He	   maintains	   that	  Aristotle’s	  explanation	  of	  akrasia	  is	  one	  in	  which	  differences	  in	  beliefs,	  valuational	  thoughts	  and	  intellectual	   perceptions	   between	   the	   akratic	   and	   the	   non-­‐akratic	   must	   be	   explained	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Ibidem.	  55	  NE	  1102a	  56	  NE	  1103a15-­‐20	  57	  NE	  1103a	  25-­‐26	  58	  Charles	  1984	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differences	  in	  their	  motivational	  states.59	  Thus,	  he	  reinterprets	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic,	  and	  in	  particular	   of	   the	   weak	   akratic,	   as	   a	   failure	   in	   desiring	   the	   conclusion	   of	   a	   correct	   practical	  syllogism.	  For	  example,	  the	  akratic,	  similarly	  to	  the	  virtuous,	  knows	  perfectly	  well	  that:	  1. She	  shouldn’t	  eat	  sweet	  things	  2. This	  piece	  of	  cake	  is	  sweet	  3. She	  shouldn’t	  eat	  this	  piece	  of	  cake	  Nevertheless,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  virtuous,	  she	  fails	  to	  desire	  to	  avoid	  the	  piece	  of	  cake.	  It	  is	  this	  very	   failure,	   then,	   that	   corresponds	   to	   the	   akratic’s	   ignorance.	   Hence,	   the	   akratic	   is	   perfectly	  aware	   that	   her	   action	   is	  wrong,	   but	   she	   fails	   to	   abide	   to	   her	   judgement	   because	   of	   her	   faulty	  motivational	  state.	  The	  assumption	   that	   the	   ignorance	  of	   the	  akratic	  consists	   in	  a	   failure	   in	  her	  desires	   is	   the	  key	  that	   allows	   Charles	   to	   resolve	   the	   inconsistency	   between	   the	   ignorance	   account	   and	   the	  motivational	  conflict	  account.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  solution	  can	  provoke	  an	  initial	  disappointment.	  Indeed,	   it	   seems	   unclear	   why	   Aristotle	   should	   have	   called	   “ignorance”	   what	   in	   fact	   was	   a	  desiderative	   failure.	   In	   order	   to	   solve	   this	   initial	   perplexity,	   therefore,	   Charles	   proposes	   a	  parallel	  between	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  knowledge,	  according	  to	  which	  affirmation	  and	  denial	  in	   theoretical	   reasoning	   are	   similar	   to	  pursuit	   and	   avoidance	   in	  practical	   reasoning.	   Thus,	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  akratic’	   ignorance	  is	  a	  failure	  in	  desiring	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  appropriately,	  which	  is	  parallel	  to	  the	  failure	  to	  affirm	  the	  conclusion	  of	  	  a	  theoretical	  syllogism.	  	  This	  analogy	  with	  theoretical	  reasoning,	  however,	   is	  not	  perfect,	   for	  the	  failure	  of	  desire	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  distinctive	   of	   desire	   and	   practical	   reasoning,	   which	   is	   separate	   from	   the	   irrationality	  	  (self-­‐deception,	   temporary	   blindness,	   gross	   intellectual	   failure)	   which	   affects	   beliefs	  within	  theoretical	  reasoning.60	  	  It	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  this	  imperfect	  analogy,	  according	  to	  Charles,	  that	  Aristotle	  calls	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  ignorance,	  and	  writes	  that	  the	  akratic	  lacks	  knowledge	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  drunk,	  the	  student	  and	  the	  actor	  lack	  it:	  For	   people	   affected	   in	   this	  way	   even	   recite	   demonstrations	   and	   verses	   of	   Empedocles,	  and	  those	  who	  have	  just	  begun	  to	  learn	  something	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  it,	  though	  they	  	  string	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Ibidem,	  p	  162	  60	  Ibidem,	  p	  191	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the	  words	   together;	   […]	  so	  we	  must	  suppose	   that	   those	  who	  are	  acting	  akratically	  also	  say	  the	  words	  in	  the	  way	  that	  actors	  do.61	  Charles'	  explanation	  is	  very	  insightful,	  but	  the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  it	  relies	  are	  controversial.	  The	   analogy	   between	   affirmation	   and	   pursuit	   and	   denial	   and	   avoidance	   he	   proposes	   is	   not	  immediately	  evident	  in	  the	  Aristotelian	  corpus.	  In	  De	  Anima,	  Aristotle	  does	  write	  that	  	  perception	   is	   like	  mere	  saying	  and	  thinking:	  when	  the	  object	   is	  pleasant	  or	  painful,	   the	  soul	  pursues	  or	  avoids	  it-­‐	  as	  it	  were	  asserting	  or	  denying62.	  To	  feel	  pleasure	  or	  pain	  is	  to	  adopt	  an	  attitude	  with	  the	  sensitive	  mean	  towards	  what	  is	  good	  or	  bad	  as	  such.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   Aristotle	   really	   grouped	   desires	   into	   the	   same	   category	   of	  assertions,	   considering	   them	  modes	   of	   acceptance	   of	   a	   proposition.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   is	   not	  immediately	   evident	   that	   the	   proposition	   "this	   is	   pleasant"	   can	   be	   either	   just	   “perceived”	   or	  “said”	  without	  committing	   to	   its	   truth,	  or	  really	  accepted	  because	   it	   is	  affirmed	  or	  because	  the	  object	   it	   qualifies	   as	   pleasant	   is	   desired.	   Indeed,	   the	   passage	   in	  De	   Anima	   doesn't	   necessarily	  suggest	  a	  parallel	  between	  merely	  saying	  and	  asserting	  a	  proposition,	  in	  the	  theoretical	  context,	  and	  	  merely	  perceiving	  and	  desiring	  an	  object	  in	  the	  practical	  one.	  Perceiving	  that	  something	  is	  pleasant	   may	   simply	   prompt	   the	   agent	   to	   pursue	   the	   pleasant	   thing,	   without	   requiring	   (or	  implying)	   her	   acceptance	   or	   committal	   to	   the	   truth	   of	   the	   proposition	   that	   “this	   is	   pleasant”.	  Thus,	  the	  analogy	  in	  DA	  431a	  8-­‐11	  might	  simply	  concern	  the	  attributes	  of	  pleasant	  and	  painful,	  conceived	  as	  the	  origin	  of	  (respectively)	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  desire.63	  Furthermore,	  in	  DA	  438a	  8-­‐11,	  Aristotle	  may	  not	  be	  emphasizing	  a	  difference	  between	  saying	  and	  asserting.	  The	  view	  that	  Aristotle	  is	  not	  stressing	  a	  technical	  difference	  between	  saying	  and	  asserting	  in	  this	  passage	  of	  
De	   Anima,	   indeed,	   is	   supported	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   few	   lines	   before	   he	   uses	   the	   two	   terms	   as	  synonyms:	   "saying,	   like	  affirming,	   states	   an	  attribute	  of	   a	   subject,	   and	   is	   always	  either	   true	  or	  false"64.	   If,	   in	   this	   passage,	   desire	   and	   assertion	   aren’t	   necessarily	   understood	   as	   modes	   of	  acceptance	  of	  a	  proposition,	   then	  Charles'	   imperfect	  analogy	  between	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  reasoning	  seems	  less	  plausible.	  	  Charles’	   attempt	   to	   attribute	   to	   Aristotle's	   conception	   of	   practical	   cognition	   two	   separate	  components	  (the	  thought	  component	  and	  the	  desire	  component),	  then,	  would	  solve	  the	  tension	  between	   the	  motivational	   conflict	   account	   and	   the	   ignorance	   account	   of	  akrasia:	   the	   akratic’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  NE	  1147a	  20-­‐25	  62	  "τὸ	  μὲν	  οὖν	  αἰσθάνεσθαι	  ὅμοιον	  τῷ	  φάναι	  μόνον	  καὶ	  νοεῖν·	  ὅταν	  δὲ	  ἡδὺ	  ἢ	  λυπηρόν,	  οἷον	  καταφᾶσα	  ἢ	  
ἀποφᾶσα	  διώκει	  ἢ	  φεύγει·	  καὶ	  ἔστι	  τὸ	  ἥδεσθαι	  καὶ	  λυπεῖσθαι	  τὸ	  ἐνεργεῖν	  τῇ	  αἰσθητικῇ	  μεσότητι	  πρὸς	  τὸ	  ἀγαθὸν	  ἢ	  κακόν,	  ᾗ	  τοιαῦτα."	  DA	  431a	  8-­‐11	  	  63	  Charles	  1984,	  p	  191	  and	  Kenny	  1979,	  p	  94	  have	  a	  similar	  view	  on	  this	  point.	  64	  "ἔστι	  δ’	  ἡ	  μὲν	  φάσις	  τι	  κατά	  τινος,	  ὥσπερ	  καὶ	  ἡ	  ἀπόφασις,	  καὶ	  ἀληθὴς	  ἢ	  ψευδὴς	  πᾶσα”	  DA	  430b	  26-­‐28	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ignorance	  would	  simply	  correspond	   to	  her	   failure	   to	  desire	  appropriately	   to	  perform	  the	  non-­‐akratic	  action.	  Hence,	  she	  would	  at	  the	  same	  time	  be	  ignorant	  and	  torn	  by	  a	  conflict	  of	  desires.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  thought	  component	  and	  the	  desire	  component	  seems	  to	   be	   based	   on	   an	   interpretation	   of	   the	   role	   desires	   play	   in	   practical	   cognition	   which	   is	   not	  compelling.	   This	   objection,	   combined	   with	   the	   initial	   suspicion	   that	   a	   desiderative	   failure	  couldn't	   really	   be	   considered	   a	   case	   of	   ignorance,	   gestures	   towards	   the	   need	   for	   a	   different	  interpretive	  strategy.	  	  	  1.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Conclusion	  If	   the	   analysis	  of	   the	  Socratic	   and	  desire-­‐based	   interpretations	  of	  Aristotle’s	   view	  on	  akrasia	   I	  proposed	   in	   the	   last	   two	   sections	   is	   correct,	   it	   emerges	   that	   both	   these	   views	   face	   strong	  objections.	   Neglecting	   the	   struggle	   account	   or	   treating	   the	   ignorance	   account	   as	   mistaken	  evidently	   contradict	   the	   Nicomachean	   Ethics	   in	   various	   different	   sections.	   Hence,	   we	   must	  presuppose	  that	  Aristotle	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  both	  accounts	  when	  writing	  his	  ethical	  works.	  Explaining	  away	   the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	  by	  claiming	   that	   it	  occurs	  before	   the	  akratic’s	   intellectual	   failure,	   in	   turn,	   renders	   clear-­‐eyed	   akrasia	   impossible,	   and	   praiseworthy	  
akrasia	   possible,	   thus	   drawing	   two	   consequences	   Aristotle	   wanted	   to	   avoid.	   Reducing	   the	  akratic’s	   failure	   to	   a	   desiderative	   failure,	   in	   conclusion,	   leaves	   unexplained	   the	   reason	   why	  Aristotle	  considered	  the	  akratic	  “ignorant”.	  In	   a	   series	   of	   articles65	   published	   after	  Aristotle’s	   Philosophy	   of	   Action,	   Charles	   recognizes	   the	  faults	   of	   both	   the	   Socratic	   and	   desire-­‐based	   interpretation.	   Thus,	   he	   proposes	   a	   “third-­‐way”	  between	   these	   two	   approaches,	   according	   to	   which	   the	   knowledge	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   is	   a	  "distinctive	  type	  of	  state"66.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  weak	  akratic,	  he	  writes	  that	  her	  	  failure	   in	  practical	  knowledge	   is	  not	  simply	  a	   failure	   in	   intellectual	  confidence,	  nor	  yet	  simply	  a	  failure	  in	  desire.	  […]	  Rather,	  it	  is	  best	  seen	  as	  a	  sui	  generis	  state	  which,	  although	  describable	  (roughly)	  either	  as	  a	  form	  of	  desire	  or	  as	  a	  form	  of	  intellect	  (or	  opinion),	   is	  properly	  speaking	  neither	  (nor	  yet	  a	  complex	  of	  the	  two).67	  	  In	  the	  second	  chapter	  of	  this	  work,	  I	  will	  pursue	  a	  similar	  strategy,	  trying	  to	  look	  for	  a	  third	  way	  between	   the	   Socratic	   interpretation	   and	   the	   desire-­‐based	   interpretation.	   Although	   I	   maintain	  that	  Charles	  is	  right	  in	  individuating	  the	  need	  for	  a	  third	  way,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  propose	  an	  alternative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Charles	  2007,	  2009,	  2011	  66	  Charles	  2009,	  p	  65	  67	  Ibidem	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to	  his	  account.	  This	  departure	   from	  his	   interpretation	   is	  motivated	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   it	  seems	  to	  contradict	  Aristotle's	  suggestion	  that	  ignorance	  is	  not	  only	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  akratic's	  action,	  but	  also	   of	   her	   blameworthy	   affection	   (pathos)	   or	   desire.	   Indeed,	   Charles	   sees	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  akratic	  as	  being	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  victory	  of	  her	  "sensual	  desire":	  	  there	   is	   a	   conflict	   between	   sensual	   desire	   and	   a	   distinctive	   state	   of	   practical	   opinion.	  Sensual	   desire	   is	   victorious	   because	   the	   agent	   lacks	   proper	   practical	   confidence	   in	   his	  conclusion	  (understood	  as	  a	  distinctive	  type	  of	  failure	  in	  practical	  understanding)68.	  	  Among	   the	   phainomena	   that	   Aristotle	   seems	   to	   be	   willing	   to	   preserve	   in	   the	   VII	   book	   of	   the	  
Nicomachean	   Ethics,	   however,	   we	   find	   the	   assumption	   that	   ignorance	   is	   “the	   cause	   of	   the	  akratic’s	  affection	  (pathos	  )”,	  and	  thereby	  not	  only	  of	  her	  action:	  	  if	  ignorance	  causes	  the	  affection	  [of	  the	  akratic],	  we	  must	  look	  for	  the	  type	  of	  ignorance	  it	  turns	  out	  to	  be;	  for	  it	  is	  evident,	  at	  any	  rate,	  that	  before	  he	  is	  affected	  the	  person	  who	  acts	  incontinently	  does	  not	  think	  [he	  should	  do	  the	  action	  he	  eventually	  does]	  69	  	  What	  I	  will	  suggest,	  therefore,	  is	  that	  the	  ignorance	  account	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  akratic's	  conflict	  of	  desires,	  and	  not	  only	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  victory	  of	  her	  sensual	  desire.	  In	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	  is	  a	  description	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  state,	  while	  the	  ignorance	  account	  is	  Aristotle’s	  explanation	  of	  how	  the	  akratic	  gets	  to	  that	  very	  state.	  Hence	  they	  continue	  to	  play	  two	  distinct	  (or	  at	  least	  distinguishable)	  roles	  in	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  However,	  rather	  than	  being	  in	  tension	  with	  one	  another,	  they	  are	  intimately	  linked.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Ibidem	  69	  "δέον	  ζητεῖν	  περὶ	  τὸ	  πάθος,	  εἰ	  δι᾽	  ἄγνοιαν,	  τίς	  ὁ	  τρόπος	  γίνεται	  τῆς	  ἀγνοίας.	  ὅτι	  γὰρ	  οὐκ	  οἴεταί	  γε	  ὁ	  
ἀκρατευόμενος	  πρὶν	  ἐν	  τῷ	  πάθει	  γενέσθαι,	  φανερόν."	  NE	  1145	  b26-­‐32	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Chapter	  2:	  Reconciling	  the	  Ignorance	  Account	  and	  the	  Motivational	  conflict	  Account	  of	  Akrasia:	  Is	  the	  Akratic’s	  Failure	  a	  Failure	  of	  Phantasia?	  	  2.1	  Introduction	  In	   the	   first	   chapter	   of	   this	   thesis,	   I	   argued	   that	   both	   the	   Socratic	   interpreters	   and	   the	   desire-­‐based	   interpreters	   fail	   to	   give	   a	   convincing	   reconciliation	   of	   the	  motivational	   conflict	   account	  and	   the	   ignorance	   account.	   If	   my	   critiques	   are	   right,	   then	   they	   indicate	   that	   a	   “third	   way”	  between	   the	   Socratic	   Solution	   and	   the	   desire-­‐based	   solution	   is	   needed.	   I	   concluded	   the	   first	  chapter	   by	   noting	   that	   the	   need	   for	   a	   third	   way	   between	   the	   desire-­‐based	   and	   Socratic	  interpretation	  has	  been	  individuated	  by	  David	  Charles70	  in	  a	  series	  of	  recent	  articles.	  However,	  I	  emphasized	  how	  Charles'	  third	  way	  doesn't	  take	  into	  account	  that	  ignorance	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  akratic's	  affections,	  and	  not	  directly	  of	  her	  action.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  suggest	  a	  different	  solution	  to	  the	  alleged	  incoherence	  of	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  I	  will	  try	  to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  reconcile	  the	  ignorance	  account	  with	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	   if	  we	   interpret	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  akratic	  as	  a	   failure	  of	  phantasia,	   and	  not	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  intellect.	  This	  solution,	  which	  derives	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  
De	   Anima	   and	  De	  Motu	   Animalium,	   is	   meant	   to	   occupy	   a	  middle	   ground	   between	   the	   desire-­‐based	  account	  and	  the	  	  Socratic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  	  In	   order	   to	   present	   my	   interpretation,	   I	   will	   firstly	   list	   a	   set	   of	   requirements	   a	   convincing	  explanation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  akrasia	  should	  meet.	  These	  requirements	  are	  extrapolated	  from	   the	   critique	   of	   the	   Socratic	   interpretation	   and	   of	   the	   desire-­‐based	   interpretation	   I	  presented	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  and	  will	  constitute	  both	  the	  guide	  and	  a	  preliminary	  test	   for	  my	  explanation.	  Secondly,	  I	  will	  concentrate	  on	  book	  VII	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  where	  Aristotle	  presents	   the	   ignorance	   account	   of	   akrasia.	   I	   will	   suggest	   that	   the	   ignorance	   account	   doesn’t	  necessarily	  involve	  an	  intellectual	  failure	  on	  the	  akratic’s	  behalf,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  mistaken	  assumption	  that	  some	  interpreters	  proposed	  the	  Socratic	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  Then	  I	  will	  present	  a	  more	  detailed	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ignorance	  account	  according	   to	  which	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia.	   My	   interpretation	   is	   to	  some	   extent	   speculative,	   for	  Aristotle	   doesn’t	   characterize	   in	   detail	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   akratic’s	  ignorance	   in	   the	   Nicomachean	   	   Ethics.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   view	   is	   at	   least	   suggested	   by	   some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Charles	  2007,	  2009	  and	  2011.	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important	   remarks	   in	   the	   Nicomachean	   Ethics,	   and	   it	   is	   supported	   by	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	  
phantasia	  in	  De	  Anima.	  Once	  I	  have	  presented	  the	  textual	  evidence	  that	  supports	  my	  view,	  I	  will	  strengthen	   my	   interpretation	   by	   showing	   that	   it	   resolves	   the	   incoherence	   between	   the	  motivational	   conflict	   account	   and	   the	   ignorance	   account	   and	   that	   it	  meets	   the	   requirements	   I	  listed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  In	  conclusion	  I	  will	  present	  and	  indicate	  the	  response	  to	  what	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  most	  powerful	  objection	  that	  can	  be	  raised	  against	  my	  view.	  	  	  	  2.2	  Requirements	  for	  a	  Plausible	  Reconciliation	  between	  the	  Ignorance	  Account	  and	  the	  Desire	  Based	  Account	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  introduce	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	  and	  the	   ignorance	  account	  of	  akrasia	  which	  escapes	   the	  criticisms	   that	  can	  be	  directed	  against	   the	  Socratic	   view	   and	   the	   desire-­‐based	   view.	   	   Before	   presenting	   this	   reconciliation	   I	   will	   list	   and	  explain	   a	   set	   of	   requirements	   that	   the	   proposed	   account	   will	   have	   to	   meet	   in	   order	   to	   be	   a	  plausible	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  text.	  Most	  of	  these	  requirements	  are	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  critiques	  of	  the	  Socratic	  and	  desire-­‐based	  view,	  with	  some	  additional	  points	  derived	  from	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  	  The	  first	  requirement	  of	  a	  satisfactory	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	  and	  the	  ignorance	  account	  arises	  immediately	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Socratic	  and	  desire-­‐based	  interpretations.	  The	  most	  evident	  problem	  of	  both	  the	  desire-­‐based	  view	  and	  the	  Socratic	  view	  is	   that	   an	   explanation	   of	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	  akrasia	   should	   not	   "downplay"	   the	   role	   of	   the	  akratic’s	  motivational	  conflict	  and	  cognitive	  failure.	  It	  seems	  evident	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  ‘explain	  away’	  either	   the	   ignorance	  account	  or	   the	  motivational	  conflict	  account	  contradicts	   the	  textual	  evidence	  in	  both	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  and	  De	  Anima.71	  Hence,	  if	  the	  alleged	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  accounts	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  without	  subverting	  what	  Aristotle	  says	  about	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance	  and	  motivational	  conflict,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  better	  to	  admit	  the	  substantial	  incoherence	  of	  his	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  Second,	   the	   reconciliation	   should	   not	   fall	   prey	   to	   the	   temptation	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   questionable	  conception	   of	   Aristotelian	   practical	   reason	   (phronesis)	   and	   intellect	   (nous).	   When	   analyzing	  Aristotle’s	  conception	  of	  the	  intellect	  or	  his	  definition	  of	  practical	  reason,	  many	  interpreters	  are	  inclined	  to	  attribute	  to	  him	  a	  form	  of	  intellectualism	  which	  seems	  to	  distort	  his	  ethical	  theory	  in	  general,	  and	  his	  account	  of	  akrasia	  in	  particular.	  As	  I	  noted	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  this	  charge	  seems	  to	  threaten	  Wiggins’	  and	  Moss’	  views	  respectively:	  while	  the	  former	  assumes	  that	  grasping	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Cf.	  NE1102b20,	  NE	  VII3,	  DA	  433b	  5-­‐7.	  
	  	   	   25	  
correct	   conception	   of	   the	   good	   is	   sufficient	   to	   reach	   eudaimonia,	   the	   latter	   suggests	   that	  Aristotle,	  when	  discussing	  akrasia,	   treats	  (practical)	   ’intellect’	  as	  a	  faculty	  which	  is	   in	  principle	  infallible	  and	  a	  faculty	  whose	  workings	  are	  always	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  to	  determine	  correct	  human	  action.72	  Third,	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  Aristotle’s	  understanding	  of	  akrasia	  should	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  number	  of	  claims	  Aristotle	  intends	  to	  make	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  different	  possible	  instantiations.	  Aristotle	  distinguishes	  between	  weak	  akratics,	  impetuous	  akratics,	  akratics	  with	  respect	  to	  pleasure	  and	  akratics	  with	  respect	  to	  spirit	  (thumos).	  Weak	  akratics,	  for	  example,	  include	  smokers	  or	  gluttons	  who	   decide	   to	   quit	   but	   cannot	   rid	   themselves	   of	   their	   bad	   habits:	   they	   ‘deliberate,	   but	   fail	   to	  stand	  by	   their	  choice.’73	   Impetuous	  akratics,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  are	  extremely	  susceptible,	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  deliberate	  when	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  pathos	  .74	  They	  are	  similar	  to	  Paolo	  and	  Francesca	  in	  Dante’s	  Divine	   Comedy,	  who	   are	   abruptly	   seized	   by	   an	   illegitimate	   passion	   for	   one	   another	  (Paolo	   is	   the	   brother	   of	   Gianciotto,	   Francesca’s	   husband)	  while	   reading	   together	   the	   story	   of	  Lancelot	  and	  Guinevere.75	  A	  convincing	  explanation	  of	  Aristotle's	  account	  of	  akrasia,	   therefore,	  should	  make	  sense	  of	   the	  distinction	   between	   impetuous	   and	   weak	   akratics,	   as	   well	   as	   accounting	   for	   the	   difference	  between	   akratics	   simpliciter	   and	   akratics	   with	   respect	   to	   spirit.	   The	   former	   are	   those	   who	  succumb	  to	  pleasure,	  or	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  desiderative	  part	  of	  the	  soul.	  The	  latter	  are	  those	  who	  succumb	  to	  spirit	  (thumos),	  and	  are	  therefore	  called	  akratics	  only	  metaphorically.	  Indeed,	  in	  Aristotle’s	   view	   spirit	   as	   opposed	   to	   appetites	   ‘listens	   to	   reason’,	   but,	   being	  naturally	   hasty,	   it	  rushes	  off	  without	  paying	  the	  due	  attention	  to	  its	  instructions.76	  	  In	  conclusion,	  a	  satisfactory	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  ignorance	  account	  and	  the	  desire-­‐based	  account	  should	  not	  be	   in	   tension	  with	  Aristotle’s	  view	  on	  which	  actions	  count	  as	  “akratic”	  and	  which	  actions	  do	  not.	  In	  particular,	  it	  shouldn’t	  contradict	  Aristotle’s	  remarks	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  clear-­‐eyed	  akrasia,	  which	  suggest	  that	  some	  akratics	  are	  aware	  that	  their	  actions	  are	  wrong	  or	  bad	  while	  they	  are	  doing	  them.77	  Moreover,	  it	  should	  explain	  why	  Aristotle	  rejects	  the	  sophistic	  challenge	   which	   contends	   that	   ‘foolishness	   combined	   with	   akrasia	   is	   not	   virtue.’78	   Indeed,	  Aristotle	  denies	  that	  Neoptolemus,	  who	  has	  been	  persuaded	  by	  Odysseus	  to	  tell	  a	  lie	  but	  refrains	  from	  doing	  so	  because	  he	  feels	  pain	  or	  shame,	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  akratic.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Moss	  2009	  and	  Wiggins	  1980b	  73	  NE	  1150b.	  74	  NE	  1149a25–35.	  75	  Dante	  Alighieri,	  Divina	  Commedia,	  Inferno	  Canto	  V,	  vv	  127–138.	  	  76	  NE	  1150a	  25–30.	  77‘An	  agent	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  his	  vice,	  whereas	  he	  is	  of	  his	  akrasia	  (ἀκρασία	  οὐ	  λανθάνει)’	  (NE	  1151a).	  78	  NE	  1146a	  27–28.	  
	  	   	   26	  
The	  requirements	   listed	  above	  suggest	   that	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  Aristotle	  means	  by	  akrasia	  and	  how	  he	  intends	  to	  explain	  it	  does	  not	  depend	  solely	  on	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  motivational	  conflict	   account	   and	   the	   ignorance	   account.	   Rather,	   such	   an	   explanation	   should	   account	   for	   a	  number	  of	  related	  remarks	  Aristotle	  makes	  with	  respect	  to	  akratic	  actions.	  Understanding	  these	  remarks	   as	   a	   set	   of	   requirements	   for	   a	   plausible	   explanation	   of	   akrasia	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	  providing	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  from	  which	  this	  explanation	  can	  be	  deduced.	  The	  requirements	  do	  not	  cohere	  in	  a	  fully	  fledged	  account	  of	  akrasia,	  and	  some	  speculative	  work	  is	  needed	  to	  combine	  them	   into	  a	   richer	  and	  more	  satisfactory	  picture.	   In	   the	  next	   section	   I	  will	   therefore	  construct	  such	  a	  picture	  of	  akrasia,	  relying	  on	  several	  texts	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  corpus.	  The	  requirements	  I	  have	  spelled	  out	  above	  will	  both	  guide	  the	  reconstruction	  and	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  test	  for	  its	  plausibility.	  	  2.3	  Could	  the	  Akratic’s	  Ignorance	  Be	  a	  Failure	  of	  Phantasia?	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	  will	   suggest	   that	   the	  motivational	   conflict	   account	  and	   the	   ignorance	  account	  can	  be	  reconciled	  by	  interpreting	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  phantasia,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	   failure	   of	   the	   intellect	   (nous).	   This	   suggestion	   is	   to	   some	   extent	   speculative.	  When	  Aristotle	  presents	  the	  ignorance	  account	  in	  the	  seventh	  book	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  he	  mentions	  the	  faculty	   of	   phantasia	   only	   once79.	   The	   discussion	   of	   the	   role	   played	   by	   phantasia	   in	   practical	  thought	   is	   carried	   forward	  mostly	   in	   the	   third	  book	  of	  De	  Anima,	   and	  more	  briefly	   in	  De	  Motu	  
Animalium.80	   In	   order	   to	   pave	   the	   way	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   phantasia	   into	   the	   ignorance	  account,	   therefore,	   I	  will	   first	  propose	  an	  analysis	  of	  NE	  VII.	   III	   that	  clarifies	  why	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  not	  necessarily	  intellectual.	  Then	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  account	  of	  phantasia	  in	  DA	  III.	  X	  to	  explain	  why	  an	  impairment	  of	  the	  latter	  faculty	  provides	  a	  suitable	  explanation	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance.	  In	  conclusion,	  I	  will	  strengthen	  my	  thesis	  by	  underlining	  how	  this	  explanation	  of	  the	  ignorance	  account	  not	  only	  renders	  it	  compatible	  with	  the	  motivational	  conflict	  account,	  but	  also	  meets	  the	  requirements	  I	  set	  out	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Aristotle	  introduces	  the	  ignorance	  account	  among	  a	  series	  of	  puzzles	  that	  concern	  akrasia.	  The	  origin	   of	   the	   ‘ignorance	   puzzle’,	   as	   he	   notes,	   is	   certainly	   found	   in	   the	   doctrine	   attributed	   to	  Socrates,	   according	   to	  which	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   act	   against	   one’s	   own	   best	   judgement.	   Hence	  when	  we	  act	  akratically	  our	  action	  conflicts	  with	  what	   is	  best	  only	  because	  we	  are	   ignorant	  of	  the	   conflict.81	   The	   Socratic	   conclusion,	   however,	   is	   obviously	   problematic,	   for	   it	   seems	   to	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patently	   contradict	   our	   everyday	   experience.	  After	   all,	   akratic	   action	   seems	   to	   be	   so	   precisely	  because	  the	  agent	  knows	  that	  what	  she	  is	  doing	  is	  wrong!82	  However,	  Aristotle	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  abandon	   the	   Socratic	   account	   completely.	   Rather,	   he	   intends	   to	   solve	   Socrates'	   problem	   by	  enquiring	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ignorance	  that	  causes	  the	  akratic's	  pathos.	  83	  Aristotle	   begins	   analysing	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   ignorance	   that	   causes	   the	   akratic's	   pathos	   in	   an	  indirect	   way.	   Instead	   of	   discussing	   immediately	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   akratic	   is	   ignorant,	   he	  analyses	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  ‘has	  knowledge’,84	  and	  notes	  that	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  people	  who	  ‘know’85	  we	  do	  so	  in	  a	  twofold	  sense.	  We	  may	  refer	  to	  those	  who	  ‘have	  knowledge	  and	  use	  their	  knowledge,	  or	  to	  those	  who	  have	  knowledge	  but	  do	  not	  use	  their	  knowledge’.86	  Clearly,	  then,	  the	  akratic	   is	   someone	  who	  has	  knowledge	  but	  does	  not	  use	   it,	   for	   if	   she	  used	  her	  knowledge	  she	  would	  not	  act	  against	   it.	   In	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  state	  of	  someone	  who	  knows	  but	  does	  not	  use	  her	   knowledge,	   Aristotle	   refers	   to	   his	   theory	   of	   the	   practical	   syllogism,	   and	   proposes	   the	  following	  (quite	  peculiar)	  example:	  Since	   there	   are	   two	   types	   of	   premises,	   someone’s	   action	   may	   well	   conflict	   with	   his	  knowledge	   if	   he	   has	   both	   types	   of	   premises,	   but	   uses	   only	   the	   universal	   and	   not	   the	  particular	  premise.[…]For	  instance,	  someone	  knows	  that	  dry	  things	  benefit	  every	  human	  being,	  and	  that	  he	  himself	  is	  a	  human	  being,	  or	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  thing	  is	  dry;	  but	  he	  either	  does	  not	  have	  or	  doesn’t	  activate	  the	  knowledge	  that	  this	  particular	  thing	  is	  of	  this	  sort.87	  The	  state	  of	  having	  but	  not	  using	  knowledge,	  however,	  seems	  to	  be	  only	  the	  genus	  to	  which	  the	  specific	  knowledge	  (or	  ignorance)	  of	  the	  akratic	  belongs.	  Aristotle	  continues	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  phrase	  "having	  knowledge	  without	  using	  it"	  by	  explaining	  that	  it	  "can	  include	  different	  types	  of	  having".	  Among	  these	  "different	  types	  of	  having"	  there	  is	  a	  distinctive	  type	  which	  characterizes	  the	  drunk,	  the	  mad	  and	  the	  sleeping,	  i.e.	  a	  type	  of	  having	  which	  involves	  "both	  having	  knowledge	  in	   a	   way	   and	   not	   having	   it".88	   The	   subsequent	   discussion	   clarifies	   that	   the	   akratic,	   too,	   has	  knowledge	   and	   does	   not	   have	   it,	   in	   a	   similar	   way	   to	   the	   sleeping,	   the	   mad	   and	   the	   drunk.	  Aristotle	   notes,	  moreover,	   that	   sometimes	   akratic	   agents	   talk	  as	   if	   they	   possessed	   knowledge.	  For	  example,	  gluttons	  or	  smokers	  are	  perfectly	  able	  to	  enumerate	  the	  reasons	  why	  eating	  sweets	  or	  smoking	  is	  bad	  for	  them.	  Nevertheless,	  comparing	  akratics	  to	  students,	  drunkards,	  actors,	  the	  sleeping	   and	   the	   mad	   Aristotle	   emphasizes	   that	   this	   ability	   shouldn’t	   be	   mistaken	   for	   actual	  possession	  of	  knowledge:	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[the	  fact	  that	  the	  akratic]	  says	  the	  words	  that	  come	  from	  knowledge	  is	  no	  sign	  [of	   fully	  having	  it].	  For	  people	  who	  are	  in	  those	  states	  (the	  mad	  the	  sleeping	  and	  the	  drunk)	  even	  recite	   demonstrations	   and	   the	   verses	   of	   Empedocles.	   And	   those	   who	   have	   learned	  something	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  it,	   though	  they	  string	   the	  words	   together;	   for	   it	  must	  grow	  into	   them,	   and	   this	   takes	   time.	   And	   so	   we	   must	   suppose	   that	   those	   who	   are	   acting	  akratically	  also	  say	  the	  words	  in	  the	  way	  actors	  do.89	  Thus	  the	  akratic	  has	  knowledge	  and	  does	  not	  have	  it	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  drunk,	  the	  mad	  and	  the	  sleeping.	  Moreover,	  she	  speaks	  the	  words	  of	  knowledge	  without	  fully	  having	  it,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  actors	  and	  students	  do.	   	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  akratic	  is	  in	  the	  same	  state	  of	  ignorance	  as	  the	  drunk,	  the	  mad,	  the	  sleeping,	  the	  student	  and	  the	  actor.	  But	  what	  precisely	  does	  this	  state	  of	  ignorance	  consist	  in?	  Many	  commentators	  have	  supposed	  that	  the	  phrase	  ‘both	  having	  and	  not	  having	   knowledge’	   corresponds	   to	   the	   phrase	   ‘having	   knowledge	   but	   not	   using	   it’.	   This	  assumption,	   in	   turn,	   supports	   some	   versions	   of	   the	   desire-­‐based	   interpretation,	   according	   to	  which	  the	  akratic’s	  failure	  concerns	  not	  the	  status	  of	  her	  knowledge,	  but	  the	  use	  she	  makes	  of	  it,	  or	   the	   way	   in	   which	   her	   desires	   arise	   in	   accordance	   with	   what	   she	   knows	   or	   thinks.	   Other	  commentators	   note	   that	   the	   state	   of	   having	   and	   not	   having	   knowledge,	   in	   Aristotle’s	   text,	   is	  distinguished	  from	  the	  state	  of	  having	  and	  not	  using	  knowledge.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  interpret	  that	  state	  of	  knowing	  and	  not	  knowing	  as	  providing	  a	  justification	  for,	  or	  an	  explanation	  of,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  akratic	  does	  not	  use	  her	  knowledge.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  too	  hasty	  in	  interpreting	  the	  parallel	  with	  the	  drunk,	  the	  mad	  and	  the	  sleeping	  as	  implying	  that	   the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  akratic	   ‘does	  not	  have	  knowledge’	  corresponds	  to	  an	   impairment	  or	  temporary	  dysfunction	  of	  her	  intellectual	  faculties.90	  Rejecting	  the	  desire-­‐based	  account,	  we	  deny	  that	  having	  and	  not	  having	  knowledge	  is	  equivalent	  to	  having	  knowledge	  only	  potentially.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  rejecting	  the	  Socratic	  account,	  we	  deny	  that	   having	   and	   not	   having	   knowledge	   means	   knowing	   that	   something	   is	   the	   case,	   and	  subsequently	  forgetting	  it	  when	  akrasia	  occurs.	  Hence,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  for	  another	  way	  in	  which	  it	   is	   possible	   for	   the	   akratic	   to	   have	   and	   not	   have	   knowledge	   (ἔχειν	   πως	   καὶ	   μὴ	   ἔχειν	  τὴν	  
ἐπιστήμην).	  An	   interesting	  starting	  point	   for	   this	  enquiry	  can	  be	   found,	  as	  Anthony	  Kenny	  has	  noted91,	   in	   the	  Topics	  148a8.	  There,	   	  Aristotle	   characterizes	   ignorance	  as	  a	   state	   that	   involves	  more	   than	   having	   forgotten	   that	   something	  was	   the	   case	   or	   having	   only	   potential	   knowledge.	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  Kenny	  1966,	  P	  165	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Ignorance	   involves	   being	  wrong	   about	   some	   state	   of	   affairs,	   or	   having	   a	   “positively	  mistaken	  belief”92:	  For	  what	  is	  generally	  thought	  to	  be	  ignorant	  (ἀγνοεῖν)	  is	  not	  that	  which	  lacks	  knowledge,	  (μὴ	  ἔχον	  ἐπιστήμην),	  but	   rather	   that	  which	  has	  been	  deceived	   (τὸ	   διηπατημένον),	   and	  for	   this	   reason	   we	   do	   not	   talk	   of	   inanimate	   things	   or	   of	   children	   as	   ‘being	   ignorant’.	  ‘Ignorance’,	  then,	  is	  not	  used	  to	  denote	  a	  mere	  privation	  of	  knowledge.93	  In	   order	   to	   clarify	   the	   state	   of	   ignorance	   of	   the	   akratic,	   then,	   we	   can	   refer	   to	   Aristotle’s	  clarification	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  ignorant	  and	  to	  lack	  knowledge.	  We	  know	  the	  akratic	  is	  not	  fully	  ignorant,	  for	  she	  has	  not	  been	  deceived,	  and	  she	  doesn’t	  believe	  that	  it	  right	  to	  perform	  the	  akratic	   action.	  We	   also	   know	   that	   she	  doesn’t	   lack	   knowledge	   entirely.	  Rather	   she	   “has	   it	   and	  doesn’t	  have	  it”.	  Could	  her	  partial	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  and	  her	  partial	  ignorance,	  then,	  correspond	  to	   a	   mistaken	   representation,	   which	   doesn’t	   have	   the	   status	   of	   a	   belief?	   This	   interpretation,	  indeed,	  would	  be	  coherent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  akratic	  has	  knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  cluster	  of	  correct	  beliefs	  about	  the	  situation	  she	  finds	  herself	  in,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  she	  in	  a	  way	  lacks	  knowledge	  and	  is	  ignorant.	  	  In	   order	   to	   test	   this	   suggestion,	   it	   may	   be	   helpful	   to	   consider	   whether	   it	   is	   consistent	   with	  Aristotle’s	  most	  debated	  example	  of	  akrasia:	  the	  glutton’s	  syllogism.	  	  Suppose	  then,	   that	  someone	  has	   the	  universal	  belief	  hindering	   from	  tasting;	  he	  has	   the	  second	  belief,	   that	  everything	  is	  pleasant	  and	  this	   is	  sweet,	  and	  this	  belief	   is	  active;	  but	  turns	  out	  that	  appetite	  is	  present	  in	  him.	  The	  belief,	  then,	  […]	  tells	  him	  to	  avoid	  this,	  but	  appetite	  leads	  him	  on,	  for	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  moving	  each	  of	  the	  bodily	  parts.	  The	  result	  then	  is	  that	  in	  a	  way	  reason	  and	  belief	  make	  him	  act	  akratically.	  The	  second	  belief	  is	  contrary	  to	  correct	  reason,	  but	  only	  coincidentally,	  not	  in	  its	  own	  right.94	  For	  the	  appetite,	  not	  the	  belief,	  is	  contrary	  to	  correct	  reason.95	  In	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  of	  this	  work	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia	  more	  closely.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  analysis	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance,	  however,	  it	  suffices	  to	  note	  that	  this	  passage	  can	  provide	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  be	  ignorant	  in	  virtue	  of	  a	  positively	  mistaken	   representation,	  which	  doesn’t	  have	   the	   status	  of	   a	  belief.	  Aristotle	   clarifies	  here	   that	  the	  akratic	  does	  not	  have	  a	  mistaken	  belief.	  The	  “second	  belief”,	  indeed,	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  correct	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Ibidem.	  	  93	  “τὸ	  γὰρ	  μὴ	  ἔχον	  ἐπιστήμην	  οὐ	  δοκεῖ	  ἀγνοεῖν,	  ἀλλὰ	  μᾶλλον	  τὸ	  διηπατημένον·	  διὸ	  οὔτε	  τὰ	  ἄψυχα	  οὔτε	  τὰ	  παιδία	  φαμὲν	  ἀγνοεῖν.	  ὥστ’	  οὐ	  κατὰ	  στέρησιν	  ἐπιστήμης	  ἡ	  ἄγνοια	  λέγεται.	  "Topics	  148a	  8-­‐10	  (trans	  Tredennick	  1960)	  94οὐκ	  ἐναντίας	  δὲ	  καθ᾽αὑτήν,	  ἀλλὰ	  κατὰ	  συμβεβηκός.	  95ἡ	  γὰρ	  ἐπιθυμία	  ἐναντία,	  ἀλλ᾽	  οὐχ	  ἡ	  δόξα.	  NE1147b33–35.	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reason	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  but	  only	  coincidentally.	  What	  is	  contrary	  to	  correct	  reason,	  then,	   is	  the	  desire.	  The	  desire	  however,	  shouldn’t	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  blind	  urge	  which	   is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  akratic’s	   	   cognitive	   appraisal	   of	   her	  predicament.	  Rather,	   it	   is	   based	  on	   the	   akratic’s	  mistaken	  representation	  of	  this	  particular	  thing	  as	  desirable	  or	  good.	  	  These	  remarks	  gesture	  towards	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  akratic	  has	  knowledge	  because	  her	  beliefs	  are	  correct,	  and	  doesn’t	  have	  knowledge	  because	  she	  also	  has	  a	  non-­‐doxastic	  misrepresentation	  of	  her	  predicament.	  Thus,	  they	  suggest	  that	  her	  cognitive	  appraisal	  of	  a	  certain	  object	  (the	  sweet)	  is	  conflicted:	  she	  believes	  she	  should	  avoid	  the	  cake,	  but	  she	  also	  sees	  it	  as	  good	  or	  desirable.	  This	  cognitive	  conflict,	   then,	   is	   the	  source	  of	  her	  motivational	  conflict.	  Thus,	   this	   interpretation	  sets	  up	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   a	   reconciliation	   between	   the	   motivational	   conflict	   account	   and	   the	  ignorance	  account.	  Indeed,	  it	  envisages	  the	  ignorance	  of	  the	  akratic	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  blameworthy	  desire	  she	  experiences.	  	  The	  view	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  consists	  in	  a	  non-­‐doxastic	  misrepresentation,	  in	  turn,	  can	  shed	   some	   light	   on	   Aristotle’s	   ambiguous	   claim	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   involves	  “perceptual	  knowledge”:	  the	  pathos	  does	  not	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  knowledge	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  nor	  is	  this	  very	  same	  knowledge	  that	  is	  dragged	  about	  by	  the	  pathos	  ,	  but	  as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  presence	  of	   perceptual	   knowledge	   (and	   this	   is	   the	  knowledge	   that	   is	  dragged	  about	  by	  the	  pathos	  ).96	  The	  root	  of	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  this	  passage	  depends	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  genitive	  absolute	  "τῆς	  κυρίως	  ἐπιστήμης	  εἶναι	  δοκούσης	  παρούσης"	   and	   on	   the	   verb	   to	   which	   the	   negation	   οὐ	  should	   refer.	   While	   some	   translators	   (Rakham,	   Irwin,	   Moss)	   read	   οὐ	   εἶναι	   and	   interpret	   the	  genitive	  absolute	  as	  expressing	  a	  temporal	  relation,	  others	  (Kenny)	  read	  οὐ	  γίνεται	  and	  render	  the	  genitive	  absolute	  with	  a	  causal	  relation.	  Thus	  the	  former	  translate	  the	  passage	  as	  follows:	  	  for	   the	   knowledge	   that	   is	   present	   when	   akrasia	   occurs,	   and	   that	   is	   dragged	   about	   on	  account	   of	   akrasia,	   is	   not	   the	   sort	   that	   seems	   to	   be	   fully	   knowledge,	   but	   it	   is	   only	  perceptual	  knowledge.97	  This	   translation	   supports	   an	   interpretation	   that	   considers	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   as	   strictly	  intellectual,	   for	   it	   suggests	   that	   akrasia	   occurs	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   knowledge.	   Indeed,	   this	  translation	  seems	  to	  support	  a	  negative	  existential	  claim	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  knowledge	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96οὐ	  γὰρ	  τῆς	  κυρίως	  ἐπιστήμης	  εἶναι	  δοκούσης	  παρούσης	  γίνεται	  τὸ	  πάθος,	  οὐδ᾽	  αὕτη	  περιέλκεται	  διὰ	  τὸ	  πάθος,	  ἀλλὰ	  τῆς	  αἰσθητικῆς.	  NE1147b	  17–19.	  97	  Trans	  based	  on	  Irwin	  1998.	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akratic.	  When	  akrasia	  occurs,	   there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  knowledge	   in	   the	  strict	  sense,	   "τῆς	  κυρίως	  
ἐπιστήμης	  οὐ	   εἶναι	  δοκούσης".	   The	   latter	   translators,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   give	   a	   translation	  similar	   to	   the	   one	   I	   proposed	   above	   in	   order	   to	   support	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  akratic	  is	  not	  intellectual	  but	  desiderative:	  "the	  pathos	  	  does	  not	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	   what	   seems	   to	   be	   knowledge	   in	   the	   strict	   sense,	   nor	   is	   this	   very	   same	   knowledge	   that	   is	  dragged	  about	  by	  the	  pathos	  ,	  but	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  (and	  this	  is	  the	   knowledge	   that	   is	   dragged	   about	   by	   the	  pathos)"98.	   According	   to	   these	   interpreters99,	   this	  passage	  simply	  shows	  that	  the	  akratic's	  emotional	  upheaval	   is	  not	  causally	  connected	  with	  the	  presence	   of	   knowledge	   in	   the	   strict	   sense.	   Hence,	   the	   passage	   leaves	   open	   for	   the	   akratic	   the	  possibility	   to	   have	   knowledge	  when	  akrasia	   occurs.	   If	   the	   akratic	   has	   knowledge	   in	   the	   strict	  sense	  when	  akrasia	  occurs,	  however,	   she	  may	  be	  seen	  as	   failing	   to	  desire	  what	   is	  best	   for	  her.	  Thus,	  in	  this	  interpretation,	  she	  undergoes	  not	  an	  intellectual	  failure,	  but	  a	  desiderative	  failure.	  	  In	   the	   introduction	  I	  noted	  that	  both	  the	   intellectualist	  and	  the	  desire-­‐based	   interpretations	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  failure	  are	  in	  tension	  with	  a	  number	  of	  remarks	  Aristotle	  makes	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  
Ethics.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   notice,	   however,	   that	   the	   translation	   favoured	   by	   the	   desire-­‐based	  account	  is	  coherent	  with	  an	  interpretation	  that	  sees	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  as	  involving	  a	  non-­‐doxastic	  mistaken	   representation.	   Indeed,	  Aristotle	  may	  have	   in	  mind	   the	   faculty	  of	  phantasia	  when	  he	  says	  that	  the	  pathos	  doesn't	  occur	  because	  of	  a	  failure	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  but	  because	  of	  a	  failure	  of	  ‘perceptual	  knowledge’.	  	  The	  discussion	  on	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  phantasia	  has	  been	  the	  object	  of	  many	  controversies.	  In	  this	   chapter	   I	   will	   only	   sketch	   a	   list	   of	   features	   that	   can	   support	   the	   thesis	   that	   phantasia	   is	  responsible	  for	  the	  akratic's	  cognitive	  failure.	  In	  the	  third	  chapter,	  in	  turn,	  I	  will	  propose	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  phantasia	  in	  Aristotle's	  conception	  of	  practical	  thought.	  The	  first	  feature	  of	  phantasia	  which	  seems	  relevant	  for	  this	  discussion	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  phantasia	  is	  a	  ‘close	  cousin	  of	  perception,’100	  for	  it	  is	  ‘a	  movement	  that	  arises	  from	  the	  workings	  of	  perception’101	  and	  it	  is	  not	  present	  in	  animals	  which	  lack	  perception.102	  Being	  to	  some	  extent	  related	  to	  perception,	  however,	  does	  not	  prevent	  phantasia	  from	  being	  a	  distinct	  cognitive	  faculty:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Kenny	  1966,	  183–84.	  	  99	  	  Ibidem.	  100	  Moss	  2009,	  p.125.	  101	  DA	  429a	  1	  ff	  102	  DA	  433b	  27-­‐32	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phantasia	   is	   distinguished	   from	   perception	   and	   thought;	   it	   does	   not	   arise	   without	  perception	   and	   it	   is	   required	   by	   judgement.	   But	   clearly	   phantasia	   and	   judgement	   are	  different	  modes	  of	  thought.103	  	  A	  further	  sign	  of	  Aristotle’s	  characterization	  of	  phantasia	  as	  a	  ‘mode	  of	  thought’	  is	  the	  remark	  on	  its	  capacity	  to	  be	  either	  right	  or	  wrong:	  	  it	   is	   the	   process	   by	  which	  we	   say	   an	   appearance	   is	   presented	   to	   us,	   it	   is	   one	   of	   these	  states	  of	  mind	  by	  which	  we	  make	  distinctions	  and	  are	  either	  right	  or	  wrong.104	  	  Even	  though	  phantasia	  is	  a	  mode	  of	  thought,	  however,	  Aristotle	  seems	  to	  distinguish	  the	  status	  of	  beliefs	  and	  phantasiai:	   In	  DA	  428	  a	  20-­‐25,	  we	  are	  told	  that	  the	  representations	  produced	  by	  
phantasia	   are	   non-­‐doxastic.	   Since	   phantasia	   is	   both	   a	   ‘mode	   of	   thought’	   and	   a	   faculty	   closely	  related	  to	  ‘the	  workings	  of	  perception’,	  it	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  party	  to	  what	  Aristotle	  calls	  ‘perceptual	  knowledge’.	  	  The	   second	   relevant	   feature	   of	  phantasia	   is	   its	   important	   role	   in	   Aristotle's	   account	   of	   desire	  formation.	  Both	  animals	  and	  humans	  are	  incapable	  of	  desire	  without	  phantasia.105	  Phantasia	  can	  produce	   appearances	  which	   are	   rich	   enough	   to	   give	   rise	   to	  desires,	   both	   in	   irrational	   animals	  and	   in	  human	  beings.	   In	  other	  words,	  phantasia	   is	   capable	  of	   characterizing	  certain	  objects	  as	  good	  or	   bad,	   thus	   rendering	   them	  proper	   ‘objects	   of	   desire’.	  Moreover,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   very	  appearances	  produced	  by	  phantasia	  must	  be	  the	  objects	  of	  practical	  thought:	  ‘The	  thinking	  soul	  never	  thinks	  without	  a	  mental	  image’106.	  	  If	  this	  brief	  sketch	  of	  the	  role	  of	  phantasia	   in	  practical	  reasoning	  is	  correct,	  then	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  reconsider	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic.	   In	   particular,	   we	   can	   recall	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  ignorance	  of	  the	  akratic	  consists	  in	  knowing	  and	  not	  knowing	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  see	  that	  it	  can	   now	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia.	   If	   the	   akratic	   represents	   the	   cake	   as	   being	  desirable	  or	  good	  by	  means	  of	  her	  phantasia,	  she	  is	  exercising	  a	  ‘mode	  of	  thought’.	  She	  does	  not	  simply	  perceive	  the	  cake,	  but	  she	  actively	  qualifies	  it	  as	  ‘good'	  or	  'desirable'.	  This	  representation,	  however,	   is	   wrong	   or	  mistaken:	   a	   virtuous	   person,	   or	   someone	  who	   is	   fully	   good,	   would	   not	  make	   the	   same	   cake	   an	   object	   of	   desire.	   The	   mistaken	   representation	   coexists	   without	  contradiction	  with	  the	  correct	  belief	  that	  the	  cake	  is	  sweet.	  This	  belief,	  once	  combined	  with	  the	  maxim	  ‘everything	  sweet	  should	  be	  avoided’,	  leads	  the	  agent	  to	  believe,	  correctly,	  that	  the	  cake	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  DA	  427b	  18–19.	  104	  DA	  428a	  1–5.	  105	  DA	  433b	  29.	  106	  DA	  431a.	  
	  	   	   33	  
should	  be	  avoided.	  	  The	  mistaken	  representation	  and	  the	  correct	  belief	  thus	  are	  also	  the	  objects	  of	  two	  conflicting	  desires:	  the	  desire	  to	  avoid	  the	  cake,	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  eat	  it.	  As	   long	   as	   the	   akratic	   has	   the	   mistaken	   representation	   of	   the	   cake	   as	   desirable	   or	   good,	  therefore,	   she	  does	  not	  have	  knowledge.	  Nevertheless,	   she	  also	  has	  knowledge	   (in	   a	  way),	   for	  she	   is	   right	   in	   thinking	   that	   the	  cake	  should	  be	  avoided.	  But	  as	  Aristotle	  notices,	   the	  akratic	   is	  also	  someone	  who	  knows	  and	  yet	  does	  not	  use	  her	  knowledge.	  Hence,	  although	  she	  formulates	  the	   correct	   judgement,	   she	   follows	   the	   temptations	   of	   the	   mistaken	   appearance	   and	   the	  corresponding	  blameworthy	  desire.	  Once	  her	  state	  of	  ignorance	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  state	  which	  involves	  a	  failure	  of	  phantasia,	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  explain	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  does	  not	  use	  her	  knowledge	  as	  a	  further	  failure	  of	  the	  intellect.	  The	  impairment	  of	  phantasia	  opens	  the	  logical	  possibility	  of	  an	  action	  that	  goes	  against	  reason	  but	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  a	  belief	  that	  contradicts	  reason.	   The	   intellect	   functions	   perfectly	   well:	   it	   is	   the	   agent's	   malfunctioning	   phantasia	   that	  produces	  a	  mistaken,	  yet	  motivationally	  potent	  and	  causally	  masking	  appearance.	  Once	  he	  has	  made	  room	  for	   this	  possibility,	  Aristotle	  can	  explain	   the	   fact	   that	  some	  agents	  do	  not	  abide	  by	  their	   correct	   deliberation	   by	   underlining	   how	   their	   mistaken	   appearances	   give	   rise	   to	   an	  irrational	   desire	   which	   is	   stronger	   than	   the	   rational	   desire	   to	   stand	   firm	   in	   the	   face	   of	  temptation.	   If	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia,	   Aristotle	   can	   avoid	   the	  burdensome	   Socratic	   picture	   in	   which	   the	   akratic’s	   intellect	   is	   ‘clouded’	   or	   ‘covered	   over’.	  Moreover,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   desire-­‐based	   account,	   this	   interpretation	   clarifies	   why	   Aristotle	  follows	  Socrates	   in	  considering	   the	  akratic	   ignorant	   in	  a	  way.	   Indeed,	  as	   long	  as	  phantasia	   is	  a	  ‘mode	  of	  thought’107,	  its	  failure	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ignorance.	  Interpreting	   the	   akratic’s	   cognitive	   failure	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia	   also	   seems	   to	   meet	   the	  requirements	  I	  presented	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Indeed,	  since	  in	  this	  view	  the	  failure	  of	   the	   akratic	   gives	   rise	   to	   conflicting	   desires,	   this	   view	   justifies	   Aristotle’s	   remarks	   on	   the	  akratic’s	  motivational	   struggle.	   By	   emphasizing	   that	   the	   failure	   of	  phantasia	   is	   the	   failure	   of	   a	  ‘mode	  of	  thought’,	  it	  does	  not	  "downplay"	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ignorance	  account.	  This	   interpretation,	  moreover,	   focuses	   on	   the	   faculty	   of	  phantasia	   and	   doesn’t	   run	   the	   risk	   of	  reading	   Aristotle’s	   moral	   psychology,	   and	   thereby	   his	   account	   of	   akrasia,	   as	   a	   form	   of	   rigid	  intellectualism.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  by	  granting	  that	  the	  akratic	  does	  not	  experience	  an	  intellectual	  failure,	   it	   allows	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   clear-­‐eyed	   akrasia.	   	   In	   the	   same	   way,	   interpreting	   the	  failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia	   allows	   us	   to	   clarify	   why	   Aristotle	   denies	   the	  existence	   of	   praiseworthy	   akrasia,	   and	   therefore	   does	   not	   consider	   Neoptolemus	   an	   akratic.	  Neoptolemus	   is	   someone	   whose	   non-­‐doxastic	   representations	   are	   perfectly	   right:	   he	   is	   not	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mistaken	  to	  regard	   lying	  to	  Philoctetes	  as	  bad	  and	  shameful	   thing	  to	  do.	  Rather,	  his	  mistake	   is	  purely	  intellectual,	  for	  he	  has	  been	  misled	  by	  Odysseus’s	  ‘sophistical’	  arguments,	  and	  he	  wrongly	  believes	  that	  lying	  is	  just	  or	  excusable.	  In	   conclusion,	   if	   the	   akratic’s	   failure	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia,	   we	   can	   make	   sense	   of	   the	  distinctions	   Aristotle	   draws	   between	   the	   weak	   and	   the	   impetuous	   akratic,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  differences	   between	   the	   akratic	   with	   respect	   to	   spirit	   and	   that	   with	   respect	   to	   pleasure.	   The	  weak	  akratic	  corresponds	  to	  the	  clear-­‐eyed	  akratic:	  she	  has	  time	  to	  deliberate	  correctly,	  but	  she	  experiences	   a	   conflict	   of	   motives.	   Thus	   the	   weak	   akratic	   does	   not	   abide	   by	   her	   deliberation	  because	   her	   phantasia	   is	   mistaken,	   and	   she	   is	   overcome	   by	   ‘shameful	   pleasure’.	   The	  malfunctioning	  of	  phantasia	  is	  the	  source	  of	  a	  motivationally	  potent	  appearance	  that	  renders	  her	  choice,	   i.e.	   the	   result	   of	   her	   deliberation,	   inactive	   or	   idle.	   The	   impetuous	   akratic,	   in	   turn,	  immediately	  follows	  the	  mistaken	  appearance,	  without	  even	  trying	  to	  deliberate	  in	  accord	  with	  reason:	  she	  is	  in	  such	  haste	  to	  follow	  her	  pleasures	  that	  she	  does	  not	  pause	  to	  consider	  whether	  these	   pleasures	   are	   blameworthy	   or	   shameful.	   The	   akratic	  with	   respect	   to	   spirit,	   similarly,	   is	  someone	   who	   does	   not	   pause	   to	   deliberate	   calmly.	   She	   rushes	   off	   and	   overreacts	   when,	   for	  example,	   she	   feels	   insulted.	   Nevertheless,	   she	   is	   akratic	   only	   metaphorically,	   because	   the	  pleasures	   that	   lead	   her	   to	   overreact	   do	   not	   entirely	   depend	   	   on	   a	   mistaken	   representation.	  Indeed,	  at	  least	  in	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  these	  akratics’	  appearances	  are	  at	  least	  partially	  correct:	  their	  mistake	  consists	  in	  giving	  them	  too	  much	  importance.	  ‘Some	  people	  are	  overcome	  by,	  or	  pursue,	  some	   of	   these	   naturally	   fine	   and	   good	   things	   to	   a	   degree	   that	   goes	   against	   reason;	   they	   take	  honour,	  or	  children,	  or	  parents	  (for	  instance),	  more	  seriously	  than	  is	  right.’108	  	  2.4	  Conclusion:	  Objections	  and	  Responses	  In	   the	   previous	   section	   I	   suggested	   that	   the	   contradiction	   between	   the	   motivational	   conflict	  account	   and	   the	   ignorance	   account	   of	   akrasia	   can	   be	   resolved	   by	   interpreting	   the	   akratic’s	  ignorance	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia.	   The	   gist	   of	   this	   suggestion	   is	   that	   the	   akratic	   is	   ignorant	  because	  her	  phantasia	  mistakenly	  represents	  or	  qualifies	  a	  certain	  object	  as	  'desirable	  or	  good'.	  It	   is	   by	   virtue	   of	   this	   misrepresentation	   that	   she	   experiences	   a	   blameworthy	   desire	   and	  eventually	  performs	  an	  akratic	  action.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapters	  I	  will	  try	  to	  support	  this	  suggestion	  analyzing	   in	  detail	  Aristotle's	   theory	  of	  desire	   formation	  and	  his	   syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  This	  discussion,	  I	  hope,	  will	  complete	  and	  clarify	  my	  account	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  phantasia	   in	  Aristotle’s	   conception	   of	   practical	   reasoning.	   Before	   engaging	   in	   this	   task,	   however,	   I	   will	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conclude	   this	   first	   sketch	  of	  my	  positive	  proposal	  by	   trying	   to	   indicate	  a	   response	   to	   the	  most	  obvious	  potential	  objection	  against	  it.	  	  In	   the	   interpretation	   I	   have	  proposed,	   the	   akratic’s	   state	  of	   ignorance	   is	   one	   in	  which	   she	  has	  knowledge	  and	  does	  not	  have	  it	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  because	  she	  has	  a	  mistaken	  appearance	  which	  coexists	  with	  her	  correct	  beliefs.	  Having	  knowledge	  and	  not	  having	  it	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  turn,	  is	  what	  leads	  the	  akratic	  to	  experience	  two	  conflicting	  desires.	  This	  interpretation,	  then,	  seems	  to	  assimilate	   the	   state	   of	   the	   akratic	   to	   that	   of	   her	   counterpart:	   the	   enkratic	   (continent).	   The	  enkratic	  too	  is	  someone	  who	  experiences	  a	  conflict	  of	  desires.	  Hence,	  similarly	  to	  the	  akratic,	  she	  must	   have	   a	   wrong	   or	   mistaken	   appearance.	   Nevertheless,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   akratic,	   the	  enkratic	  doesn't	  act	  on	  her	  mistaken	  appearance.	  How,	  then,	  can	  my	  interpretation	  account	  for	  this	  difference	  between	  the	  akratic	  and	  the	  enkratic?	  Moreover,	  my	  interpretation	  may	  seem	  to	  obscure	  the	  reason	  why	  Aristotle	  insists	  on	  comparing	  the	  akratic	  to	  the	  drunk,	  the	  mad	  and	  the	  sleeping.	   Indeed,	   it	   seems	   intuitive	   that	   this	   comparison	   is	   meant	   to	   show	   that	   the	   akratic’s	  cognitive	  faculties	  are	  damaged	  in	  a	  way	  that	  involves	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  failure	  of	  phantasia.	  These	   two	   concerns	   are,	   I	   think,	   interconnected.	   It	   has	   usually	   been	   assumed	   that	   the	  comparison	  of	  the	  akratic	  with	  the	  drunk,	  the	  sleeping	  and	  the	  mad	  is	  meant	  to	  underline	  that	  her	   intellect,	   unlike	   the	   enkratic’s	   (or	   continent’s)	   intellect,	   is	   impaired	   or	   ‘clouded’.109	   This	  assumption,	  however,	  is	  not	  entirely	  warranted.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  aims	  of	  Aristotle’s	  discussion	  of	  
akrasia	   and	   enkrateia	   in	   the	  Nicomachean	   Ethics	   is	   to	   distinguish	   these	   two	   conditions	   from	  virtue	   and	  vice.	  Besides	  warning	  us	  not	   to	   conflate	  enkrateia	  with	  virtue	  or	  akrasia	  with	  vice,	  however,	  Aristotle	  points	  out	  that	  akrasia	  and	  enkrateia	  are	  more	  similar	  than	  we	  may	  think:	  	  we	  must	  not	  suppose	  that	  continence	  and	  akrasia	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  same	  state	  as	  virtue	  and	  vice,	  or	  that	  they	  belong	  to	  a	  different	  kind.110	  Further	   evidence	   for	   the	   assimilation	   of	   akrasia	   and	   enkrateia	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Aristotle’s	  discussion	  of	  ‘prudence’	  (phronesis).	  In	  NE	  VI	  12,	  Aristotle	  discusses	  the	  nature	  of	  prudence,	  and	  writes	  that	  	  prudence	   is	  not	   cleverness,	   though	   it	   requires	   this	   capacity.	   [Prudence],	   this	   eye	  of	   the	  soul,	  requires	  virtue	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  its	  fully	  developed	  state.111	  	  Cleverness	  and	  prudence,	  in	  turn,	  are	  ‘in	  the	  part	  of	  the	  soul	  that	  has	  belief’,	  while	  natural	  virtue	  and	  full	  virtue	  are	  in	  the	  part	  of	  the	  soul	  that	  has	  character.112	  Since	  prudence	  requires	  virtue	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  See,	  for	  example,	  Moss	  2009	  110	  NE	  1145b	  37–39.	  111	  NE	  1144a	  29-­‐31	  112	  NE	  1144b	  14-­‐17	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order	  to	  achieve	  its	  fully	  developed	  state,	  we	  should	  not	  fall	  prey	  to	  Socrates’	  mistake	  and	  think	  that	  virtues	  are	  instances	  of	  prudence.	  Rather,	  we	  should	  envisage	  the	  state	  of	  the	  virtuous	  and	  that	  of	  the	  prudent	  as	  a	  single	  state,	  for	  ‘one	  has	  all	  the	  virtues	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  prudence,	  which	  is	  a	  single	  state.’113	  If	  Aristotle	  considers	  virtue	  and	  prudence	  as	  two	  complementary	  definitions	  of	  the	  same	  state,	  it	  becomes	  clearer	  why	  he	  does	  not	  draw	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	   ‘intellectual	  health’	  of	  the	  akratic	  and	   that	  of	   the	  enkratic.	  The	  enkratic	   is	  neither	  prudent	  nor	  virtuous,	  because	  she	  has	   bad	   appetites,	   i.e.	   she	   has	   not	   acquired	   full	   virtue	   of	   character.	   The	   same	   holds	   for	   the	  akratic,	  for	  Aristotle	  has	  shown	  that:	  it	   is	   impossible	   for	   the	  same	  person	   to	  be	  akratic	  and	  prudent.	  A	  prudent	  person	  must	  also	   at	   the	   same	   time	   be	   excellent	   in	   character	   [and	   the	   akratic	   is	   not].	   Moreover,	  someone	  is	  not	  prudent	  simply	  by	  knowing,	  he	  must	  also	  act	  on	  his	  knowledge.	  But	  the	  akratic	   person	   does	   not.[...]He	   is	   not	   in	   the	   condition	   of	   someone	   who	   knows	   and	   is	  attending	  to	  his	  knowledge,	  but	  in	  the	  condition	  of	  one	  asleep	  or	  drunk.114	  Once	  we	  have	  explained	  why,	  in	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  the	  enkratic	  and	  the	  akratic	  are	  closer	  than	  we	  may	   think,	   we	   can	   return	   to	   the	   comparison	   of	   the	   akratic	   with	   the	   drunk,	   the	  mad	   and	   the	  sleeping,	   and	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   akratic	   does	   not	   abide	   by	   her	   own	   best	   choice.	   In	   the	   first	  section	  of	   this	  chapter,	   I	   tried	   to	  show	  that	   the	  akratic	   is	   ignorant	   insofar	  as	  she	  has	  a	  correct	  belief	  and	  a	  mistaken	  representation	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  To	  this	  extent,	  therefore,	  the	  enkratic	  can	  be	   considered	   ignorant	   too,	   and	   assimilated	   to	   the	   drunk,	   the	   sleeping	   and	   the	   mad.	   She	   is	  similar	  to	  the	  akratic	  in	  that	  she	  has	  a	  mistaken	  appearance	  and	  is	  in	  the	  condition	  of	  having	  and	  not	  having	  knowledge	  at	   the	  same	  time.	  This	  explains	  why	  the	  enkratic,	   like	  the	  akratic,	   is	  not	  prudent	   and	   experiences	   appetitive	   desires	   that	   go	   against	   reason.	   	   What	   differentiates	   the	  enkratic	   from	   the	   akratic,	   the	   mad	   and	   the	   drunk,	   then,	   is	   not	   that	   the	   akratic’s	   intellect	   is	  impaired	  while	  the	  enkratic’s	  is	  not.	  In	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis,	  therefore,	  I	  will	  defend	  the	  claim	   that	   the	  difference	  between	   the	   enkratic	   and	   the	   akratic	   is	   to	  be	   found	   in	   the	   enkratic’s	  ability	   to	   stand	   firm	   in	   face	   of	   temptation.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   enkratic	   doesn't	   act	   on	   her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  NE	  1145a1–2.	  114	  	  Contra	  Irwin	  1999,	  I	  follow	  OCT	  and	  I	  do	  not	  transpose	  NE	  1152a	  8,9.	  If	  my	  interpretation	  is	  right,	  the	  comparison	  with	  the	  drunk	  and	  the	  sleeping	  maintains	  in	  NE	  1152a	  8,9	  the	  same	  double	  reference	  to	  ‘knowing	  and	  not	  knowing’	  and	  ‘knowing	  and	  not	  using’	  as	  it	  has	  in	  NE1147	  a10–15.	  	  	  "οὐδ᾽	  ἅμα	  φρόνιμον	  καὶ	  ἀκρατῆ	  ἐνδέχεται	  εἶναι	  τὸν	  αὐτόν:	  ἅμα	  γὰρ	  φρόνιμος	  καὶ	  σπουδαῖος	  τὸ	  ἦθος	  δέδεικται	  
ὤν.	  ἔτι	  οὐ	  τῷ	  εἰδέναι	  μόνον	  φρόνιμος	  ἀλλὰ	  καὶ	  τῷ	  πρακτικός:	  ὁ	  δ᾽	  ἀκρατὴς	  οὐ	  πρακτικός	  […]οὐδὲ	  δὴ	  
ὡς	  ὁ	  εἰδὼς	  καὶ	  θεωρῶν,	  ἀλλ᾽	  ὡς	  ὁ	  καθεύδων	  ἢ	  οἰνωμένος."	  NE	  1152a	  8-­‐15	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mistaken	   phantasia	   because	   she	   is	   able	   to	   employ	   effective	   cognitive	   strategies	   in	   order	   to	  reinforce	  her	  rational	  desires.	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Chapter	  3.	  Aristotle’s	  Cognitivism	  
	  3.1	  Introduction.	   	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance	  should	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  a	  failure	  of	   the	   faculty	  of	  phantasia.	  According	   to	  my	   interpretation,	   the	  akratic	  both	  mistakenly	  represents	   a	   certain	   object	   as	   “good	   or	   desirable”	   and	   correctly	   believes	   that	   the	   very	   same	  object	  is	  to	  be	  avoided.	  The	  correct	  belief	  and	  the	  mistaken	  representation,	  in	  turn,	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  akratic’s	  conflicting	  desires,	  and	  eventually	  to	  her	  failure	  to	  abide	  by	  her	  own	  deliberation.	  I	  also	  pointed	  out	   that	   this	  picture	  of	  akrasia	  preserves	  and	  reconciles	   the	  motivational	   conflict	  account	   and	   the	   ignorance	   account.	   Indeed,	   it	   grants	   that	   the	   akratic	   experiences	   conflicting	  desires,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   explains	   her	   cognitive	   failure,	   though	   it	   emphasizes	   that	   this	  failure	  is	  not	  intellectual.	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   analyse	   the	   function	   of	   the	   faculty	   of	   phantasia	   in	   Aristotle’s	   theory	   of	  desire	   formation.	   This	   analysis	   will	   help	   me	   to	   clarify	   in	   what	   way	   the	   akratic’s	   failure	   of	  
phantasia	   is	   cognitive	  but	  not	   intellectual,	   as	  well	   as	  providing	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	   the	  differences	  between	  the	  akratic	  with	  respect	   to	  spirit	  (thumos)	  and	  the	  akratic	  with	  respect	   to	  bodily	  desires	  (epithumiai).	  Moreover,	  explaining	  the	  role	  of	  phantasia	   in	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  desire	  formation	  would	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  Aristotle’s	  syllogistic	  account	   of	   akrasia,	   which	   I	   will	   propose	   in	   the	   fourth	   and	   concluding	   chapter.	   Clarifying	   the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia,	   in	  turn,	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  spell	  out	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  akratic,	  the	  enkratic	  and	  the	  virtuous	  person	  in	  Aristotle’s	  ethics.	  	  In	   the	   first	   section,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   Aristotle,	   similarly	   to	   many	   other	   ancient	   philosophers,	  proposes	  a	  cognitivist	  theory	  of	  desire	  formation.115	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  he	  maintains	  that	  desires	  are	  based	  on	   the	   agent’s	   intentional	   awareness	  of	   a	   certain	  object,	  which	   is	   represented	   as	   to	  
orekton	  (the	  “object	  of	  desire”).	  Then,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  cognitive	  representation	  of	  the	  object	  of	  desire	  can	  be	  twofold,	   i.e.	   it	  can	  consist	  either	  in	  a	  belief	  or	  in	  a	  
phantasia.	  I	  will	  also	  try	  to	  show	  that,	  in	  this	  context,	  the	  relevant	  difference	  between	  beliefs	  and	  
phantasiai	   is	   that	   beliefs,	   as	   opposed	   to	   phantasiai,	   require	   conviction	   and	   are	   responsive	   to	  persuasion.	  I	  will	  conclude	  my	  analysis	  of	  Aristotle’s	  cognitivism	  by	  suggesting	  that	  in	  his	  view	  the	   intentional	   awareness	   of	   the	   object	   of	   desire,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   phantasia	   or	   a	   belief,	   is	   a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  desire.	  Phantasiai	  and	  beliefs,	  in	  turn,	  are	  not	  sufficient	  conditions	  of	  desires,	  but	  they	  can	  both	  “sufficiently	  cause	  them”.	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  a	  belief	  or	  a	  phantasia	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  See	  Nussbaum	  1994	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produce	  a	  corresponding	  desire	   in	  most	  occasions,	  although	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  have	  the	  belief	  or	  the	  phantasia	  without	  experiencing	  the	  corresponding	  desire.116	  A	  further	  result	  of	  this	  analysis	  of	  Aristotle’s	   theory	  of	  desires	  will	  be	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  rational	  and	  irrational,	  in	  Aristotle’s	  theory,	  has	  evaluative	  significance,	  and	  doesn’t	  map	  onto	  the	  descriptive	  distinction	   between	   cognitive	   and	   non-­‐cognitive117.	   Hence,	   both	   phantasia-­‐based	   desires	   and	  belief-­‐based	  desires	  can	  be	  irrational	  if	  directed	  towards	  the	  wrong	  object	  of	  desire,	  and	  rational	  if	  directed	  towards	  the	  correct	  object	  of	  desire.	  In	   the	   second	   section,	   I	   will	   consider	   the	   implications	   of	   this	   interpretation	   of	   Aristotle’s	  cognitivism	   for	  his	   tripartite	   categorization	  of	  desires.	  Aristotle,	   in	   the	  Rhetoric,	  De	  Anima	   and	  the	   Ethical	   treatises,	   distinguishes	   between	   bodily	   desire	   (epithumia),	   “spiritedness”	   (thumos)	  and	  wish	  (boulesis).	  I	  will	  consider	  these	  three	  types	  of	  desires	  separately,	  arguing	  first	  that	  the	  proper	  form	  of	  wish	  is	  based	  on	  beliefs,	  although	  there	  is	  an	  improper	  form	  of	  wishes	  based	  on	  
phantasiai;	  second	  that	  bodily	  desires	  are	  mostly	  based	  on	  phantasiai,	  although	  in	  the	  Rhetoric	  Aristotle	  allows	   for	   the	  possibility	  of	  belief-­‐based	  bodily	  desires;	  and	   third	   that	   thumos,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  humans,	  is	  based	  on	  a	  cluster	  of	  beliefs	  and	  phantasiai.	  This	  discussion	  will	  complete	  the	  picture	  of	  ancient	  cognitivism	  I	  proposed	  in	  the	  first	  section,	  and	  help	  me	  clarify	  the	  difference	  between	  akrasia	  with	  respect	  to	  spirit	  and	  akrasia	  with	  respect	  to	  bodily	  desires.	  In	   conclusion,	   I	   will	   explain	   how	   this	   analysis	   of	   Aristotle’s	   cognitivism	   clarifies	   my	   initial	  suggestion	  that	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  akratic	   is	  a	   failure	  of	  phantasia.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  account	   I	  have	  proposed,	  phantasia	   is	  a	   form	  of	  cognition	  which	  can	  represent	  an	  object	  as	  desirable	  or	  good,	  thus	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  corresponding	  desire.	  Phantasia,	  however,	  doesn't	  produce	  belief-­‐like	  representations.	   Rather,	   its	   products	   lack	   conviction	   and	   are	   not	   responsive	   to	   persuasion.	  Furthermore,	   the	  akratic's	   ignorance,	   if	   it	   is	  a	   failure	  of	  phantasia,	   consists	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  akratic	  has	  a	  mistaken	  non	  doxastic	  representation	  of	  a	  certain	  object	  as	  an	  object	  of	  desire.	  The	  akratic's	  mistake	  is	  evaluative:	  her	  phantasia	  	  doesn't	  function	  correctly	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  identifies	  the	   wrong	   object	   of	   desire.	   This	   characterization	   of	   the	   akratic's	   failure,	   together	   with	   the	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  workings	  of	  phantasia	  and	  the	  tripartite	  Aristotelian	  characterization	  of	  desires,	  will	  also	  allow	  me	  to	  explain	  further	  why	  Aristotle	  considers	  akrasia	  with	  respect	  to	  thumos	  less	  shameful	  than	  akrasia	  with	  respect	  to	  bodily	  desires.	  	  	  3.2	  Phantasia	  and	  Desire	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  See	  Ibidem,	  p	  89	  117	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  81	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In	  order	  to	  clarify	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  cognitive	  but	  not	  intellectual,	  it	  is	   necessary	   to	   propose	   a	  more	   detailed	   account	   of	   phantasia	   than	   the	   one	   I	   sketched	   in	   the	  second	  chapter.	   	   Indeed,	   I	  only	  briefly	  pointed	  out	  that	  phantasia,	   in	  Aristotle’s	  view,	   is	  closely	  related	   to	   perception,	   as	   well	   as	   being	   a	   “mode	   of	   thought”.	   Moreover,	   I	   emphasized	   that	  
phantasia	  has	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play	  in	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  desire	  formation	  in	  both	  animals	  and	  human	  beings.	  In	  this	  section,	  therefore,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  reconstruct	  what	  Aristotle	  means	  when	  he	   writes	   that	   phantasia	   is	   connected	   to	   both	   thought	   and	   perception	   and	   in	   what	   way	   its	  workings	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  human	  and	  animal	  desires.	  	  As	  I	  noted	  in	  the	  second	  chapter,	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  phantasia	  is	  extremely	  controversial.	  The	  difficulty	  most	  interpreters	  experience	  in	  reconstructing	  Aristotle’s	  view	  on	  phantasia,	  however,	  is	  at	   least	  partially	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Aristotle	  describes	   its	   function	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  contexts.	   In	  De	   Anima,	   phantasia	   has	   a	   role	   to	   play	   in	   the	   explanation	   of	   animal	   and	   human	  perception	  and	  movement.	  In	  De	  Motu	  Animalium,	  phantasia	  is	  explicitly	  described	  as	  the	  faculty	  that	  renders	  animals	  capable	  of	  desiring.	  In	  De	  Insomniis	  and	  De	  Memoria,	  phantasia	  is	  crucial	  for	  Aristotle’s	  view	  on	  dreams,	  memory	  and	  recollection.	  In	  this	  work,	  I	  will	  limit	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	   of	   phantasia	   in	   the	   practical	   context,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   context	   of	   animal	   and	   human	   action	   and	  desire	   formation.	  My	   discussion,	   therefore,	   will	   have	   a	   narrow	   focus,	   and	  will	   not	   attempt	   to	  provide	  an	  exhaustive	  and	  coherent	  account	  of	  Aristotle’s	  phantasia	  in	  all	  its	  functions.118	  	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   contemporary	   reader,	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   desires	   and	   desire	  formation	  can	  be	  misleading.	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  in	  The	  Therapy	  of	  Desire119,	  emphasizes	  that	  in	  the	   context	  of	   ancient	  moral	  psychology	  we	   should	  keep	   in	  mind	   that	   the	  distinction	  between	  rational	   and	   irrational	   has	   normative	   value,	   and	   doesn’t	   necessarily	  map	   onto	   the	   distinction	  between	   cognitive	   and	   non-­‐cognitive,	   which	   has	   only	   descriptive	   value.120	   In	   Nussbaum’s	  account,	  being	  a	  cognitivist	  in	  the	  ancient	  world	  involves	  being	  committed	  to	  the	  following	  three	  assumptions:	  1. the	  assumption	  that	  emotions	  are	  about	  an	  object,	  or	  directed	  towards	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  that	  emotions	  correspond	  to	  the	  intentional	  awareness	  of	  a	  certain	  object.	  2. the	  assumption	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  at	  least	  a	  necessary	  condition,	  if	  not	  a	  constituent	  part	  or	  a	  sufficient	  condition,	  of	  the	  corresponding	  emotion.	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  For	  a	  more	  exhaustive	  account	  of	  phantasia	  see	  for	  example	  Osborne	  2000,	  Frede	  1992	  and	  Schofield	  1992	  119	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  pp	  78-­‐80.	  See	  also	  Moss	  2009,	  p	  126	  120	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  pp	  78-­‐80	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3. the	  assumption	  that	  an	  emotion	  is	  to	  be	  qualified	  as	  rational	  or	  irrational	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  normative	  status.121	  	  Nussbaum’s	   account	   of	   “ancient	   cognitivism”,	   however,	   cannot	   be	   immediately	   extended	   to	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  desire.	  Indeed,	  Nussbaum’s	  view	  concerns	  first	  and	  foremost	  complex	   emotions	   (pathe),	   such	   as	   pity	   and	   anger,	   and	   therefore	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	  beliefs	   as	   their	   necessary,	   or	   even	   sufficient	   conditions.	   Nonetheless,	   if	   	   we	   take	   into	  consideration	   several	   passages	   of	   De	   Anima,	   we	   notice	   that	   at	   least	   the	   first	   assumption	   of	  ancient	  cognitivism	  about	  emotions	  holds	  in	  Aristotle's	  account	  of	  desires.	  	  Mind	  is	  never	  seen	  to	  produce	  movement	  without	  desire	  (orexeis)	  (for	  wish	  (boulesis)	  is	  a	  form	  of	  desire,	  and	  when	  movement	  accords	  with	  calculation,	  it	  accords	  also	  with	  wish),	  but	  desire	  produces	  movement	  contrary	  to	  calculation;	  for	  bodily	  desire	  (epithumia)	  is	  a	  form	  of	  desire	  (orexis).	  Now	  mind	  is	  always	  right,	  but	  desire	  and	  phantasia	  may	  be	  right	  or	  wrong.	   Thus	   the	   object	   of	   desire	   (to	   orekton)	   produces	  movement,	   but	   this	  may	   be	  either	  the	  real	  or	  the	  apparent	  good.122	  while	   that	   which	   causes	   movement	   is	   specifically	   one,	   the	   faculty	   of	   desire	   qua	  desiderative	   or	   ultimately	   the	   object	   of	   desire	   (for	   this,	   though	   unmoved,	   causes	  movement	   by	   being	   thought	   or	   represented	   by	   phantasia),	   the	   things	   which	   cause	  movement	  are	  numerically	  many.123	  	  In	   these	   passages,	   Aristotle	   emphasizes	   that	   desires	   are	   directed	   towards	   a	   certain	   object	   (to	  
orekton-­‐	   the	   “object	   of	   desire”)	   which	   is	   either	   thought	   of	   or	   represented	   by	   phantasia.	  Aristotle’s	   insistence	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   to	   orekton,	   then,	   suggests	   that	   in	   his	   view	   desires	  involve	  the	  awareness	  of	  an	  ‘object	  of	  desire’.	  In	  other	  words,	  desires	  are	  ‘directed	  towards’	  or	  are	  ‘about’	  an	  object,	  which	  the	  agent	  represents	  as	  good,	  or	  desirable.124	  	  The	   fact	   that,	   according	   to	  Aristotle,	   desires	   involve	   the	   intentional	   awareness	   of	   an	   object	   of	  desire	  immediately	  raises	  two	  questions.	  The	  first	  question	  concerns	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  cognitive	  state	   that	   represents	   the	   object	   as	   good	   or	   desirable:	   is	   it	   a	   belief	   or	   another	   type	   of	  representation?	   The	   second	   question	   is	   about	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   desire	   itself	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Ibidem	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  "νῦν	  δὲ	  ὁ	  μὲν	  νοῦς	  οὐ	  φαίνεται	  κινῶν	  ἄνευ	  ὀρέξεως	  (ἡ	  γὰρ	  βούλησις	  ὄρεξις,	  ὅταν	  δὲ	  κατὰ	  τὸν	  λογισμὸν	  κινῆται,	  καὶ	  κατὰ	  βούλησιν	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  δ’	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ὄρεξίς	  τίς	  ἐστιν.	  νοῦς	  μὲν	  οὖν	  πᾶς	  ὀρθός	  ἐστιν·	  ὄρεξις	  δὲ	  καὶ	  φαντασία	  καὶ	  ὀρθὴ	  καὶ	  οὐκ	  ὀρθή.	  διὸ	  ἀεὶ	  κινεῖ	  μὲν	  τὸ	  ὀρεκτόν,	  ἀλλὰ	  τοῦτ’	  ἐστὶν	  ἢ	  τὸ	  ἀγαθὸν	  ἢ	  τὸ	  φαινόμενον	  ἀγαθόν.	  "DA433a	  22-­‐28	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  "εἴδει	  μὲν	  ἓν	  ἂν	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  ὀρεκτικόν,	  ᾗ	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  κινοῦντα."	  DA433b	  10-­‐15	  	  124	  See	  Moss	  2009,	  p	  124,	  Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisia	  De	  Fato	  XI.	  178,	  Charles	  1984,	  p	  89	  et	  alt.	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cognitive	   awareness	   of	   it:	   is	   the	   cognitive	   awareness	   of	   to	   orekton	   a	   constitutive	   part	   of	   the	  desire?	  Is	  it	  only	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  desire,	  or	  also	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  of	  the	  desire?	  In	   Nussbaum’s	   account	   of	   Aristotle's	   theory	   of	   emotions,	   these	   two	   questions	   receive	   a	   clear	  answer.	  The	  cognitive	   state	   that	   represents	   the	  object	  of	   the	  emotion	   is	   a	  belief,	   or	  a	   complex	  system	  of	  beliefs	  (doxa/doxai).	  For	  example,	  my	  anger	  may	  be	  directed	  against	  someone	  because	  I	   believe	   that	   she	   	   has	   insulted	   me	   and	   that	   I	   should	   do	   something	   to	   avenge	   myself.	   In	  Nussbaum’s	  view,	  since	  the	   intentional	  awareness	  of	  the	  object	  of	  the	  emotion	  must	  “rest	  on	  a	  belief”,	  the	  belief	  is	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  the	  emotion.	  The	  belief	  is	  also	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	   corresponding	   emotion:	   I	   couldn’t	   be	   angry	   with	   my	   sister	   if	   didn’t	   believe	   that	   she	   had	  insulted	   me.	   In	   conclusion,	   Nussbaum	   argues	   that	   the	   Aristotelian	   corpus	   doesn’t	   give	   us	  decisive	   evidence	   that	   beliefs	   are	   the	   sufficient	   conditions	   of	   our	   emotions.	   Nonetheless,	   she	  emphasizes	  that	  Aristotle	  often	  suggests	  that	  beliefs	  can	  “sufficiently	  cause”	  emotions.	  To	  return	  to	  my	  example,	  Aristotle	  would	  grant	  that,	   in	  most	  cases,	  the	  belief	  that	  someone	  has	  wronged	  me	  is	  sufficient	  to	  make	  me	  angry	  with	  them125.	  	  Nussbaum’s	   view,	   therefore,	   is	   that	  Aristotelian	   emotions	   are	   directed	   towards	   an	   object,	   and	  that	   we	   represent	   the	   object	   by	   means	   of	   beliefs.	   These	   beliefs,	   in	   turn,	   are	   the	   emotions'	  necessary	   condition,	   and	   often	   suffice	   to	   cause	   them.	   Is	   this	   view	   justified?	   And,	   more	  importantly,	  can	  we	  extend	  it	  from	  complex	  emotions	  like	  anger	  and	  pity	  to	  all	  kinds	  of	  desires,	  and	  in	  particular	  bodily	  desires	  (epithumiai)?	  The	  view	  that	  beliefs	  are	  a	  necessary	  condition	  and	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  desires	  encounters	  a	  number	  of	   objections,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   bodily	   desires	   (epithumiai).	   From	   the	  passages	  quoted	  above,	  indeed,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  in	  Aristotle's	  view	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  faculties	  that	  can	  represent	   the	   object	   of	   desire,	   qualifying	   it	   as	   “good”.	   These	   faculties	   are	   intellect	   (nous)	   and	  
phantasia:	  	  the	   object	   of	   desire	   [...]	   though	   unmoved,	   causes	   movement	   by	   being	   thought	   or	  represented	  by	  phantasia	  (phantasthenai).126	  	  In	  De	  Motu	  Animalium,	   even	  sense-­‐perception	  (aisthesis)	   is	   included	  among	   the	  representative	  faculties	   (ta	  kritikà,	   the	   faculties	   that	   are	  able	   to	   “make	  distinctions”)	   that	   can	   individuate	   the	  object	  of	  desire:	  	  the	   proximate	   reason	   for	   movement	   is	   desire,	   and	   this	   comes	   to	   be	   either	   through	   sense-­‐perception	  or	  through	  phantasia	  and	  thought127.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  see	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  pp	  81-­‐89	  126	  DA	  433b11	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The	  fact	  that	  the	  object	  of	  desire	  can	  be	  individuated	  by	  phantasia,	  however,	   is	   in	  tension	  with	  the	   idea	   that	   the	   cognitive	   states	   that	   represent	   the	   object	   as	   good	   is	   always	   a	   belief.	   Indeed,	  Aristotle	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  products	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  phantasia	  are	  importantly	  different	  from	  beliefs:	  belief	   (doxa)	   implies	   conviction	   (pistis),	   and	   conviction	   implies	   persuasion.	   And	   no	  animal	   has	   conviction,	   but	   many	   have	   phantasia.	   Every	   belief	   is	   accompanied	   by	  conviction,	   conviction	   by	   persuasion	   (pepeisthai),	   persuasion	   by	   rational	   discourse	  (logos).	  Although	  some	  animals	  have	  phantasia,	  they	  don’t	  have	  rational	  discourse.128	  	  In	   light	   of	   this	   passage,	   then,	  we	   can	   return	   to	   the	   question	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   cognitive	  state	  that	  represents	  a	  certain	  object	  as	  to	  orekton,	  i.e.	  as	  the	  object	  of	  desire.	  This	  state	  can	  be,	  in	  some	  cases,	  a	  belief.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	  an	  agent	  could	  desire	  to	  help	  her	  friend	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   she	   believes	   that	   doing	   so	   is	   good,	   or	   pleasant.	   In	   other	   cases,	  however,	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  cognitive	  state	  that	  represents	  to	  orekton	  will	  be	  different,	  and	  will	  consist	  in	  a	  phantasia,	  or	  in	  a	  product	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  phantasia.	  What	  does	  the	  difference	   between	   the	   belief-­‐based	   desire	   and	   the	   phantasia-­‐based	   desire	   amount	   to?	  According	  to	  some	  interpreters,	  the	  relevant	  distinction	  between	  phantasiai	  and	  doxai,	  between	  appearances	  and	  beliefs,	  concerns	   the	  propositional	   form	  of	   the	   former	  and	  the	   imagistic	  (and	  thereby	   non-­‐propositional	   form)	   of	   the	   latter.129	   In	   the	   context	   of	   practical	   reasoning,	  however,130	   this	   distinction	   doesn’t	   seem	   relevant.	   Both	   phantasia	   and	   thought	   seem	   to	   be	  capable	  of	  predicating	  of	  a	  certain	  object	  x	  that	  it	  has	  the	  property	  of	  being,	  for	  example,	  good,	  or	  desirable.	   Insofar	   as	   they	   are	   both	   interpretative	   faculties,	   their	   products	   seem	   to	   have	  propositional	   content,	   or	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   at	   least	   possible	   to	   translate	   their	   content	   into	   a	  proposition.131	  The	   difference	   between	   the	   two,	   then,	   has	   to	   be	   individuated	   in	   a	   different	  way.	   The	   starting	  point	   of	   another	  way	   of	   distinguishing	   between	   belief	   and	   appearance	   (phantasia),	  moreover,	  can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   passage	   of	   De	   Anima	   I	   quoted	   above.	   There,	   Aristotle	   stresses	   that	   the	  relevant	  distinction	  between	  phantasiai	  and	  beliefs	  is	  that	  the	  former	  lack	  conviction	  (pistis)	  and	  are	   not	   subject	   to	   persuasion	   (peitho).	   The	   latter,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   available	   only	   to	  creatures	  who	  have	  logos	  (reason),	  and	  involve	  conviction	  and	  persuasion.	  As	  R.	  Sorabji	  notes	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  MA	  701a	  33.	  Translations	  of	  MA	  are	  based	  on	  those	  of	  Nussbaum	  1978	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated.	  128	  "ἀλλὰ	  δόξῃ	  μὲν	  ἕπεται	  πίστις	  (οὐκ	  ἐνδέχεται	  γὰρ	  δοξάζοντα	  οἷς	  δοκεῖ	  μὴ	  πιστεύειν),	  τῶν	  δὲ	  θηρίων	  οὐθενὶ	  ὑπάρχει	  πίστις,φαντασία	  δὲ	  πολλοῖς.	  [ἔτι	  πάσῃ	  μὲν	  δόξῃ	  ἀκολουθεῖ	  πίστις,	  πίστει	  δὲ	  τὸ	  πεπεῖσθαι,	  πειθοῖ	  δὲ	  λόγος·	  τῶν	  δὲ	  θηρίων	  ἐνίοις	  φαντασία	  μὲν	  ὑπάρχει,	  λόγος	  δ’	  οὔ."DA	  428a	  19-­‐24	  129	  See	  Modrak	  1986.	  130	  Sorabji	  1993,	  	  pp	  18-­‐19	  and	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  p	  84	  agree	  on	  this	  interpretation.	  131	  Sorabji	  1993,	  pp	  18-­‐20	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Animal	  Minds	  and	  Human	  Morals132,	   in	  this	  passage	  Aristotle	  adopts	  a	  "rhetorical	  criterion"	   for	  beliefs.	  According	  to	  Aristotle,	  the	  characterizing	  feature	  of	  a	  belief	  is	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  convinced	  of	   it133	   or	   adheres	   to	   it	   in	   a	   specific	   way,	   i.e.	   because	   she	   has	   been	   persuaded134	   of	   its	   truth.	  Sorabji	   notes	   that	   this	   criterion	   is	   called	   rhetorical	   because	   it	   entails	   that	   every	   belief	   is	   the	  result	  of	  conversation	  or	  discourse	  with	  others.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  criterion	  may	  not	   be	   strict,	   and	  may	   include	   “silent	   conversation”	  within	   one’s	   soul	   as	  well	   as	   conversation	  with	  others.	  To	   this	  we	  can	  add	   that	  a	  belief,	   in	  order	   to	  qualify	  as	   such,	  may	  only	  need	   to	  be	  responsive	   to	   rational	   discourse	   (internal	   or	   public),	   rather	   than	   being	   the	   result	   of	   rational	  discourse.135	   At	   any	   rate,	   both	   the	   strict	   and	   the	   weak	   forms	   of	   the	   rhetorical	   criterion	  emphasize	  that	  the	  form	  of	  assent	  or	  conviction	  (pistis)	  that	  qualifies	  a	  mental	  state	  as	  a	  belief	  is	  strongly	   linked	   to	   rational	   discourse	   and	   persuasion.	   The	   difference	   between	   a	   belief	   and	   a	  
phantasia,	  or	  a	  representation	  produced	  by	  the	  faculty	  of	  phantasia,	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  latter,	  as	   opposed	   to	   the	   former,	   lacks	   a	   form	   of	   assent	   (pistis)	   which	   is	   the	   product	   of	   rational	  discourse	  and	  is	  responsive	  to	  rational	  discourse.	  In	  other	  words,	  phantasiai	  are	  representations	  that	  lack	  “reflective	  assent”136.	  	  If	   we	   grant	   this	   distinction	   between	   beliefs	   and	   phantasiai,	   then,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   the	  cognitive	  state	  that	  represents	  the	  object	  of	  desire	  can	  be	  either	  a	  representation	  to	  which	  the	  “desirer”	   accords	   reflective	   assent,	   or	   a	   representation	   to	   which	   the	   desirer	   doesn’t	   give	  reflective	   assent.	   Some	   evidence	   for	   this	   distinction,	   moreover,	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Aristotle’s	  characterization	  of	  bodily	  desires	  (epithumiai)	  in	  the	  Rhetoric:	  now,	  of	  bodily	  desires	  some	  are	  unreasoned	  (alogoi),	  others	  with	  reason	  (meta	  logou).	  I	  call	   unreasoned	   all	   those	   that	   are	   not	   the	   result	   of	   any	   assumption.	   Such	   are	   all	   those	  which	  are	  called	  natural;	  for	  instance,	  those	  which	  come	  into	  existence	  through	  the	  body-­‐	  such	  as	  the	  desire	  for	  food,	  thirst,	  hunger,	  the	  desire	  for	  such	  and	  such	  food	  in	  particular;	  the	  desires	  connected	  with	  taste,	  sexual	  pleasures,	   in	  a	  word,	  with	  touch,	  smell	  hearing	  and	   sight.	   The	   desires	   with	   reason	   are	   those	   that	   arise	   from	   conviction	   (ek	   tou	  
peisthenai);	   for	  there	  are	  many	  things	  which	  we	  desire	  to	  see	  or	  acquire	  when	  we	  have	  heard	  them	  spoken	  and	  are	  convinced.	  137	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  Ibidem,	  p	  36	  133	  pistis	  134	  pepeithai	  135	  See	  ibidem,	  fn	  37.	  Sorabji	  disagrees	  with	  this	  suggestion.	  136	  Sihvola	  1996,	  p	  117-­‐120	  137	  "τῶν	  δὲ	  ἐπιθυμιῶν	  αἱ	  μὲν	  ἄλογοί	  εἰσιν	  αἱ	  δὲ	  μετὰ	  λόγου.	  λέγω	  δὲ	  ἀλόγους	  ὅσας	  μὴ	  ἐκ	  τοῦ	  
ὑπολαμβάνειν	  ἐπιθυμοῦσιν	  (εἰσὶν	  δὲ	  τοιαῦται	  ὅσαι	  εἶναι	  λέγονται	  φύσει,	  ὥσπερ	  αἱ	  διὰ	  τοῦ	  σώματος	  
ὑπάρχουσαι,	  οἷον	  ἡ	  τροφῆς	  δίψα	  καὶ	  πεῖνα,	  καὶ	  καθ’	  ἕκαστον	  εἶδος	  τροφῆς	  εἶδος	  ἐπιθυμίας,	  καὶ	  αἱ	  περὶ	  τὰ	  γευστὰ	  καὶ	  ἀφροδίσια	  καὶ	  ὅλως	  τὰ	  ἁπτά,	  καὶ	  περὶ	  ὀσμὴν	  [εὐωδίας]	  καὶ	  ἀκοὴν	  καὶ	  ὄψιν),	  μετὰ	  
	  	   	   45	  
The	  conclusion	  that	  desires	  can	  be	  based	  on	  reasoned	  beliefs	  or	  unreasoned	  phantasiai,	  in	  turn,	  suggests	   an	   interesting	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   the	  desire	   itself	   and	   the	   cognitive	   awareness	   of	   the	   desire.	   Given	   that	   the	   object	   of	   desire	   can	   be	  apprehended	  either	  by	  a	  belief	  or	  by	  a	  phantasia,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  in	  general	  one	  of	  the	  two	  possible	  forms	  of	  intentional	  awareness	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  desire.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  either	  a	  
phantasia	   or	   a	   belief	   are	   necessary	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   desire.	   In	   this	   interpretation	   of	  Aristotle’s	  view	  of	  desire	  formation,	  desires	  must	  be	  based	  on	  the	  representation	  of	  an	  object	  as	  the	  object	  of	  desire,	  and	  this	  representation	  can	  be	  either	  a	  belief	  or	  a	  phantasia.	  Since	  the	  object	  of	   desire	   can	   be	   individuated	   by	   phantasia,	   in	   turn,	   beliefs	   cannot	   be	   the	   constitutive	   or	  necessary	  condition	  of	  every	  desire.	  The	   suggestion	   that	   beliefs	   cannot	   be	   the	   constitutive	   or	   the	   necessary	   condition	   of	   desires	  because	   the	   object	   of	   desires	   can	   be	   represented	   by	   phantasia	   faces	   an	   immediate	   counter-­‐objection.	  Many	  interpreters138,	  indeed,	  have	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  emotions	  Aristotle’s	  use	  of	   phantasia	   and	   related	   terms	   such	   as	   phantasthenai	   is	   non-­‐technical.	   This	   is	   to	   say	   that	  whenever	  Aristotle	  writes	  that	  emotions	  are	  directed	  towards,	  or	  about,	  phantasiai,	  his	  use	  of	  a	  
phantasia-­‐related	   term	   doesn’t	   suggest	   any	   contrast	   with	   beliefs.	   The	   contrast	   between	  
phantasiai	  and	  beliefs	  is	  supposed	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  perceptual	  context,	  where	  Aristotle	  wants	  to	  stress	  the	  difference	  between	  “the	  way	  things	  look”	  (phainesthai)	  and	  the	  way	  we	  “take	  them	  to	  be”	   on	   reflection	   (dokein,	   oiein,	  nomizein).139	   In	   the	   practical	   context,	   however,	  phantasia	   and	  
doxa	  can	  be	  used	   interchangeably.	   In	  the	  case	  of	   the	  emotions	  (pathe),	  which	  are	  a	  subclass	  of	  the	   desires	   (orexeis),	   this	   view	   is	   conceptually	   defensible.140	   	   Moreover,	   especially	   in	   the	  
Rhetoric,	   Aristotle	   does	   seem	   to	   use	   interchangeably	   phantasia	   and	   doxa,	   phainesthai	   and	  
dokein.141	  In	  the	  case	  of	  bodily	  desires,	  however,	  the	  thesis	  that	  phantasia	  has	  the	  same	  meaning	  of	   belief	   is	   less	   plausible.	   Indeed,	   especially	   in	   De	   Anima,	   Aristotle	   discusses	   the	   nature	   of	  desires,	  and	  attributes	  them	  to	  both	  humans	  and	  animals:	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  δὲ	  ὅσας	  ἐκ	  τοῦ	  πεισθῆναι	  ἐπιθυμοῦσιν·	  πολλὰ	  γὰρ	  καὶ	  θεάσασθαι	  καὶ	  κτήσασθαι	  ἐπιθυμοῦσιν	  
ἀκούσαντες	  καὶ	  πεισθέντες."Rhet	  I	  xi	  5	  (1370a15	  ff)	  I	  follow,	  sometimes	  loosely,	  the	  translation	  in	  Freese	  1926.	  138	  Dow	  2009,	  section	  3	  and	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  p	  85.	  See	  Sihvola	  1996,	  105	  ff	  	  and	  Sorabji	  1993	  for	  the	  opposite	  view.	  139	  For	  Example	  Dow	  2009,	  p	  144	  and	  section	  3	  140	  Especially	  if	  we	  grant	  that	  complex	  emotions	  such	  as	  pity	  and	  shame	  are	  only	  available	  to	  creatures	  who	  have	  intellect	  and	  can	  form	  beliefs,	  i.e.	  human	  beings.	  141	  Ibidem	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In	   so	   far	   as	   the	   living	   creature	   (to	   zoon)	   is	   capable	   of	   desire,	   it	   is	   also	   capable	   of	   self	  movement;	   but	   it	   (to	   zoon)	   is	   not	   capable	   of	   desire	   without	   phantasia,	   and	   phantasia	  involves	  either	  calculation	  or	  perception.	  	  Every	  animal	  shares	  the	  latter	  phantasia.142	  Hence,	  assuming	  that	  at	  least	  in	  some	  cases	  animal	  and	  human	  desires	  are	  not	  different	  in	  kind,	  we	  cannot	  allow	  beliefs	  to	  be	  the	  necessary	  condition	  or	  constitutive	  of	  desires:	  animals	  do	  not	  have	  beliefs,	  but	  they	  do	  have	  desires.143	  	  This	  initial	  sketch,	  however,	  doesn’t	  exhaust	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  desire	  and	  its	   intentional	   object,	   however	   represented.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   still	   unclear	   whether	   the	  representation,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   belief	   or	   a	   phantasia,	   of	   the	   object	   as	   good	   or	   desirable	   is	   a	  sufficient	  condition	  of	  the	  desire.	  As	  Nussbaum144	  notes,	  the	  Aristotelian	  corpus	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  provide	  conclusive	  evidence	  to	  settle	  this	  issue.	  In	  De	  Anima,	  Aristotle	  suggests	  that	  the	  object	  of	  desire	  is	  the	  final	  cause	  of	  the	  desire,	  but	  doesn’t	  clarify	  whether	  it	  can	  also	  be	  its	  efficient	  cause,	  or	  whether	  it	  suffices	  to	  bring	  it	  into	  existence:	  and	  every	  desire	  (orexis)	   is	  directed	  towards	  an	  end	  (eneka	  tou);	   for	  the	  thing	  at	  which	  appetite	  aims	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  practical	  mind,	  and	  the	  last	  step	  of	  the	  practical	  mind	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  action.145	  	  Moreover,	   in	   the	   few	   passages	   where	   Aristotle	   suggests	   an	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   whether	  beliefs	  or	  phantasiai	  are	  sufficient	  to	  cause	  desires,	  he	  seems	  to	  contradict	  himself.	  At	   first,	  his	  view	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  only	  beliefs	  are	  sufficient	  to	  cause	  desires:	  	  again,	   when	   we	   form	   a	   belief	   that	   something	   is	   threatening	   or	   frightening,	   we	   are	  immediately	  affected	  by	  it,	  and	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  our	  opinion	  of	  something	  that	  inspires	  courage;	   but,	   as	   far	   as	   phantasia	   is	   concerned,	   we	   are	   like	   spectators	   looking	   at	  something	  dreadful	  or	  encouraging	  in	  a	  picture.146	  Not	   many	   pages	   after,	   however,	   he	   emphasizes	   that	   sometimes	   an	   agent	   can	   think	   that	  something	  is	  frightening	  or	  pleasant	  without	  thereby	  having	  a	  desire	  to	  pursue	  or	  avoid	  it:	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  ὅλως	  μὲν	  οὖν,	  ὥσπερ	  εἴρηται,	  ᾗ	  ὀρεκτικὸν	  τὸ	  ζῷον,	  ταύτῃ	  αὑτοῦ	  κινητικόν·	  ὀρεκτικὸν	  δὲ	  οὐκ	  ἄνευ	  φαντασίας·	  φαντασία	  δὲ	  πᾶσα	  ἢ	  λογιστικὴ	  ἢ	  αἰσθητική.	  ταύτης	  μὲν	  οὖν	  καὶ	  τὰ	  ἄλλα	  ζῷα	  μετέχει."	  DA	  433b	  28-­‐30	  	  143	  for	  a	  similar	  view,	  see	  Sihvola	  1996	  and	  Osborne	  2000.	  144	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  p	  89	  	  145	  "καὶ	  ἡ	  ὄρεξις	  <δ’>	  ἕνεκά	  του	  πᾶσα·	  οὗ	  γὰρ	  ἡ	  ὄρεξις,	  αὕτη	  ἀρχὴ	  τοῦ	  πρακτικοῦ	  νοῦ,	  τὸ	  δ’	  ἔσχατον	  
ἀρχὴ	  τῆς	  πράξεως."	  DA	  433a	  15-­‐17	  146	  "ἔτι	  δὲ	  ὅταν	  μὲν	  δοξάσωμεν	  δεινόν	  τι	  ἢ	  φοβερόν,	  εὐθὺς	  συμπάσχομεν,	  ὁμοίως	  δὲ	  κἂν	  θαρραλέον·	  κατὰ	  δὲ	  τὴν	  φαντασίαν	  ὡσαύτως	  ἔχομεν	  ὥσπερ	  ἂν	  εἰ	  θεώμενοι	  ἐν	  γραφῇ	  τὰ	  δεινὰ	  ἢ	  θαρραλέα."	  DA	  427b	  22-­‐26	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even	  when	  the	  mind	  contemplates	  such	  an	  object,	  it	  does	  not	  directly	  suggest	  avoidance	  or	   pursuit;	   e.g.	   it	   sometimes	   thinks	   that	   something	   is	   fearful	   or	   pleasant	   without	  suggesting	  fear.147	  In	   De	   Motu	   Animalium,	   in	   turn,	   Aristotle	   often	   suggests	   that	   phantasia	   is	   sufficient	   to	   bring	  desires	  into	  existence.	  For	  the	  affections	  suitably	  prepare	  the	  organic	  parts,	  desire	  the	  affections,	  and	  phantasia	  the	  desire	  (orexis).148	  The	  proximate	  reason	  for	  movement	  is	  desire,	  and	  this	  comes	  to	  be	  either	  through	  sense-­‐perception	  or	  through	  phantasia	  and	  thought.149	  	  Because	   of	   the	   puzzles	   that	   these	   passages	   present,	   a	   number	   interpreters	   have	   considered	  some	  of	  them	  spurious.	  Freudenthal,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  DA	  427b	  22-­‐26	  is	  an	  interpolation,	  for	   it	   is	   evident	   from	   other	   passages	   that	   phantasiai	   cause	   desires.150Freudenthal’s	  interpretation,	  however,	  is	  perhaps	  too	  strong.	  After	  all,	  the	  passages	  in	  the	  Rhetoric,	  De	  Anima	  and	  De	  Motu	  do	  not	  conclusively	  show	  either	  that	  beliefs	  are	  the	  sufficient	  condition	  of	  desires,	  or	   that	   phantasiai	   are	   the	   sufficient	   condition	   of	   desires.	   Aristotle,	   then,	  may	   have	   adopted	   a	  weaker	   view,	   according	   to	   which	   both	   beliefs	   and	   phantasiai	   can	   sufficiently	   cause	   desires,	  although	  they	  not	  always	  do.151	  This	  interpretation,	  besides	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  accommodates	  many	  textual	  difficulties,	  also	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  attributing	  to	  him	  a	  more	  complex,	  and	  plausible,	  view	  about	  desire	  formation.	  In	   sum,	   if	   the	   interpretation	   I	   proposed	   is	   correct,	   Aristotle’s	   cognitivism	   indicates	  phantasiai	  and	   beliefs	   as	   the	   two	   possible	   forms	   of	   representation	   of	   the	   objects	   of	   desires.	   Thus,	   every	  desire	   has	   either	   a	   phantasia	   or	   a	   belief	   as	   its	   necessary	   condition	   and	   constituent	   part.	  Moreover,	   both	   phantasiai	   and	   beliefs	   can	   sufficiently	   cause	   desires.	   Borrowing	   Nussbaum’s	  phrasing,	   Aristotle’s	   cognitivism	   has	   descriptive	   value.152	   This	   is	   to	   say	   that	   it	   qualifies	   as	  cognitivism	   because	   it	   assumes	   that	   every	   desire	   is	   based	   on	   the	   cognitive	   awareness	   of	   a	  certain	   object	   qualified	   as	   good	   or	   desirable	   by	   the	   intellect	   or	   by	   phantasia.	   This	   form	   of	  cognitivism,	   as	   Nussbaum	   emphasizes,	   implies	   that	   the	   distinction	   between	   rational	   and	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  702a	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  MA	  701a	  35-­‐40	  150	  Freudenthal	  1863,	  p	  16.	  see	  de	  ins	  460b3	  probl	  XXX	  7	  956	  a	  20	  151	  For	  a	  similar	  position	  that	  concerns	  only	  beliefs	  see	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  p	  89	  152	  Nussbaum	  1994,	  p	  8	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irrational	   desires	   has	   normative	   value,	   and	  doesn’t	  map	  directly	   onto	   the	  distinction	  between	  cognitive	   and	   non-­‐cognitive.	   Hence,	   in	   Aristotle’s	   view,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   all	   desires	   are	  rational	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  based	  on	  the	  cognitive	  awareness	  that	  the	  object	  of	  desire	  is	  good.	  Rather,	   they	   can	  be	   rational	  or	   irrational	  depending	  on	  whether	   they	  are	  directed	   towards	  an	  object	  which	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  correct	  reason,	  a	  proper	  object	  of	  desire.	  Hence,	  both	  a	  belief-­‐based	  desire	  and	  a	  phantasia-­‐based	  desire	  can	  be	  irrational,	  in	  the	  normative	  sense,	  if	  they	  are	  directed	   to	  an	  object	  which	   shouldn’t	  be	   represented	  as	  an	  object	  of	  desire.	   In	  other	  words,	   if	  they	  are	  directed	  towards	  an	  object	  which	  is	  not	  really	  good.	  Given	  that	  desires	  can	  be	  based	  on	  two	  types	  of	   representations,	   the	   irrationality	  of	  desires	  seems	  able	   to	   take	   two	   forms.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  my	  anger	  or	  my	  desire	   to	   retaliate	   can	  be	  based	  on,	   for	   example,	   the	   (evaluatively)	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  my	  sister	  has	  insulted	  me	  and	  that	  should	  I	  take	  revenge.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  my	   desire	   to	   smoke	   can	   be	   based	   on	   the	   (evaluatively)	   mistaken	   non-­‐doxastic	   appearance	  (phantasia)	  that	  smoking	  is	  desirable.	  	  	  
3.3	  Boulesis,	  Epithumia,	  Thumos	  and	  Phantasia.	  
In	   sketching	   this	   picture	   of	   the	   role	   of	  phantasiai	   and	   beliefs	   in	   desire	   formation,	   I	   discussed	  desire	   (orexis)	   in	   general,	   without	   focusing	   on	   Aristotle’s	   distinction	   between	   bodily	   desire	  (epithumia),	   “spiritedness”	   (thumos)	   and	  wish	   (boulesis).153	   In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   consider	   the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  distinction	  applies	  to	  the	  tripartite	  division	  of	  orexeis.	  This	  discussion	  will	  help	  me	  clarify	  the	  reason	  why	  Aristotle	  considers	  akrasia	  with	  respect	   to	  spirit	   less	  shameful	   than	  
akrasia	  with	  respect	  to	  bodily	  desires.	  	  The	  case	  of	  wish	   is	  perhaps	  the	  easiest	  one	  to	  discuss.	   In	  De	  Anima,	  Aristotle	  connects	  wish	  to	  rational	  discourse	  and	  emphasizes	  that,	  in	  a	  theory	  that	  divided	  the	  soul	  into	  a	  part	  with	  reason	  and	  a	  part	  without	  reason,	  wish	  should	  be	  located	  in	  the	  part	  of	  the	  soul	  with	  reason.154	  If	  wish	  arises	  in	  accordance	  with	  rational	  discourse,	  then	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  wishes	  are	  belief-­‐based	  desires.	  Although	  this	  conclusion	  seems	  to	  be	  granted	  by	  the	  textual	  evidence	  in	  De	  Anima,	  there	  is	  a	  passage	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  that	  seems	  to	  question	  it.	  Aristotle,	  indeed,	  suggests	  that	  sometimes	  wishes	  can	  be	  directed	  towards	  the	  “apparent	  good”	  (to	  phainomenon	  agathon):	  If,	   then,	   these	   views	  do	  not	   satisfy	   us,	   should	  we	   say	   that,	  without	   qualification	   and	   in	  reality,	  what	   is	  wished	   is	   the	  good,	  but	   for	  each	  person	  what	   is	  wished	   is	   the	  apparent	  good?	  For	  the	  excellent	  person,	  then,	  what	  is	  wished	  will	  be	  what	  is	  [wished]	  in	  reality,	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while	   for	   the	   base	   person	  what	   is	  wished	   is	  whatever	   it	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   [that	   appears	  good	  to	  him].155	  This	   passage	   threatens	   a	   view	   that	   takes	   beliefs	   to	   be	   the	   form	   of	   intentional	   awareness	   on	  which	  wishes	  are	  based	  because	  it	  states	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  wishes	  can	  be	  for	  what	  appears	  to	  be	   good.	   The	   term	   Aristotle	   uses	   in	   order	   to	   characterize	   the	   apparent	   good,	   in	   turn,	   is	  “phainomenon”,	   which	   is	   related	   to	   phantasia	   and	   often	   used	   within	   Aristotle’s	   technical	  discussion	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  phantasiai.	  Is	  Aristotle’s	  reference	  to	  to	  phainomenon	  agathon	  enough	  to	   debunk	   the	   assumption	   that	   wishes	   are	   always	   about	   beliefs?	   A	   possible	   reply	   to	   this	  suggestion	  is	  that,	  in	  this	  passage	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  apparent	  good	  is	  non-­‐technical.	  Aristotle	   is	   interested	  in	  stressing	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  really	   is	  good,	  and	  what	  isn’t.	  Hence,	  the	  use	  of	  a	  phantasia-­‐related	  term	  doesn’t	  gesture	  towards	  a	  disanalogy	  between	  phantasia	   and	   belief,	   but	   towards	   the	   difference	   between	   how	   things	   really	   are,	   and	  how	  an	  agent	  may	  mistakenly	  take	  them	  to	  be.156	  This	  reply	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  plausible,	  because	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  is	  truly	  good	  and	  what	  isn’t	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  Aristotle’s	  discussion	  in	  this	  section.157	  Nonetheless,	  a	  parallel	  passage	  in	  the	  Eudemian	  Ethics	  makes	  a	  clearer	  use	  of	  the	  technical	  distinction	  between	  phantasia	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  context	  of	  wish:	  	  The	  thing	  desired	  and	  wished	  is	  either	  the	  good	  or	  the	  apparent	  good.	  Therefore	  also	  the	  pleasant	   is	   desired,	   for	   it	   is	   an	   apparent	   good,	   since	   some	  people	   think	   it	   good,	   and	   to	  others	  it	  appears	  good	  even	  though	  they	  do	  not	  think	  it	  so	  (as	  phantasia	  and	  opinion	  are	  not	  in	  the	  same	  part	  of	  the	  soul).158	  In	  this	  passage,	  Aristotle	  clearly	  implies	  that	  sometimes	  wish	  can	  be	  based	  on	  a	  phantasia,	  and	  it	  is	  precisely	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  sometimes	  one	  can	  wish	  for	  the	  apparent	  good	  even	  when	  one	  doesn’t	  think	  it	  is	  good.	  The	  Ethical	  treatises,	  then,	  suggest	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  view	  about	  wishes	  in	  
De	  Anima.	  Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  wishes	  in	  the	  true	  unqualified	  sense	  (	  kat’aletheia	  and	  haplos)	  are	   about	   true	  beliefs	   concerning	   the	   good,	   there	   is	   a	   secondary	   form	  of	  wishes	  which	   can	  be	  based	  on	  phantasiai.	  The	  case	  of	  bodily	  desires	   (epithumiai)	  mirrors	   the	  case	  of	  wishes.	   In	  De	  Anima,	  Aristotle	  says	  that	   if	   one	   divided	   the	   soul	   into	   a	   part	  with	   reason	   and	   a	   part	  without	   reason,	   bodily	   desires	  would	  reside	  in	  the	  part	  of	  the	  soul	  without	  reason.159	  Moreover,	  he	  writes	  that	  epithumia	  is	  for	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the	  pleasant,	  which	  is	  the	  apparent	  good	  par	  excellence160,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  type	  of	  desire	  that	  all	  animals	  (rational	  and	  irrational)	  share161.	  These	  remarks	  could	  induce	  us	  to	  think	  that	  the	  basis	  for	  epithumiai,	  in	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  is	  always	  a	  phantasia,	  or	  a	  non-­‐doxastic	  representation.	  Once	  again,	   this	   clear	   cut	   classification	   is	  proved	  wrong,	   this	   time	  by	  a	  passage	   in	   the	  Rhetoric.	  As	   I	  noted	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   section,	   in	   Rhet.	   1370a	   v-­‐vi,	   Aristotle	   divides	   epithumiai	   into	  “reasoned”	  and	  “unreasoned”.	  The	  former	  are	  based	  on	  belief	  and	  on	  conviction.	  The	  latter	  fall	  short	   of	   conviction	   and	   persuasion,	   and	   are	   thereby	   based	   on	   phantasiai.	   	   Even	   epithumiai,	  therefore,	   can	   be	   based	   either	   on	   beliefs	   or	   on	   phantasiai.	   As	   opposed	   to	   the	   case	   of	   wishes,	  however,	   Aristotle	   doesn’t	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   in	   status	   between	   belief-­‐based	  
epithumiai	  and	  phantasiai-­‐based	  epithumiai.	   	  Hence,	  we	  cannot	  assume	  that	   there	   is	  a	  primary	  type	   of	   epithumiai,	   based	   for	   example	   on	   phantasiai,	   and	   a	   secondary	   one	   based	   on	   beliefs.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  textual	  evidence	  from	  De	  Anima	  and	  the	  ethical	  treatises	  can	  drive	  us	  to	  think	  that,	   in	  most	   cases,	   epithumia	   is	   based	   on	   non-­‐doxastic	   appearances.	   Indeed,	   the	   reference	   to	  belief-­‐based	  epithumiai	   is	   limited	   to	   the	   aforementioned	  passage	   in	   the	  Rhetoric,	  which	   is	   not	  echoed	   in	   any	   other	   text.	   In	   particular,	   Aristotle	   	   emphasizes	   the	   unreasoned	   nature	   of	  
epithumiai	  when	  he	  is	  analyzing	  akrasia.	  In	  the	  Eudemian	  Ethics,	  he	  writes	  that	  epithumia	  “leads	  on	   without	   employing	   persuasion,	   since	   it	   has	   no	   share	   with	   reason	   (logos)”162.	   In	   the	  
Nicomachean	  Ethics,	   furthermore,	  Aristotle	   famously	   distinguishes	   between	  akrasia	   caused	  by	  
epithumia	   and	   akrasia	   caused	   by	   thumos,	   and	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   former	   is	   more	   shameful	  because	  it	  has	  no	  share	  in	  reasoning,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  does:	  	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  since	  thumos	  	  is	  naturally	  hot	  and	  hasty,	  it	  hears,	  but	  does	  not	  hear	  the	  instruction,	  and	  rushes	  off	   to	  exact	  a	  penalty.	  For	  reason	  and	  phantasia	  has	  shown	  that	  we	  are	  being	  slighted	  or	  wantonly	  insulted,	  and	  thumos,	  as	  though	  it	  had	  inferred	  that	  it	  is	  right	  to	  fight	  this	  sort	  of	  thing,	  is	  irritated	  at	  once.	  Epithumia,	  however,	  only	  needs	  [the	  reason	  or]163	  	  perception	  to	  say	  that	  this	  is	  pleasant,	  rushes	  off	  to	  enjoy	  it.	  And	  so	  thumos	  follows	  reason	  in	  a	  way,	  but	  epithumia	  does	  not.	  For	  if	  someone	  is	  akratic	  about	  thumos,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  see	  for	  example	  EE	  1235	  b	  161	  DA	  414b	  4-­‐7	  162	  "ἡ	  δὲ	  ἐπιθυμία	  οὐ	  πείσασα	  ἄγει·	  οὐ	  γὰρ	  μετέχει	  λόγου"	  EE	  1224b2	  	  163	  Rakham	  considers	  this	  an	  interpolation.	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  agree	  with	  him	  because	  here	  Αristotle	  is	  stressing	  the	  difference	  between	  reasoned	  thumos	  and	  unreasoned	  desire.	  "οὕτως	  ὁ	  θυμὸς	  διὰ	  θερμότητα	  καὶ	  ταχυτῆτα	  τῆς	  φύσεως	  ἀκούσας	  μέν,	  οὐκ	  ἐπίταγμα	  δ’	  ἀκούσας,	  ὁρμᾷ	  πρὸς	  τὴν	  τιμωρίαν.	  ὁ	  μὲν	  γὰρ	  λόγος	  ἢ	  ἡ	  φαντασία	  ὅτι	  ὕβρις	  ἢ	  ὀλιγωρία	  ἐδήλωσεν,	  ὃ	  δ’	  ὥσπερ	  συλλογισάμενος	  ὅτι	  δεῖ	  τῷ	  τοιούτῳ	  πολεμεῖν	  χαλεπαίνει	  δὴ	  εὐθύς·	  ἡ	  δ’	  ἐπιθυμία,	  ἐὰν	  μόνον	  εἴπῃ	  ὅτι	  ἡδὺ	  [ὁ	  λόγος	  ἢ]	  ἡ	  αἴσθησις,	  ὁρμᾷ	  πρὸς	  τὴν	  ἀπόλαυσιν.	  ὥσθ’	  ὁ	  μὲν	  θυμὸς	  ἀκολουθεῖ	  τῷ	  λόγῳ	  πως,	  ἡ	  δ’	  ἐπιθυμία	  οὔ.	  αἰσχίων	  οὖν·	  ὁ	  μὲν	  γὰρ	  τοῦ	  θυμοῦ	  ἀκρατὴς	  τοῦ	  λόγου	  πως	  ἡττᾶται,	  ὃ	  δὲ	  τῆς	  ἐπιθυμίας	  καὶ	  οὐ	  τοῦ	  λόγου."	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he	  is	  overcome	  by	  reason	  in	  a	  way;	  but	  if	  he	  is	  akratic	  about	  epithumia,	  he	  is	  overcome	  by	  
epithumia,	  not	  by	  reason.164	  In	  order	   to	  understand	   in	  what	  way	  epithumia	   lacks	  reason	   in	  a	  way	   that	   thumos	  doesn’t,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  conclude	  this	  brief	  analysis	  of	  Aristotle’s	   tripartite	  view	  of	  desires	  by	   focusing	  on	  
thumos	  itself.	  Thumos	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  controversial	  desire	  in	  Aristotle’s	  categorization.	  First,	  it	  is	  the	  only	  desire	  for	  which	  Aristotle	  doesn’t	  individuate	  a	  proper	  object:	  epithumia	  is	  directed	  towards	  the	  pleasant,	  and	  boulesis	  towards	  the	  good.	  Many	  interpreters165	  argue	  that	  thumos	  is	  directed	   towards	   to	  kalon	   (the	  noble,	   the	   fine),	   but	   this	   view	   is	  not	   explicit	   in	   the	  Aristotelian	  corpus.	   Second,	   thumos	   is	   considered	   an	   "unreasoned"	   desire	   in	   De	   Anima	   432b	   7,	   but	  participates	  or	   “has	  a	   share”	   in	   reason	   in	   the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  Third,	   thumos	   is	   sometimes	  used	   as	   a	   synonym	   of	   orgè,	   i.e.	   "anger".	   Anger,	   however,	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   specifically	   human	  emotion,	  which	  involves	  a	  cluster	  of	  evaluative	  beliefs:	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  has	  been	  slighted,	  the	  belief	   that	   one	   should	   retaliate,	   etc.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   thumos	   is	   sometimes	   attributed	   to	  animals	  as	  well	  as	  humans.166	  Hence,	  its	  meaning	  cannot	  coincide	  entirely	  with	  anger,	  but	  must	  be	  broader.	  Animals,	   indeed,	   lack	  discursive	   reason,	  and	  couldn’t	   thereby	  get	   strictly	   speaking	  “angry”	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  humans	  do.	  	  Resolving	   these	   puzzles	   is	   very	   difficult,	   and	   providing	   an	   exhaustive	   account	   of	   thumos	   lies	  outside	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   work.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   can	   already	   be	   inferred	   from	   these	   initial	  remarks	  that	  thumos	  is	  a	  broad	  family	  concept,	  which	  assumes	  different	  meanings	  depending	  on	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  used.	  Since	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  work	  is	  akrasia,	  and	  akrasia,	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  which	  involves	  only	  rational	  animals,	  it	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  narrow	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  discussion	  down	  to	  the	  type	  of	  thumos	  that	  humans	  can	  experience.	  In	  NE	  1116b	  23-­‐37,	  Aristotle	  analyzes	  thumos	  in	  relation	  to	  courage:	  	  those	  who	   act	   on	   account	   of	   thumos	   also	   seem	   to	   be	   courageous	   as	   beasts	   seem	   to	   be	  when	   they	  attack	   those	  who	  have	  wounded	   them.[...]courageous	  people	   seem	   to	  act	  on	  account	   of	   the	   noble,	   and	   thumos	   assists	   them,	   but	   beasts	   only	   act	   on	   account	   of	  pain.[...]human	  beings	  as	  well	  as	  beasts	  find	  it	  painful	  to	  be	  angered,	  and	  pleasant	  to	  exact	  a	   penalty.	   But	   those	   who	   fight	   for	   these	   reasons	   are	   not	   brave,	   though	   they	   are	   good	  fighters;	   for	   they	   fight	  because	  of	   their	   feelings,	  not	  because	  of	   the	  noble	  nor	  as	  reason	  prescribes.	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  Sihvola	  1996,	  p	  129	  166	  NE	  1111a	  24-­‐26	  NE	  1111b	  12-­‐13	  
	  	   	   52	  
In	  this	  passage,	  the	  specific	  type	  of	  thumos	  Aristotle	  attributes	  to	  the	  courageous	  man	  seems	  to	  be	   based	  on	   evaluative	   beliefs.	   Their	   thumos	   arises	   in	   accordance	   to	   reason:	   it	   doesn't	   simply	  involve	  an	  unreflective	  representation	  of	  a	  painful	  slight	  and	  of	  a	  pleasant	  revenge.	  It	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  conviction	  that	  it	   is	  right,	  or	  noble,	  to	  take	  revenge.	  In	  the	  Rhetoric,	   too,	  the	  reflective	  and	  unreflective	  components	  of	  thumos	  seem	  to	  emerge:	  	  (thumos)	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  certain	  pleasure,	  for	  this	  reason	  first	  [i.e.	  because	  the	  angry	  person	  believes	  she	  will	  take	  revenge],	  and	  also	  because	  men	  dwell	  upon	  the	  thought	  of	  revenge,	  and	  the	  appearance	  (phantasia)	  that	  rises	  before	  us	  produces	  the	  same	  pleasure	  as	  one	  sees	  in	  dreams.167	  	  The	   fact	   that	   Aristotle	   gestures	   towards	   a	   belief	   component	   of	   thumos	   in	   the	   Rhetoric	   isn’t	  surprising,	  for	  one	  of	  the	  main	  aims	  of	  this	  treatise	  is	  to	  teach	  rhetoricians	  and	  public	  speakers	  how	  to	  stir	  up	  the	  emotions	  of	  their	  audiences	  by	  means	  of	  conviction	  and	  persuasion.	  Despite	  the	  emphasis	  on	  beliefs,	  however,	  Aristotle	  indicates	  some	  elements	  of	  anger	  which	  seem	  non-­‐doxastic:	   dwelling	   in	   the	   thought	   of	   revenge	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   phantasia	   that	   enhances	   the	  attractiveness	  of	  revenge.	  The	  belief	  that	  one	  should	  take	  revenge	  against	  a	  slight,	  then,	  can	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  phantasia	  which	  increases	  the	  appeal	  of	  revenge,	  and	  presumably	  contributes	  to	  increasing	  the	  agitation	  of	  the	  angry	  person.	  What	  this	  reconstruction	  suggests	  is	  that	  thumos	  and	  anger	  can	  be	  based	  on	  a	  complex	  cluster	  of	  representations,	  which	  involve	  both	  the	  beliefs	  that	  arise	  from	  persuasion	  or	  rational	  discourse	  and	  phantasiai.	  If	  this	  is	  true	  it	  can	  clarify	  why	  what	  Aristotle	  means	  when	  he	  writes	   that	   anger	   follows	   reason,	   although	   it	   isn’t	   entirely	   or	   always	   controlled	   by	   reason.	  Indeed,	  anger	  involves	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  has	  been	  slighted	  and	  that	  one	  should	  retaliate,	  but	  it	  also	  involves	  fantasizing	  about	  the	  revenge.	  The	  appeal	  of	  the	  revenge,	  then,	  requires	  reason	  and	  the	  belief	   that	  one	  has	  been	  offended	  and	  must	   react	   to	   the	  offense,	  but	   it	   is	   increased	  by	  our	  tendency	   to	   dwell	   upon	   a	   phantasia,	   a	   pleasant	   representation	   of	   the	   revenge	   itself.	   The	  irritation	   provoked	   by	   the	   representations	   of	   phantasia,	   then,	   is	   not	   necessarily	   contrary	   to	  reason.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  can	  exaggerate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  slight	  suffered,	  or	  drive	  the	  agent	  to	   overreact	   without	   considering	   all	   the	   features	   of	   her	   predicament	   carefully.	   In	   Aristotle’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  "ἀκολουθεῖ	  γὰρ	  καὶ	  ἡδονή	  τις	  διά	  τε	  τοῦτο	  καὶ	  διότι	  διατρίβουσιν	  ἐν	  τῷ	  τιμωρεῖσθαι	  τῇ	  διανοίᾳ	  ἡ	  οὖν	  τότε	  γινομένη	  φαντασία	  ἡδονὴν	  ἐμποιεῖ,	  ὥσπερ	  ἡ	  τῶν	  ἐνυπνίων."	  Rhet	  1378	  b7-­‐9	  I	  take	  διά	  τε	  τοῦτο	  to	  stand	  for	  "the	  belief	  that	  one	  will	  take	  revenge"	  because	  in	  the	  preceding	  lines	  Aristotle	  uses	  the	  form	  οἴεσθαι	  in	  order	  to	  express	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  angry	  person	  towards	  the	  representation	  of	  her	  revenge.	  This	  verbal	  form,	  indeed,	  seems	  to	  suggest	  a	  doxastic	  attitude.	  cf	  ἡδὺ	  μὲν	  γὰρ	  τὸ	  οἴεσθαι	  τεύξεσθαι	  ὧν	  ἐφίεται.	  Rhet	  1378b	  2-­‐3 
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view,	  the	  workings	  of	  phantasia	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  turn	  the	  horses	  of	  instruction	  into	  (un)wise	  tigers	  of	  wrath.168	  	  3.4	  Conclusion	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Aristotle's	  theory	  of	  desire	  formation	  is	  a	  cognitivist	  theory,	  for	   it	   assumes	   that	   desires	   are	   based	   on	   the	   agent's	   representation	   of	   a	   certain	   object	   as	   "to	  
orekton",	   i.e.	   the	   object	   of	   desire.	   This	   representation,	   in	   turn,	   can	   assume	   a	   doxastic	   form	  (belief),	   or	   a	   non-­‐doxastic	   form	   (phantasia).	   The	   difference	   between	   beliefs	   and	   phantasiai,	  furthermore,	  is	  that	  the	  former,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  latter,	  involve	  conviction	  and	  are	  responsive	  to	   discursive	   persuasion.	   I	   also	   explained	   how	   beliefs	   and	   phantasiai	   are	   involved	   in	   the	  formation	   of	   bodily	   desires,	   wishes	   and	   thumos.	   I	   argued	   that	  wishes	   are	   primarily	   based	   on	  beliefs,	   although	   there	   is	   a	   secondary	   type	   of	   wish	   that	   can	   be	   based	   on	   phantasiai.	   Bodily	  desires,	  instead,	  are	  mostly	  based	  on	  phantasiai,	  although	  in	  the	  Rhetoric	  Aristotle	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  belief-­‐based	  bodily	  desires.	  I	  concluded	  my	  analysis	  noting	  that	  thumos	  is	  the	  most	  complex	  type	  of	  desire,	  and	  that,	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  human	  beings	  are	  concerned,	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  complex	  cluster	  of	  beliefs	  and	  phantasiai.	  This	  account	  of	  Aristotle's	  cognitivism,	  then,	  can	  clarify	  my	  initial	  suggestion	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	   akratic	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia.	   In	   the	   second	   chapter,	   I	   suggested	   that	   the	   akratic	   is	  ignorant,	  or	  doesn't	  have	  knowledge,	  because	  she	  mistakenly	  represents	  a	  certain	  object	  as	  good	  or	  desirable.	  I	  also	  suggested	  that	  this	  representation	  is	  a	  product	  of	  phantasia.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  account	  of	  phantasia	   I	  proposed	  above,	   I	  can	  clarify	  further	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  mistake.	  The	  akratic's	   mistaken	   representation	   is	   a	   phantasia,	   and	   thereby	   falls	   short	   of	   the	   features	   that	  characterize	  beliefs:	   it	   lacks	   conviction	   (pistis)	   and	   it	   is	   not	   responsive	   to	  persuasion	   (peitho).	  Nonetheless,	   this	   representation	   is,	   or	   can	   be	   translated	   into,	   a	   proposition.	   For	   example,	   the	  proposition	   that	   "this	   piece	   of	   cake	   is	   good	   or	   desirable".	   	   This	   proposition	   expresses	   the	  akratic's	  evaluative	  mistake.	  The	  cake,	  indeed,	  shouldn't	  be	  an	  object	  of	  desire:	  since	  a	  virtuous	  agent	  wouldn't	  represent	  it	  as	  an	  object	  of	  desire,	  it	  is	  evalutively	  wrong	  to	  represent	  it	  as	  such.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  object	  of	  desire	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  desired,	  although	  it	  shouldn't	  be	  desired:	  it	  is	  a	  desideratum,	  but	   it	   is	  not	  a	  desiderandum.	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  evaluative	  mistake	  of	   the	  akratic	  concerns	   a	   representation	   of	  phantasia,	   in	   turn,	   entails	   that	   this	  mistake	   is	   not	   responsive	   to	  rational	  persuasion.	  As	  Aristotle	  notes,	  the	  predicament	  of	  the	  akratic	  is	  usually	  described	  by	  the	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  tigers	  of	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saying	  "if	  water	  chokes	  us,	  what	  do	  we	  drink	  to	  wash	  it	  down?"169.	  This	  metaphor,	  as	  St	  Thomas	  explains	   in	   his	   Commentaries	   of	   the	   Nicomachean	   Ethics,170	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   akratic	  because	  the	  akratic	  doesn't	  benefit	  from	  being	  persuaded	  or	  convinced	  that	  her	  evaluations	  are	  mistaken.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   she	   may	   be	   already	   be	   convinced	   that	   what	   she	   represents	   as	  desirable	   shouldn't	   be	   desired,	   but	   this	   conviction	   doesn't	   correct	   or	   remove	   her	   mistaken	  evaluation.	   Persuading	   her	   that	   she	   shouldn't	   believe	   that	   what	   her	   phantasia	   represents	   as	  good	   is	   in	   fact	   good	   would	   like	   giving	   a	   sick	   person	   medication	   which	   has	   already	   proved	  ineffective.	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   played	   by	   phantasia	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   bodily	   desires	   and	   thumos,	  moreover,	   can	   clarify	   further	   why	   Aristotle	   considers	   akrasia	   with	   respect	   to	   bodily	   desires	  more	  shameful	  than	  akrasia	  with	  respect	  to	  spirit.	  Thumos,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  human	  beings,	  is	  based	  on	  a	  complex	  cluster	  of	  beliefs	  and	  phantasiai,	  and	  therefore	  requires	  reflective	  reason	  as	  well	  as	  
phantasia	   in	  order	   to	  arise.	   If	  we	  accept	   the	   thesis	   that	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  akratic	   is	  a	   failure	  of	  
phantasia,	   in	   turn,	   the	  akratic	   is	   someone	  whose	   reflective	   reason	   functions	  correctly:	   she	  has	  the	   correct	   beliefs	   about	  what	   she	   should	   do.	   The	   reflective	   component	   of	   her	   anger,	   then,	   is	  right	   in	   judging	   for	   example	   that	   she	   has	   been	   slighted,	   and	   that	   she	   should	   do	   something	   to	  respond	  to	  the	  slight.	  However,	  the	  non-­‐reflective	  component	  of	  her	  anger,	  her	  phantasia,	  leads	  her	  to	  dwell	  on	  the	  pleasure	  of	  envisaging	  an	  exaggerated	  revenge,	  and	  drives	  her	  to	  overreact	  to	  the	  slight.171	  Both	  reason	  and	  phantasia	  represent	  the	  agent's	  retaliation	  as	  appropriate.	  In	  a	  way,	  they	  both	  express	  the	  same	  evaluative	  outlook.	  Thus,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  evaluative	  judgements	  she	  assents	  to	  on	  reflection,	  and	  the	  evaluative	  representations	  of	  her	  phantasia	   is	  not	   a	   substantial	   difference,	   but	   a	   difference	   in	   degree.	   Phantasia	   simply	   enhances	   the	  attractiveness	  of	  a	  violent	  revenge.	  The	  akratic's	  mistake,	   then,	  doesn't	  produce	  an	  irreparable	  incoherence	   in	   her	   evaluative	   outlook,	   and	   is	   thereby	   less	   shameful,	   or	   less	   irrational	   in	   the	  evaluative	  sense	  of	  the	  word.	  	  As	  opposed	  to	   thumos,	  bodily	  desire	  can	  be	  based	  only	  on	  non-­‐reflective	  appearances.	  Thus,	   it	  doesn't	  	  usually	  involve	  beliefs	  or	  reflective	  reason.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  opposition	  between	  the	  akratic's	  reflective	  evaluations	  and	  her	  phantasia	  about	  the	  desirability	  of	  a	  bodily	  pleasure	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Aristotle	  presents	  this	  saying	  as	  one	  of	  the	  common	  opinions	  concerning	  akrasia.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  endorses	  this	  common	  opinion,	  however,	  	  is	  evident	  when	  he	  argues	  that	  weak	  akratics	  are	  harder	  to	  cure	  than	  impetuous	  akratics	  NE1152a	  25.	  See	  also	  Broadie	  2009,	  160	  170	  St	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  Commentaries	  on	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  Book	  VII	  1319	  	  171	  This	  interpretation	  of	  thumos	  may	  seem	  to	  obscure	  the	  reason	  why	  Aristotle	  thinks	  that	  thumos	  is	  hasty	  and	  irritable.	  Indeed,	  it	  emphasizes	  that	  thumos	  requires	  the	  agent	  to	  "dwell"	  on	  the	  pleasures	  of	  the	  appearance	  of	  her	  revenge,	  etc.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  interpretation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  thumos	  is	  hasty	  and	  irritable:	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  process	  that	  triggers	  the	  thumetic	  desire	  is	  complex	  (it	  requires	  thought	  and	  phantasia),	  whereas	  the	  thumetic	  reaction,	  once	  triggered,	  is	  quick	  and	  hot	  tempered.	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be	   radical.	  When	   the	   glutton	   desires	   the	   forbidden	   piece	   of	   cake,	   the	   difference	   between	   her	  reflective	   evaluations	   and	   the	   representations	   of	   her	  phantasia	   is	   not	   a	  matter	   of	   degree.	   The	  belief	  that	  commands	  avoidance	  and	  the	  phantasia	  that	  suggests	  pursuit	  are	  incoherent,	  as	  they	  do	  not	   share	  an	  evaluative	  outlook,	  however	  general	   it	  may	  be.	  Akrasia	  with	   respect	   to	  bodily	  desire	  is	  shameful	  because	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  substantial	  evaluative	  mistake.	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Chapter	   4.	   Looking	   at	   the	   Cause	   of	   Akrasia	   Referring	   to	   the	   “Human	  Nature”:	  the	  Syllogistic	  Account	  of	  Akrasia.	  	  4.1	  Introduction	  In	  the	  last	  chapter,	  I	  presented	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  phantasia	  in	  Aristotle's	  theory	  of	  desires.	   This	   interpretation	   clarifies	   why	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   is	   cognitive	   but	   non-­‐intellectual,	  and	  why	  Aristotle	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  akratic	  with	  respect	   to	  spirit	  and	  the	  akratic	   with	   respect	   to	   bodily	   desires.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   try	   to	   analyze	   the	   account	   I	  suggested	  from	  a	  different	  perspective:	  whilst	  the	  preliminary	  interpretation	  I	  proposed	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  general	   introduction	  to	  Aristotle’s	  understanding	  of	   the	  akratic’s	   ignorance,	  this	  second	  analysis	  will	  be	  more	  “technical”.	  The	  analysis	  I	  intend	  to	  propose	  will	  be	  technical	  in	  so	   far	   as	   it	   will	   focus	   on	   Aristotle’s	   formal	   account	   of	   the	   akratic's	   practical	   syllogism.	   This	  technical	   turn	   is	   suggested	  by	   the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	   itself:	   in	  NE	  1147	  a	  25,	  Aristotle	  writes	  that	  “	  we	  may	  look	  at	  the	  cause	  [of	  akrasia]	   in	  the	  following	  way,	  referring	  to	  [human]	  nature”	  and	  introduces	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  my	  analysis	  of	  Aristotle's	  account	  of	  akrasia,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  bring	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  akratic’s	  cognitive	  failure	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  phantasia	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  In	   the	   first	   section,	   I	  will	  propose	  a	  general	  account	  of	   the	  practical	   syllogism,	   focusing	  on	   the	  	  
Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  De	  Motu	  Animalium	   	   and	  De	  Anima.	   First,	   I	  will	   endorse	  an	   interpretation	  according	   to	  which	   a	   coherent	   account	  of	   the	  practical	   syllogism	  can	  be	   extrapolated	   from	  De	  
Motu	  Animalium	  and	  De	  Anima	   172.	  Second,	   I	  will	  analyze	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  practical	  syllogism	   and	   Aristotle's	   account	   of	   choice	   and	   deliberation	   in	   the	   Nicomachean	   Ethics.	   In	  conclusion,	  this	  discussion	  will	  help	  me	  clarify	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Aristotle	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  well-­‐formed	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  an	  action.	  In	  the	  second	  section	  I	  will	  consider	  the	  syllogistic	  explanation	  of	  akrasia	  Aristotle	  proposes	  in	  book	   VII	   of	   the	  Nicomachean	   Ethics.	   I	   will	   point	   out	   that	   most	   interpreters	   have	   assigned	   to	  Aristotle’s	   akratic	   two	   distinct	   syllogisms:	   a	   “normatively	   incorrect	   syllogism”	   and	   a	  “normatively	   correct	   syllogism”173	   .	   Whilst	   the	   normatively	   correct	   syllogism	   recites	   “avoid	  sweet	  things(MP),	   this	   is	  sweet(mP),	   therefore	  avoid	  this”,	   the	  normatively	   incorrect	  syllogism	  would	   be	   “(MP)everything	   sweet	   is	   pleasant,	   (mP)this	   is	   sweet,	   therefore	   this	   is	   pleasant”.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  MA	  701	  a	  17-­‐18	  173	  Moss	  2009,	  pp	  143-­‐145,	  Burnyeat	  2002,	  pp	  82	  ff,	  St	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  et	  alt.	  	  A	  notable	  exception	  is	  Kenny	  1966,	  p	  80	  ff	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Nevertheless,	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  assign	  to	  the	  akratic,	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  enkratic,	  a	  single	   syllogism.174	   I	   will	   suggest	   that	   the	   error	   of	   this	   syllogism	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   the	  minor	  premise,	   which	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	   mistaken	   phantasia	   that	   causes	   the	   akratic's	   blameworthy	  desire.	  I	  will	  then	  point	  out	  that	  this	  interpretation	  can	  be	  integrated	  with	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  
enkrateia.	   In	   conclusion,	   I	   will	   emphasize	   that	   this	   analysis	   can	   make	   sense	   of	   Aristotle’s	  comparison	  of	  the	  akratic	  with	  the	  student,	  the	  drunk	  and	  the	  sleeping.	  	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  I	  will	  briefly	  sketch	  the	  account	  of	  vice,	  virtue,	  akrasia	  and	  enkrateia	  which	  the	  view	  that	   the	  akratic’s	   ignorance	   is	  a	   failure	  of	  phantasia	   seems	   to	  suggest.	   In	  particular,	   I	  will	   emphasize	   that	   this	   account	   of	  akrasia	   gestures	   towards	   a	   further	   analysis	   of	   the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  akratic	  can	  be	  “cured”.	  	  	  4.2	  The	  Practical	  Syllogism	  	  
Aristotle	  proposes	  his	  account	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  in	  De	  Motu	  Animalium,	  the	  Nicomachean	  
Ethics	   and	   De	   Anima.	   Extrapolating	   a	   coherent	   account	   from	   these	   three	   texts,	   however,	   is	  complicated.	  In	  De	  Motu	  Animalium	  and	  De	  Anima,	  Aristotle	  uses	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  connection	  between	  thought	  and	  action.	  The	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	   in	  turn,	  differs	  from	  the	  "psychological"	  treatises	   in	  that	   it	  presents	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  in	  connection	  with	  Aristotle’s	   theory	   of	   deliberation	   and	   choice,	   thus	   complicating	   the	   role	   it	   plays	   in	   explaining	  human	  action.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  first	  assume	  that	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  analogous	  in	  De	  Anima	  and	  in	  De	  Motu	  Animalium.	  Second,	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  and	  choice	  and	  deliberation	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  analysis	   will	   be,	   I	   hope,	   a	   clarification	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   Aristotle’s	   insistence	   on	   that	   the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  an	  action.175	  	  	  In	  De	  Motu	  Animalium,	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  characterized	  as	  follows:	  [...]	  when	  someone	  thinks	  that	  every	  man	  should	  take	  walks,	  and	  that	  he	  is	  a	  man,	  at	  once	  he	  takes	  a	  walk[...]I	  should	  make	  something	  good,	  a	  house	  is	  something	  good.	  At	  once	  he	  makes	  a	  house.	  I	  need	  covering,	  a	  cloak	  is	  covering.	  I	  need	  a	  cloak.	  What	  I	  need	  I	  have	  to	  make;	   I	  need	  a	  cloak.	   I	  have	  to	  make	  a	  cloak.	  And	  the	  conclusion,	   the	  "I	  have	  to	  make	  a	  cloak",	   is	   an	   action.[...]	   Now,	   that	   the	   action	   is	   the	   conclusion,	   is	   clear.	   And	   as	   for	   the	  premises	  of	  action,	  they	  are	  of	  two	  kinds:	  through	  the	  good	  and	  through	  the	  possible.176	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  See	  Kenny	  1966	  175	  MA	  701	  a	  23,	  DA	  434	  a	  12-­‐16,	  NE	  1147	  a	  28	  	  176	  MA	  701a	  10-­‐25	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According	  to	  this	  description,	  then,	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  a	  practical	  inference	  constituted	  by	  a	  major	  premise	  (the	  premise	  of	  the	  good),	  a	  minor	  premise	  (	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  possible)	  and	  a	  conclusion	  (the	  action).	  	  The	  account	  of	  De	  Anima	   is	   slightly	  different.	  Here,	  Aristotle	   is	   still	   interested	   in	  how	  thinking	  can	  move	  to	  action,	  but	  distinguishes	  more	  carefully	  between	  the	  different	  types	  of	  premises	  in	  the	  practical	  syllogism:	  the	  cognitive	  faculty	  (	  to	  epistemonikon),	  however,	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  motion,	  but	  is	  at	  rest.	  Since	   the	   one	   supposition	   and	   proposition	   –	   the	  major	   –	   is	   universal	   and	   the	   other	   is	  particular	  (the	  one	  is	  saying	  that	  such	  and	  such	  a	  human	  being	  ought	  to	  do	  such	  and	  such	  a	  thing,	  while	  the	  other	  says	  that	  this	   then	   is	  such	  and	  such	  a	  thing,	  and	  that	   I	  am	  such	  and	  such	  a	  human	  being),	  than	  either	  it	   is	  the	  latter	  opinion,	  not	  the	  universal	  one,	  that	  produces	  movement,	  or	  it	  is	  both,	  but	  the	  first	  is	  more	  static	  while	  the	  other	  is	  not.177	  	  Hence,	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  constituted	  by	  a	  major	  universal	  premise	  that	  contributes	  only	  indirectly	  to	  the	  movement.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  the	  particular	  premise	  that	  is	  "less	  static"	  and	  directly	  moves	  to	  action.	  These	  two	  accounts	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  in	  De	  Motu	  Animalium	  and	  De	  Anima	  present	  some	  differences.	   Nonetheless,	   the	  most	   promising	   (and	   the	  most	   common)178	   interpretive	   strategy	  seems	  to	  be	  one	   that	  minimizes	   those	  differences,	  and	   looks	   for	   the	   features	   that	   the	  practical	  syllogism	  presents	  in	  both	  texts.	  According	  	  to	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  major	  premise	  presents	  a	  general	   evaluative	   expression	   of	   an	   aim	   or	   goal,	   which	   concerns	   the	   agent’s	   needs,	   wants	   or	  desires:	   “I	   need	   covering”,	   “Every	   man	   should	   take	   walks”179.	   The	   minor	   premise,	   in	   turn,	  concerns	  the	  particular	  occasion	  in	  which	  the	  evaluative	  stance,	  and	  thereby	  the	  agent’s	  desires,	  needs	  or	  wants,	  can	  be	  realized:	  “a	  cloak	   	   is	  covering”,	  “I	  am	  a	  man”,	  “this	  water	   in	  question	   is	  heavy”.	  The	  conclusion,	  as	  Aristotle	  repeatedly	  states,	  is	  an	  action.180	  Even	   if	   one	   accepts	   the	   interpretation	   above,	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   the	   practical	   syllogism	  remains	   to	   some	   extent	   puzzling.	   Indeed,	   Aristotle’s	   analysis	   of	   deliberation	   (bouleusis)	   and	  choice	  (prohairesis)	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  III	  and	  VI	  raises	  some	  problems	  for	  thesis	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  an	  action.	  The	  thesis	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	   is	  an	  action,	   in	   turn,	   seems	   to	  generate	  a	  dilemma	   for	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  akrasia:	  either	   the	   akratic	   gets	   to	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   practical	   syllogism	   that	   forbids	   her	   to	   act	   in	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  DA	  434a16-­‐22	  (trans	  Hamlyn	  1968)	  178	  Nussbaum	  1978,	  interpretive	  essay	  4.	  Wiggins	  1980a,	  PP	  228-­‐230.	  Anscombe	  1958,	  pp	  60-­‐61	  179	  MA	  701a	  10	  180	  MA	  701a	  25,	  NE	  1147a	  (or	  an	  omission)	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certain	   way,	   and	   thereby	   she	   refrains	   from	   acting,	   or	   she	   doesn’t.	   If	   she	   does	   get	   to	   the	  conclusion,	  she	  doesn’t	  act	  akratically.	   If	  she	  doesn’t	  get	  to	  the	  conclusion,	  she	  acts	  against	  the	  syllogism,	  but	  she	  is	  not	  akratic	  because	  she	  is	  unaware	  that	  she	  is	  doing	  something	  wrong.181	  In	  this	  section,	   I	  will	  begin	  by	  discussing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  conclusion	  of	   the	  practical	  syllogism	   and	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   deliberation	   and	   choice.	   This	   discussion	   will	   provide	   the	  conceptual	  background	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia	  I	  will	  propose	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  In	   the	  Nicomachean	   Ethics	   III	   and	   VI,	   Aristotle	   proposes	   his	   view	   on	   deliberation	   and	   choice.	  These	   two	   concepts	   are	   obviously	   linked	   to	   one	   another:	   deliberation	   is	   a	   practical	   enquiry	  about	  what	  is	  towards	  the	  end,	  i.e.	  an	  enquiry	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  agent	  discovers	  either	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  her	  end	  or	  the	  constituent	  parts	  of	  her	  end;182	  Choice	  is	  a	  “deliberative	  desire	  to	  do	  an	  action	  that	  is	  up	  to	  us;	  for	  judging	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  deliberation,	  we	  desire	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  deliberation”	  183.	  This	  “deliberative	  desire”	  is	  formed	  when	  our	  enquiry	  concerning	  what	  to	  do	  (our	  deliberation)	  works	  out	  a	  way	  of	  pursuing	  our	  ends,	  or	  spells	  out	  the	  constituent	  parts	  of	  our	   ends.	  Hence	   choice	   is	   the	   result	   of	   deliberation184.	   Choice	   and	  deliberation	  have	   the	   same	  object	  (since	  we	  deliberate	  about	  what	  we	  choose	  to	  do),	  but	  they	  are	  praised	  or	  blamed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  different	  criteria.	  Deliberation	  is	  praised	  if	   it	   follows	  the	  right	  steps,	   if	  the	  deliberating	  agent	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   relevant	   features	  of	   the	  predicament	   she	   finds	  herself	   in.	   Choice,	  	  although	   it	   is	   the	   result	   of	   a	   deliberation,	   is	   correct,	   and	   therefore	   praised,	   when	   it	   has	   the	  correct	  object:	  a	  good	  choice	  is	  a	  choice	  to	  do	  something	  noble,	  just	  or	  good.	  having	  deliberated	  well	  seems	  […]	  to	  be	  some	  sort	  of	  good;	  for	  the	  sort	  of	  correctness	  in	  deliberation	  that	  makes	  it	  good	  deliberation	  is	  the	  sort	  that	  reaches	  a	  good	  (through	  the	  right	  steps).	  However,	  we	  can	  reach	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do,	  but	  by	  the	  wrong	  steps,	  when	  the	  middle	  term	  is	  false.	  Hence	  this	  type	  of	  deliberation,	  leading	  from	  the	  wrong	  steps	  to	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do,	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  good	  deliberation	  either.185	  In	   order	   to	   be	   praised,	   deliberation	  must	   arrive	   at	   the	   right	   choice	   through	   the	   correct	   steps.	  Choice,	  in	  turn,	  can	  be	  correct	  even	  when	  it	  isn’t	  the	  result	  of	  a	  good	  deliberation:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  See	  Wiggins	  1980b,	  et	  alt.	  182	  Here	  I	  follow	  Wiggins	  1980b,	  p	  249	  183	  ἐκ	  τοῦ	  βουλεύσασθαι	  γὰρ	  κρίναντες	  ὀρεγόμεθα	  κατὰ	  τὴν	  βούλευσιν.NE1113a10-­‐13	  (Irwin	  reads	  κατὰ	  τὴν	  	  βούλησιν	  instead	  of	  κατὰ	  τὴν	  βούλευσιν.	  κατὰ	  τὴν	  βούλευσιν	  is	  the	  correct	  lectio	  according	  to	  OCT).	  184	  NE1113a	  5-­‐10	  185	  NE	  1142	  b23-­‐27	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Choice	   is	   praised	   more	   for	   having	   the	   correct	   object,	   than	   for	   being	   arrived	   at	  correctly.186	  	  So	   far,	  Aristotle	   is	  proposing	  what	   looks	   like	  a	  plausible	   account	  of	   choice	  and	  deliberation.	  A	  process	  of	  deliberation	  results	  in	  a	  choice,	  and	  a	  good	  deliberation	  necessarily	  produces	  a	  good	  choice.	  A	  good	  choice,	  in	  turn,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  product	  of	  good	  deliberation.	  For	  example,	  an	  agent	  can	  choose	  to	  do	  the	  right	   thing	  (recycling	  paper)	   for	   the	  wrong	  reasons	  (in	  order	  to	  avoid	   her	   neighbor’s	   judgmental	   looks).	   This	   account,	   however,	   becomes	   problematic	   when	  integrated	   with	   Aristotle’s	   views	   on	   the	   practical	   syllogism,	   and	   in	   particular	   with	   the	  assumption	   that	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   practical	   syllogism	   is	   an	   action.	   When	   he	   explains	  deliberation	  Aristotle	  makes	  wide	  use	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism,	  and	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  deliberative	  process	  can	  be	  made	  explicit	  in	  the	  syllogistic	  form.	  187	  However,	  the	  assimilation	  of	  deliberation	  with	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  encounters	  a	  difficulty:	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  an	  action,	  whilst	  the	  result	  of	  deliberation	  is	  a	  choice,	  or	  deliberative	  desire.	  What	  is	  the	  relationship,	  then,	  between	  the	  choice	  and	  the	  action?	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  choice	  and	  action	  cannot	  be	  identical,	  or	  amount	  to	  the	  exact	  same	  thing.	  The	  action	  can	  surely	  be	  described	  as	  the	  content	  of	  the	  choice	  (the	  choice	  to	  recycle	  paper,	  whose	  content	  is	  the	  action	  of	  recycling	  paper,	  for	  example),	  but	  whilst	  the	  action	  is	  performed	  in	  the	  outside,	  physical	  world,	  the	  choice	  seems	  to	  be	  something	  like	  a	  mental	  state,	  a	  “deliberative	  desire”	  which	  doesn’t	  present	  any	  immediate	  observable	   feature,	   although	   it	  may	   involve	   some	   internal	  bodily	   change188.	   Since	   it	   is	   hard	   to	  believe	  that	  the	  choice	  and	  the	  action	  are	  simply	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  equivalent	  description	  of	  the	  same	  event,	  we	  may	  expect	  them	  to	  stand	  in	  a	  specific	  and	  very	  close	  relationship	  which	  isn’t	   identity.	   This	   expectation	   is	  met	   in	   NE	   1139a	   33-­‐35,	  where	  we	   find	   a	   description	   of	   the	  relationship	  between	  action	  and	  choice:	  the	   origin	   (arche)	   of	   an	   action	   –	   the	   source	   of	   motion,	   not	   the	   goal	   –	   is	   choice.	   The	  principle	  of	  choice	  is	  desire	  and	  goal	  directed	  means.189	  	  In	  this	  passage,	  Aristotle	  writes	  that	  choice	  is	  the	  "origin"	  or	  the	  "source	  of	  motion"	  of	  the	  action.	  If	   choice	   is	   the	   source	   of	  motion	  of	   the	   action,	   in	   turn,	  what	   binds	   them	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   causal	  relation:	   in	   particular,	   the	   choice	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   efficient	   cause	   of	   the	   action.	   Moreover,	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  καὶ	  ἡ	  μὲν	  προαίρεσις	  ἐπαινεῖται	  τῷ	  εἶναι	  οὗ	  δεῖ	  μᾶλλον	  ἢ	  τῷ	  ὀρθῶς.	  NE1112a	  5-­‐6.	  Here	  I	  follow	  OCT	  contra	  Irwin	  1999.	  187	  Ne	  1142a	  15-­‐25,	  1142	  b17-­‐23	  188	  By	  distinguishing	  between	  mental	  and	  physical	  events	  I	  don’t	  mean	  to	  attribute	  to	  Aristotle	  a	  version	  of	  Cartesian	  dualism.	  The	  distinction	  is	  meant	  to	  capture	  the	  difference	  between	  mental	  states	  and	  events	  in	  the	  physical	  world,	  without	  committing	  to	  any	  particular	  theory	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  mental	  states.	  	  189	  "πράξεως	  μὲν	  οὖν	  ἀρχὴ	  προαίρεσις—ὅθεν	  ἡ	  κίνησις	  ἀλλ’	  οὐχ	  οὗ	  ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως	  δὲ	  ὄρεξις	  καὶ	  λόγος	  ὁ	  ἕνεκά	  τινος."	  Rowe	  translates	  ἀρχὴ	  with	  "origin"	  (Broadie	  and	  Rowe,	  2002),	  Irwin	  has	  "principle".	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virtue	  of	  its	  being	  the	  "origin"	  of	  the	  action,	  the	  choice	  may	  even	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  constituent	  part	   of	   the	   resulting	   action.	   This	   doesn’t	   mean,	   however,	   that	   choice	   and	   action	   cannot	   exist	  independently	  of	  one	  another:	  we	  can	  imagine	  cases	  where	  the	  agent	  chooses	  to	  do	  something	  (e.	   g.,	   to	   cycle	   back	   home)	   but	   for	   some	   reason	   (e.g.,	   a	   flat	   tyre)	   the	   choice	   doesn’t	   result	   in	  action.	   If	   this	   interpretation	   is	   correct,	   it	   can	  shed	   further	   light	  on	   the	  problematic	   connection	  between	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  practical	  deliberation	  and	  his	  account	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism.	  If	  the	   choice	  which	   results	   from	   the	   agent’s	   deliberation	   isn't	   "idle",	   there	   is	   a	   relevant	   sense	   in	  which	   it	   is	   the	   conclusion	  of	   the	  practical	   syllogism,	   i.e.	   the	  action.	  The	   choice	   is	   a	   constituent	  part	  of	  the	  action.	  If	  an	  agent	  goes	  for	  a	  walk	  after	  having	  thought	  that	  "every	  man	  should	  take	  walks,	  and	  that	  he	  is	  a	  man”,	  his	  choice	  to	  act	  is	  a	  part	  (i.e.,	  the	  origin)	  of	  her	  chosen	  action.	  This	  doesn’t	   mean,	   however,	   that	   the	   choice	   and	   the	   action	   are	   identical,	   or	   that	   the	   choice	   must	  coincide	  with	  an	  action	   in	  all	  possible	  circumstances.	   In	   the	  presence	  of	  external	  obstacles,	   for	  example,	  the	  choice	  becomes	  "idle"	  or	  "impotent"	  and	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  any	  action.	  Before	  discussing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  and	  practical	  deliberation,	   I	  mentioned	  Wiggins’	  worry	  that	  Aristotle’s	  remark	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  an	  action	  couldn’t	  be	  squared	  with	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  If	  the	  view	  that	  choices	  are	  efficient	   causes	   and	   can	  be	   constituent	  parts	   of	   actions	   is	   correct,	   however,	   this	  worry	   can	  be	  solved.	  When	   the	  choice	   is	  active,	   it	   is	  a	   constituent	  part	  of	   the	  action	  process.	   If	   the	  choice	   is	  “idle”,	  however,	  it	  can	  exist	  separately	  from	  the	  action.	  This	  means,	  in	  turn,	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  the	  logical	  possibility	  for	  the	  akratic	  to	  choose,	  and	  not	  to	  perform	  the	  chosen	  action.	  	  In	   this	   section,	   I	   proposed	  an	   account	  of	   the	  practical	   syllogism	  according	   to	  which	   the	  major	  premise	  is	  an	  evaluative	  stance	  that	  expresses	  the	  agents	  needs,	  wants	  or	  desires,	  and	  the	  minor	  premise	  is	  a	  particular	  occasion	  in	  which	  the	  evaluative	  stance	  can	  be	  realized.	  I	  then	  considered	  Aristotle’s	  claim	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  an	  action	  in	  light	  of	  his	  views	  on	  practical	   deliberation,	   and	   I	   tried	   to	   reconcile	   this	   claim	   with	   the	   view	   that	   the	   result	   of	  deliberation	  is	  choice.	  If	  my	  interpretation	  is	  correct,	  the	  choice	  and	  the	  action	  are	  not	  identical,	  share	  a	  very	   close	   relationship:	   the	   choice	   is	   the	  efficient	   cause	  of	   the	  action.	  This	  means	   that	  when	  the	  choice	  is	  not	  idle	  it	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  the	  chosen	  action.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Aristotle	  	  is	  not	  contradicting	  himself	  when	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	   is	   an	   action,	   and	   the	   result	   of	   deliberation	   is	   choice.	   I	   also	   emphasized	   that	   this	  interpretation	  seems	  to	  dismiss	  Wiggins’	  worry	  that	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  seems	   to	   be	   in	   tension	   with	   his	   account	   of	   akrasia.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   will	   bring	   these	  considerations	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	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4.3	  NE	  VII.3:	  The	  Syllogistic	  Account	  of	  Akrasia	  
Aristotle’s	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia	  begins	  at	  NE	  1147a	  33	  and	  finishes	  at	  NE	  1147b	  19.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  divide	  the	  passage	  into	  five	  short	  sections.	  I	  will	  analyze	  these	  sections	  in	  light	  of	   the	   interpretive	   considerations	   I	   proposed	   in	   the	   previous	   three	   chapters	   of	   this	  work.	  My	  interpretation	  of	  NE	  1147a	  33-­‐1147b	  19,	  therefore,	  will	  be	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  speculative,	  for	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  theoretical	  analysis	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  pursue	  so	  far.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  analysis	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  solving	  some	  puzzles	  that	  this	  passage	  seems	  to	  give	  rise	  to,	  and	  that	  it	  can	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  Aristotle’s	  distinction	  between	  virtue,	  vice,	  enkrateia	  and	  akrasia.	  As	   I	   proceed	   to	   unpack	   this	   long	   passage,	   I	   will	   emphasize	   that	   these	   advantages	   include	   an	  explanation	  of	  why	   the	  akratic’s	  action	   is	  not	   “chosen"	  even	   though	   the	  akratic	  can	  arrive	  at	  a	  choice;	  an	   intelligible	  account	  of	  enkrateia;	  and	  a	  view	  on	   the	  similarities	  between	  the	  akratic,	  the	   sleeping,	   the	   drunk	   and	   the	   student.	   If	  my	   analysis	   is	   convincing,	   I	  will	   be	   able	   to	   briefly	  consider	   some	   of	   its	   implications	   on	   Aristotle’s	   account	   of	   virtue	   and	  moral	   education	   in	   the	  concluding	  section.	  In	  NE	  1147a	  33-­‐37,	   	   Aristotle	   introduces	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   syllogistic	   account	   of	  akrasia	   as	  follows:	  (1)	  Suppose,	   then,	   that	  someone	  has	   the	  universal	  belief	  hindering	   from	  tasting;	  he	  has	  the	   second	  belief,	   that	   everything	   sweet	   is	  pleasant	   and	   this	   is	   sweet,	   and	   this	  belief	   is	  active;	  but	   it	   turns	  out	  that	  appetite	   is	  present	   in	  him.	  The	  belief	   [that	   follows	  from	  the	  previous	  two	  beliefs]	  tells	  him	  to	  avoid	  this;	  but	  appetite	  leads	  him	  on,	  since	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  moving	  all	  the	  [bodily]	  parts.	  In	  this	  passage,	  according	  to	  most	  commentators,	  Aristotle	  attributes	  to	  the	  akratic	  two	  distinct	  syllogisms:	  S1	  do	  not	  taste	  sweet	  things	  (Mp)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   S2	  all	  sweet	  things	  are	  pleasant	  (Mp)	  This	  is	  sweet	  (mp)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  is	  sweet	  (mp)	  Do	  not	  taste	  this!	  (c)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	  is	  pleasant	  	  (c)	  	  	  S1	  and	  S2	  have	  two	  different	  major	  premises	  and	  share	  the	  minor.	  Their	  conclusions	  generate	  conflicting	   desires:	   S1	   prompts	   the	   agent	   to	   avoid	   the	   piece	   of	   cake,	  while	   S2	   emphasizes	   the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  cake.	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  account	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  I	  proposed	  above,	  we	  can	   interpret	  both	  syllogisms	  as	  expressing	  a	  general	  want	  or	  desire	  of	   the	  agent	   in	  the	  major	  premise,	  and	  a	  particular	  occasion	  in	  which	  the	  general	  want	  or	  desire	  can	  be	  realized	  in	   the	   minor.	   If	   both	   syllogisms	   are	   expressive	   of	   a	   deliberative	   process,	   then	   both	   their	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conclusions	  should	  be	  a	  deliberative	  desire,	  or	  a	  choice	  that,	  if	  active,	  would	  generate	  an	  action.	  Identifying	   two	   distinct	   syllogisms	   in	   the	   passage	   above,	   however,	   seems	   to	   present	   at	   least	  three	  difficulties.	  	  The	  first	  difficulty	  stems	  from	  the	  phrasing	  of	  the	  passage,	  which	  doesn’t	   immediately	  suggest	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  distinct	  syllogisms.	  Indeed,	  although	  Aristotle	  clarifies	  that	  the	  first	  premise	  of	  S1	  is	  a	  proper	  major	  (kat’holou),	  he	  doesn’t	  explicitly	  tell	  us	  how	  the	  premise	  should	  be	  stated.	  We	  only	  know	  that	  the	  major	  premise	  is	  supposed	  to	  “hinder	  the	  agent	  from	  tasting”.	  Moreover,	  what	   is	  usually	  considered	  the	  major	  premise	  of	  the	  second	  syllogism,	   i.e.	  “everything	  sweet	   is	  pleasant”,	  is	  not	  explicitly	  called	  a	  major	  premise.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  presented	  as	  if	  it	  were	  connected	  to	  the	  shared	  minor	  premise	  “this	  is	  sweet”.	  The	  presence	  of	  two	  distinct	  conclusions	  in	  the	  form	  of	  choice	  or	  chosen	  action,	  in	  turn,	  is	  questionable.	  Aristotle	  only	  mentions	  the	  “idle”	  conclusion	  of	   the	   first	   syllogism,	   “avoid	   this”,	   but	   doesn’t	   explicitly	   tell	   us	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   second	  syllogism,	  which	  should	  be	  active	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  akratic	  action.	  	  The	   second	   difficulty	   arises	   because	   attributing	   to	   the	   akratic	   two	   overlapping	   complete	  syllogisms,	  if	  we	  agree	  that	  practical	  syllogisms	  reconstructs	  a	  deliberation,190	  means	  attributing	  to	   her	   two	   distinct	   and	   simultaneous	   complete	   processes	   of	   deliberation.	   These	   two	  deliberations,	   if	   carried	   forward	   by	   two	   different	   agents,	   would	   terminate	   in	   two	   opposite	  choices	   that	  would	   give	   rise	   to	   two	   opposite	   actions:	   eating	   the	   sweet	   thing	   and	   avoiding	   the	  sweet	   thing.	   How	   do	   we	   account	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   when	   the	   two	   deliberative	   processes	   are	  carried	  forward	  simultaneously	  by	  the	  same	  agent,	  only	  the	  second	  one,	  i.e.	  the	  one	  that	  results	  in	   the	   akratic	   action,	   is	   effective?	   One	   obvious	   explanation,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Aristotle’s	   view,	  would	   be	   epistemic	   ignorance.	   The	   agent	   doesn’t	   act	   according	   to	   the	   "non-­‐akratic	   syllogism"	  (S1)	  because	  she	  fails	  to	  grasp	  or	  to	  have	  rational	  confidence	  in	  one	  of	  its	  premises.	  Later	  on	  in	  his	   syllogistic	   account	   of	   akrasia,	   Aristotle	   tells	   us	   that	   the	   akratic	   lacks	   knowledge	   of	   the	  particular.191	   Hence,	   the	   most	   plausible	   view	   for	   an	   interpretation	   that	   sees	   the	   akratic	   as	  ignoring	   one	   of	   the	   premises	   of	   the	   non-­‐akratic	   syllogism	   is	   a	   view	   according	   to	   which	   the	  akratic	  ignores	  either	  the	  particular	  premise	  or	  the	  conclusion.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  akratic	  fails	  to	   know	  or	   to	   have	   rational	   confidence	   that	   the	   object	   in	   front	   of	   her	   is	   sweet,	   or	   she	   fails	   to	  know	  or	  to	  have	  rational	  confidence	  in	  the	  choice	  to	  avoid	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  In	  other	  passages	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  (NE	  1117b	  20),	  Aristotle	  uses	  the	  practical	  syllogism	  to	  describe	  the	  deliberative	  process	  that	  could	  have	  led	  the	  agent	  to	  a	  particular	  choice,	  even	  though	  the	  agent	  has	  chosen	  to	  do	  something	  without	  deliberating.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  my	  interpretation	  because	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  here	  Aristotle	  is	  reconstructing	  the	  akratic's	  actual	  deliberation.	  191	  NE	  1147	  10-­‐19	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  Some	  version	  or	  other	  of	   this	   explanation	  has	  been	  proposed	  by	  many	   interpreters192,	   and	   in	  some	  cases	  it	  seems	  very	  sophisticated	  and	  convincing.	  In	  this	  work,	  I	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  devote	  the	  required	  attention	  to	  a	  survey	  and	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  advantages	  or	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  different	   possible	   versions	   of	   this	   view.	   Rather,	   I	   will	   emphasize	   the	   importance	   of	   three	  objections	  they	  all	  seem	  to	  face:	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  exclude	  clear	  eyed	  akrasia,	  their	  tendency	  to	  render	  enkrateia	  unintelligible	  and	  the	  difficulties	   they	   face	   in	  accommodating	  Aristotle’s	  view	  that	  the	  akratic	  doesn’t	  act	  on	  a	  choice.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  emphasized	  how	  Aristotle	  seems	  to	  be	  committed	  at	  least	  to	  the	   view	   that	   clear-­‐eyed	  akrasia	   is	   possible.	   Some	   akratics,	   in	   particular	   those	  he	  dubs	   “weak	  akratics”,	   know	   that	  what	   they	   do	   is	  wrong	   or	   blameworthy.	   A	   view	   that	   explains	   akrasia	   by	  epistemic	   ignorance	   or	   lack	   of	   rational	   confidence	   in	   one	   of	   the	   premises	   of	   the	   “non-­‐akratic	  syllogism”,	  however,	   seems	   to	   threaten	   the	  very	  possibility	  of	  clear-­‐eyed	  akrasia.	  How	  can	   the	  akratic	   know	   that	   she	   is	   doing	   something	   wrong,	   if	   she	   either	   ignores	   that	   she	   is	   eating	  something	  sweet,	  or	  if	  she	  is	  not	  convinced	  that	  she	  shouldn’t	  eat	  this	  particular	  sweet	  thing?	  	  
Enkrateia,	   being	   the	   counterpart	   of	   akrasia,	   raises	   similar	   problems	   for	   a	   view	   that	   relies	   on	  epistemic	  ignorance	  to	  explain	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  The	  enkratic	  agent	  is	  someone	  who	  desires	  to	  perform	  the	  akratic	  action,	  but	  manages	  to	  refrain	  from	  it:	  	  opposed	  to	  the	  akratic	  man	  is	  another	  (the	  enkratic),	  who	  stands	  firm	  by	  his	  choice,	  and	  does	  not	  abandon	  it	  under	  the	  mere	  impulse	  of	  passion.193	  	  Aristotle,	  in	  book	  VII	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  focuses	  on	  the	  akratic,	  and	  doesn’t	  devote	  much	  space	  to	  the	  enkratic.	  An	  account	  of	  enkrateia,	  therefore,	  must	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  few	  remarks	  we	   find	   in	   the	   text	   and	   from	   the	   parallel	   treatment	   of	  akrasia.	   The	   enkratic	   desires	   to	   do	   the	  akratic	  action,	  and	  thereby	  supposedly	  has	  the	  "akratic	  syllogism"	  (S2)	  that	  everything	  sweet	  is	  pleasant	  and	  this	  is	  sweet.	  Nevertheless,	  she	  also	  knows	  that	  she	  should	  avoid	  sweet	  things,	  and	  that	  this	  thing	  is	  sweet,	  and	  this	  non-­‐akratic	  syllogism	  is	  the	  one	  that	  eventually	  leads	  her	  to	  act.	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   akratic,	   we	   explained	   the	   fact	   that	   she	   acts	   on	   the	   akratic	   syllogism	  emphasizing	  that	  she	  ignores	  one	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  non-­‐akratic	  syllogism.	  Can	  we	  provide	  a	  parallel	   explanation	   of	   the	   enkratic’s	   case?	   Simply	   assuming	   that	   since	   the	   enkratic	   has	  knowledge	  of	  the	  non-­‐akratic	  syllogism	  she	  would	  act	  on	  it	  is	  not	  enough.	  If	  the	  two	  syllogisms	  express	  two	  parallel	  deliberations	  which	  have	  contrary	  results	  (one	  prompts	  the	  akratic	  action,	  the	  other	  hinders	  it)	  then	  assuming	  that	  the	  non-­‐akratic	  one	  must	  be	  decisive	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  ad	  
hoc	  solution.	  Indeed,	  we	  know	  from	  the	  Metaphysics	  that	  if	  an	  agent	  wishes	  or	  desires	  to	  do	  two	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  Moss	  2009,	  p	  152,	  McDowell	  1998,	  p	  29,	  Lorenz	  2006,	  p	  191	  to	  some	  extent	  Charles	  2009.	  193	  NE	  1151a	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contrary	  things,	  her	  predicament	  has	  to	  be	  considered	  an	  obstacle	  against	  acting	  in	  general.	  Like	  Buridan’s	  donkey,	  she	  will	  not	  act:	  hence	  even	  if	   it	  wishes	  or	  desires	  to	  do	  two	  things	  or	  contrary	  things	  simultaneously,	   it	  will	  not	  do	  them,	  for	  it	  has	  not	  the	  capability	  to	  do	  them	  under	  these	  conditions,	  nor	  has	  it	  the	  capability	  of	  doing	  things	  simultaneously,	  since	  it	  will	  only	  do	  the	  things	  to	  which	  the	  capability	  applies	  and	  under	  the	  appropriate	  conditions.194	  Another	  possible	  explanation	  of	  enkratic	  behaviour	  which	  is	  coherent	  with	  the	  attribution	  of	  an	  epistemic	  failure	  to	  the	  akratic,	  then,	  could	  consist	  in	  assuming	  that	  the	  enkratic	  doesn’t	  know	  or	  lacks	  confidence	  in	  one	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  akratic	  syllogism.	  This	  solution,	  however,	  has	  to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge	  never	  been	  proposed,	  and	  for	  a	  good	  reason.	  Although	  it	   is	  true	  that	  Aristotle’s	   silence	   on	   the	   explanation	   of	  enkrateia	   allows	  us	   to	   present	   imaginative	   proposals,	  assuming	   that	   the	   enkratic	   doesn’t	   know	  one	   of	   the	   premises	   of	   the	   akratic	   syllogism	  doesn’t	  seem	  plausible.	  Indeed,	  what	  characterizes	  the	  state	  of	  enkrateia	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  bad	  desires,	  desires	  that	  lead	  the	  agent	  towards	  a	  blameworthy	  action.	  If	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  these	  desires	  are	  the	   result	   of	   an	   akratic	   syllogism,	   it	   would	   be	   counterintuitive	   to	   picture	   the	   enkratic	   as	  “ignorant”	   of	   one	   of	   the	   premises	   of	   that	   syllogism.	   This	   point	   is	   connected	   to	   the	   problems	  raised	  by	  the	  exclusion	  of	  clear-­‐eyed	  akrasia.	  If	  it	  seems	  implausible	  to	  claim	  that	  Aristotle	  didn’t	  allow	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   clear-­‐eyed	   akrasia,	   then	   assuming	   that	   he	   also	   denied	   that	   the	  enkratic	   is	   aware	   of	   her	   bad	   desire	   is	   even	  more	   problematic.	  We	  may	   know	   little	   about	   the	  enkratic,	  but	  we	  know	   that	   she	   feels	  and	   is	   attracted	  by	  blameworthy	  pleasures,	   although	  she	  doesn’t	  act	  on	  them.195	  The	  third	  problem	  of	  a	  view	  that	  attributes	  to	  the	  akratic	  two	  distinct	  and	  complete	  syllogisms	  arises	  with	   respect	   to	  Aristotle’s	   claim	   that	   the	  akratic,	   as	  opposed	   to	   the	  vicious,	   acts	  against	  her	  choice196and	  is	  not	  convinced	  that	  she	  should	  perform	  the	  akratic	  action.197	  Hence,	  Aristotle	  seems	   to	   grant	   that	   the	   akratic	   action	   is	   not	   chosen.	   If	   the	   akratic	   entertains	   two	   practical	  syllogisms,	   and	   acts	   on	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   normatively	   incorrect	   syllogism	   because	   of	   her	  ignorance,	  however,	  how	  can	  her	  action	  be	  "not	  chosen"?	  After	  all,	   the	  akratic	  syllogism	  would	  represent	  a	  vicious	  piece	  of	  practical	  deliberation,	  whose	  result	  is	  a	  blameworthy	  choice.	  Similar	  to	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   non-­‐akratic	   syllogism	  would	   always	   be	   decisive	   and	  win	   over	   the	  akratic	   syllogism,	   the	   stipulation	   that	   the	   former	   expresses	   a	   deliberation	   whose	   result	   is	   a	  choice	  while	  the	  latter	  doesn’t	  seems	  an	  ad	  hoc	  solution.	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In	  light	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  arise	  if	  we	  attribute	  to	  the	  akratic	  two	  distinct	  “strings”	  of	  practical	  deliberation,	   therefore,	   we	   should	   look	   for	   an	   alternative	   interpretation	   of	   NE1147a	   33-­‐37.	  Instead	  of	   reconstructing	   two	  syllogisms,	  we	  can	  see	  Aristotle	  as	  presenting	  a	  single,	   complex,	  process	  of	  deliberation:	  the	  universal	  belief	  hindering	  from	  tasting[…]	  the	  second	  belief,	  that	  everything	  sweet	  is	  pleasant	  and	  this	  is	  sweet,	  and	  this	  belief	  is	  active[…]The	  belief	  that[…]	  tells	  him	  to	  avoid	  this;199	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  akratic's	  deliberation,	  then,	  would	  be	  the	  following:	  First	  Belief:	  sweet	  things	  should	  be	  avoided.	  Second	  Belief:	  everything	  sweet	  is	  pleasant	  and	  this	  is	  sweet.	  Conclusion:	  avoid	  this.	  The	  deliberative	  process	  could	  be	  divided	  in	  two	  phases,	  which	  can	  characterized	  as	  top	  down	  and	  bottom	  up	  respectively.	   In	  the	  top	  down	  phase,	   the	  akratic	  accepts	  the	  first	  belief	  that	  she	  should	  avoid	  sweet	  things	  (or	  has	  the	  aim	  of	  avoiding	  sweet	  things),	  and	  the	  second	  belief	  that	  the	   piece	   of	   cake	   in	   front	   of	   her	   is	   sweet	   and	   everything	   sweet	   is	   pleasant.	   In	   the	   bottom	   up	  phase,	   the	   second	   belief	   (in	   particular	   the	   belief	   that	   everything	   sweet	   is	   pleasant)	   is	  accompanied	   by	   the	  mistaken	   evaluative	   generalization	   that	   all	   pleasant	   things	   are	   good	   and	  strongly	   desirable.200	   	   This	   generalization	   is	   the	   source	   of	   the	   akratic's	   mistake,	   for	   it	   is	   the	  source	   of	   the	   mistaken	   phantasia	   of	   the	   sweet	   in	   front	   of	   her	   as	   good	   and	   desirable.	   It	   isn't	  surprising,	  within	   the	  Aristotelian	   corpus,	   that	   the	  belief	   that	   some	   things	   are	  pleasant	  would	  prompt	  a	  non-­‐virtuous	  agent	  to	  represent	  them	  as	  "good"	  or	  "desirable".	  In	  NE	  1113a	  35-­‐	  1113b	  2,	   Aristotle	  writes	   that	   what	   is	   pleasant	   deceives	   the	  many	   (tois	   pollois),	   precisely	   because	   it	  appears	   (phainetai)	   good.	   Moreover,	   Aristotle	   seems	   to	   gesture	   towards	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  akratic's	  decisive	  desire	  to	  eat	  the	  cake	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  mistaken	  evaluative	  generalization	  a	  few	  lines	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  Indeed,	  describing	  what	  seems	  to	  be	   a	   "vicious"	   syllogism,	   he	   attributes	   to	   the	   vicious	   glutton	   the	   universal	   evaluative	   premise	  that	  "everything	  sweet	  must	  be	  tasted"201	  .	  	  It	  is	  plausible	  to	  interpret	  this	  universal	  premise	  as	  expressing	   a	   (mistaken)	   evaluative	   judgement	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   sweets	   things:	   they	   must	   be	  tasted	  because	  they	  are	  good,	  because	  they	  are	  desirable.	  Hence,	  it	  can	  be	  a	  similar	  appearance,	  or	  even	  a	  similar	  belief,	  that	  inclines	  the	  akratic	  to	  have	  a	  non-­‐doxastic	  mistaken	  phantasia	  of	  the	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sweet	   thing	   as	   desirable	   and	   good.	   The	   mistaken	   phantasia,	   in	   turn,	   is	   the	   source	   of	   the	  blameworthy	   desire	   that	   leads	   the	   akratic	   to	   eat	   the	   sweet	   thing	   even	   though	   she	   thinks	   it	  shouldn't	  be	  tasted.	  	  The	  minor	  premise,	  i.e.	  the	  belief	  that	  "everything	  sweet	  is	  pleasant	  and	  this	  is	  sweet"	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  false:	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  the	  akratic	  would	  feel	  pleasure	  eating	  the	  cake,	   and	   it	   may	   also	   be	   true	   that	   even	   the	   virtuous	   person,	   if	   coerced	   to	   eat	   it,	   would	   feel	  pleasure	   too.	   	   However,	   this	   belief,	   in	   the	   akratic's202	   case,	   is	   accompanied	   by	   a	   mistaken	  generalization,	  by	  an	  evaluative	  mistake.	  In	  general	  she	  is	  wrong	  to	  represent	  all	  sweet	  things	  as	  desirable,	  or	  good.	  In	  particular,	  she	  is	  also	  wrong	  to	  represent	  the	  specific	  sweet	  thing	  in	  front	  of	  her	  as	  desirable	  or	  good.	  	  	  The	   top	   down	   phase,	   then,	   is	   reflective	   and	   quasi-­‐deductive.	   The	   bottom	   up	   phase,	   on	   the	  contrary,	   arises	   from	   the	   akratic’s	   perception	   of	   a	   particular	   object	   (the	   sweet),	   and	   from	   the	  belief	  that	  all	  object	  of	  that	  kind	  (sweets)	  are	  pleasant.	  The	  bottom-­‐up	  phase	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  akratic	  ignorance,	  or	  of	  her	  failure	  of	  phantasia:	  the	  belief	  that	  all	  sweet	  things	  are	  pleasant	  and	  the	  individuation	  of	  a	  sweet	  thing	  is	  accompanied	  by	  the	  mistaken	  generalization	  that	  all	  sweet	  things	   are	   desirable	   and	   good.	   	   This	   mistaken	   generalization,	   moreover,	   produces	   the	  appearance	   of	   the	   sweet	   thing	   in	   front	   of	   her	   as	   good	   and	   desirable,	  which	   is	   the	   source	   of	   a	  decisive	   epithumetic	   desire	   to	   eat	   it.	   It	   is	   because	   of	   a	   mistaken	   appearance,	   then,	   that	   the	  akratic's	  deliberation	   can	  only	  arrive	   to	   an	   idle	   choice.	   She	   chooses	   to	   avoid	   the	   cake,	  but	  her	  choice	  is	  not	  active	  in	  her	  refraining	  from	  tasting	  it.	  Her	  intellectual	  reasoning	  is	  correct,	  but	  it	  faces	  the	  obstacle	  of	  a	  mistaken	  non-­‐doxastic	  representation	  of	  phantasia.	  	  If	  this	  is	  a	  plausible	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  deliberative	  process,	  it	  can	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  Aristotle’s	   view	   that	   akratic	   actions	   are	  not	   chosen.	  The	   “top	  down”,	   quasi-­‐deductive	  phase	  of	  the	   akratic’s	   reasoning	   is	   correct,	   and	   can	   lead	   her	   to	   choose	   to	   avoid	   the	   akratic	   action.	  Nevertheless,	   her	   deliberation	   is	   disturbed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   her	   phantasia	   wrongly	   represents	  something	  as	   good	  and	  desirable.	  This	  malfunction	  of	  phantasia,	   however,	   isn't	   the	   result	  of	   a	  parallel	  deliberative	  process.	  Rather,	  it	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  non-­‐deliberative,	  or	  non-­‐reflective	  desire.	  Hence,	   the	  mistaken	  phantasia	   cannot	   generate	   a	  wrong	  choice:	   as	   I	   noted	   in	   the	   first	   section,	  according	   to	   Aristotle	   choice	   is	   a	   deliberative	   desire,	   it	   is	   the	   result	   of	   deliberation203.	   On	   the	  contrary,	   the	   mistaken	   phantasia,	   by	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   non-­‐deliberative	   desire,	   renders	   the	  akratic’s	  choice	  idle	  and	  results	  in	  the	  akratic	  action.	  	  In	  this	  picture,	  the	  failure	  of	  phantasia	  generates	  a	  desire	  which	  is	  sufficient	  to	  “deactivate”	  the	  akratic’s	   choice,	   thus	   explaining	   akratic	   action,	   or	   in-­‐action.	   Is	   this	   interpretation	   also	   able	   to	  accommodate	   the	  case	  of	   the	  enkratic?	  The	  enkratic	  seems	  similar	   to	   the	  akratic	   in	   that	  she	   is	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also	   subject	   the	  malfunctioning	  of	  phantasia.	   She	  also	  desires	   to	  do	   the	  akratic	  action,	  but	   she	  manages	  to	  refrain	  from	  doing	  so.	  A	  view	  according	  to	  which	  an	  evaluatively	  mistaken	  phantasia	  generates	  a	  desire	  that	  can	  cause	  the	  akratic	  action	  must	  explain	  the	  enkratic’s	  ability	  to	  resist.	  Significantly,	   even	   though	   he	   doesn't	   discuss	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   enkratic	   at	   length,	  Aristotle	  briefly	  comments	  on	  this	  ability	  of	  the	  enkratic:	  	  for	  some	  people	  are	  like	  those	  who	  do	  not	  get	  tickled	  themselves	  if	  they	  tickle	  someone	  else	   first;	   if	   they	   see	   and	  notice	   something	   in	   advance,	   and	   rouse	   themselves	   and	   their	  rational	  calculation,	  they	  are	  not	  overcome	  by	  feelings,	  no	  matter	  whether	  something	  is	  pleasant	  or	  painful206.	  	  In	   this	  passage,	  Aristotle	   stresses	  how	   impetuous	  akratics	  may	  become	  enkratic	  and	   	   learn	   to	  control	  their	  akratic	  behaviour	  by	  adopting	  some	  preventative	  strategies.	  In	  this	  case,	  if	  they	  can	  foresee	   the	  situation	   in	  which	  the	  desire	  (the	  “tickling”)	  will	  arise,	   they	  can	  counterbalance	   its	  motivational	   force.	  We	   could	   suppose,	   then,	   that	   similar	   strategies	   could	   be	   adopted	   by	   those	  who	  are	  prone	  to	  weak	  akrasia:	  that	  is,	  those	  who	  manage	  to	  deliberate	  but	  only	  arrive	  at	  an	  idle	  choice.	   Enkratics	   who	   find	   themselves	   in	   a	   similar	   position,	   may	   nevertheless	   refrain	   from	  behaving	   akratically	   because	   they	   are	   able	   to	   reinforce	   their	   choice	  with	   a	   series	   of	   cognitive	  strategies.	  They	  may	  direct	   their	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  mistaken	  evaluation	  of	  phantasia,	  or	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  “dwell”	  on	  the	  reasons	  provided	  by	  their	  deliberation.	  It	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  this	  capacity	  of	  abiding	  by	  their	  choice	  that	  Aristotle	  defines	  the	  character	  (hexis)207	  of	  the	  enkratic	  excellent.	   	  The	  enkratic	  knows	  how	  to	  resist	  what	  most	  people	  can’t	  resist.	  Like	  Odysseus	  with	  the	  sirens,	  they	  find	  a	  way	  to	  tie	  themselves	  to	  their	  reasoning	  in	  order	  not	  to	  fall	  pray	  to	  the	  call	  of	  akrasia.	  Interpreting	  the	  first	  paragraph	  of	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia	  as	  the	  description	  of	  a	  single	  complex	  process	  of	   deliberation,	  moreover,	   offers	   an	   interesting	   viewpoint	   on	   the	   subsequent	  remarks	  Aristotle	  makes.	  Once	  he	  has	  reconstructed	  the	  akratic’s	  reasoning,	  Aristotle	  writes	  that	  (2)	  [...]in	  a	  way,	  he	  acts	  akratically	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  reason.	  The	  [	  second]	  belief	  is	  contrary	   to	   the	   correct	   reason,	   but	   coincidentally,	   not	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   For	   the	   bodily	  desire,	   not	   the	  belief,	   is	   contrary.	  This	   is	   also	  why	  beasts	   are	  not	   akratic,	   because	   they	  have	  no	  universal	  supposition,	  but	  only	  phantasia	  and	  memory	  of	  particulars.208	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  NE	  1150b	  25-­‐30	  207	  NE	  1151a	  28	  208	  NE	  1147b	  1-­‐6.	  "ὑπὸ	  λόγου	  πως	  καὶ	  δόξης	  ἀκρατεύεσθαι,	  οὐκ	  ἐναντίας	  δὲ	  καθ’	  αὑτήν,	  ἀλλὰ	  κατὰ	  συμβεβηκός—ἡ	  γὰρ	  ἐπιθυμία	  ἐναντία,	  ἀλλ’	  οὐχ	  ἡ	  δόξα—τῷ	  ὀρθῷ	  λόγῳ·	  ὥστε	  καὶ	  διὰ	  τοῦτο	  τὰ	  θηρία	  οὐκ	  ἀκρατῆ,	  ὅτι	  οὐκ	  ἔχει	  καθόλου	  ὑπόληψιν	  ἀλλὰ	  τῶν	  καθ’	  ἕκαστα	  φαντασίαν	  καὶ	  μνήμην.	  I	  translate	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The	   akratic	   is	   such	   even	   though	   her	   beliefs	   are	   correct,	   and	   can	   be	   akratic	   although	   she	   is	  capable	  of	  reasoning.	  She	  knows	  that	  she	  should	  avoid	  sweet	  things.	  Even	  her	  second	  belief,	  i.e.	  the	  belief	  "that	  everything	  sweet	   is	  pleasant	  and	  this	   is	  sweet",	   is	  coherent	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  sweet	  things	  should	  be	  avoided:	  it	  is	  not	  contradictory	  to	  maintain	  that	  sweet	  things	  should	  be	  avoided	  even	  though	  they	  are	  pleasant.	  The	  second	  belief,	  however,	  is	  coincidentally	  in	  tension	  with	  correct	  reason,	  because	  it	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  mistaken	  appearance,	  which	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  blameworthy	  bodily	  desire	  and	  of	  the	  corresponding	  akratic	  action.	  The	  agent	  described	  in	  this	   passage	   is	   akratic	   precisely	   because	   she	   acts	   against	   her	   deliberation	   even	   though	   her	  beliefs	   are	   correct	   and	   coherent.	   Animals,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   cannot	   possibly	   be	   faced	  with	   her	  predicament,	   for	   they	   lack	   logos	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  reason	  and	  deliberate,	  although	  they	  have	  
phantasia.	  Hence,	  although	  they	  have	  bodily	  desires	  and	  phantasia,	  they	  couldn't	  possibly	  follow	  them	  against	   	  a	   "correct	  reasoning".	   Indeed,	   they	  are	  not	  able	   to	  characterize	  reflectively	   their	  actions	  as	  right	  or	  wrong.	  	  The	  next	  three	  paragraphs	  mark	  a	  change	  of	  viewpoint,	  and	  exemplify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  ignorance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia:	  3)How	  is	  the	   ignorance	  resolved,	  so	  that	  the	  akratic	  recovers	  his	  knowledge?	  The	  same	  account	  that	  applies	  to	  someone	  drunk	  or	  asleep	  applies	  here	  too,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  	  special	  to	  this	  way	  of	  being	  affected.	  We	  must	  hear	  it	  from	  the	  natural	  scientists.209	  4)Since	  the	  last	  premise	  is	  a	  belief	  about	  something	  perceptible,	  and	  controls	  action,	  this	  is	  what	  the	  akratic	  does	  not	  have	  when	  he	  is	  being	  affected.	  Or	  the	  way	  he	  has	  is	  it	  is	  not	  [full]	  knowledge	  of	  it,	  but,	  as	  we	  saw,	  [results	  in]	  merely	  saying	  the	  words,	  as	  the	  drunk	  says	  the	  words	  of	  Empedocles.210	  5)	  And	  since	  the	  last	  term	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  universal,	  or	  expressive	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  same	  way	  of	   the	  universal	   term,	  even	  the	  result	   that	  Socrates	  was	   looking	   for	  seems	  to	  come	  about.	  For	  the	  pathos	   	  does	  not	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  what	  seems	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ὑπὸ	  λόγου	  πως	  καὶ	  δόξης	  ἀκρατεύεσθαι	  as	  “he	  acts	  acratically	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  reason".	  Aristotle's	  use	  of	  πως	  suggests	  that	  he	  is	  not	  using	  ὑπὸ	  as	  the	  connective	  for	  a	  proper	  efficient	  cause.	  
209	  NE	  1147b	  7-­‐10	  210	  "ἐπεὶ	  δ’	  ἡ	  τελευταία	  πρότασις	  δόξα	  τε	  αἰσθητοῦ	  καὶ	  κυρία	  τῶν	  πράξεων,	  ταύτην	  ἢ	  οὐκ	  ἔχει	  ἐν	  τῷ	  πάθει	  ὤν,	  ἢ	  οὕτως	  ἔχει	  ὡς	  οὐκ	  ἦν	  τὸ	  ἔχειν	  ἐπίστασθαι	  ἀλλὰ	  λέγειν	  ὥσπερ	  ὁ	  οἰνωμένος	  τὰ	  
Ἐμπεδοκλέους."	  NE	  1147b	  11-­‐14	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be	  knowledge	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  nor	  is	  this	  very	  same	  knowledge	  that	  is	  dragged	  about	  by	  the	  pathos	  ,	  but	  as	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.211	  	  Paragraph	   3)	   is	   easily	   squared	   with	   the	   thesis	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   is	   a	   failure	   of	  
phantasia.	  Sleep	  and	  drunkenness	  are,	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	  states	  in	  which	  the	  agent’s	  faculty	  of	  phantasia	  is	  particularly	  fervid	  and	  productive:	  it	   is	  evident	   from	   the	   fore	  going	   that	   stimuli	   arising	   from	  sense	   impression,	  both	   those	  which	  are	  derived	  from	  without	  and	  those	  which	  have	  their	  origin	  within	  the	  body,	  occur	  not	  only	  when	  we	  are	  awake,	  but	  also	  when	  the	  affection	  we	  call	  sleep	  supervenes,	  and	  even	  more	  at	  that	  time.212	  	  That	   there	   is	   a	   close	   connection	   between	   the	   workings	   of	   the	   faculty	   of	   phantasia	   and	  physiological	  processes,	  in	  turn,	  is	  clear	  from	  De	  Anima	  428b-­‐429a,	  where	  phantasia	  is	  described	  as	   a	   kind	   of	   movement	   that	   arises	   from	   perception.	   It	   is	   not	   surprising,	   then,	   that	   Aristotle	  thought	  that	  the	  akratic	  valuational	  mistakes	  can	  be	  analyzed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  natural	  scientist,	  and	  that	  the	  natural	  scientist	  can	  tell	  us	  how	  she	  recovers	  from	  her	  state	  of	  ignorance.	  Her	  phantasia	   is	   triggered	   in	  particular	  occasions,	   i.e.	  when	  she	  perceives	  a	   type	  of	  object	   that	  she	  tends	  to	  see	  as	  (or	  believes	  to	  be)	  good	  or	  desirable	  (for	  example,	  sweets).	  When	  the	  object	  is	  not	  present	  or	   available,	  we	   can	   suppose	   that	   the	   akratic’s	  psychophysical	  upheaval	   ceases.	  She	  wakes	  up	  or	  sobers	  up,	  and	  her	  ignorance	  is	  resolved.	  	  	  Paragraph	  4)	  and	  5)	  are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  debated	  among	  the	  interpreters	  of	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	   akrasia.	   Here	   Aristotle	   seems	   to	   be	   determined	   to	   individuate	   the	   specific	   premise	   of	   the	  practical	  syllogism	  that	  the	  akratic	  either	  doesn’t	  know,	  or	  knows	  in	  a	  way	  that	  only	  allows	  her	  to	   “say	   the	   words”.	   He	   writes	   that	   this	   premise	   is	   the	   last	   one	   (teleutaia),	   and	   that	   it	   is	   not	  universal,	  but	  these	  remarks	  do	  not	  render	  his	  position	  less	  ambiguous.	  The	  terms	  he	  uses	  make	  the	   reader	   think	   that	   he	   is	   referring	   to	   the	   minor	   premise,	   which	   is	   kath’echaston,	   about	   a	  particular.	  As	  David	  Charles	  has	  noted,	  however,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  he	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  conclusion,	  especially	  if	  we	  attribute	  to	  Aristotle	  the	  view	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  an	  action.213	  Does	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  akratic’s	  failure	  isn’t	  an	   intellectual	   failure	   but	   a	   failure	   of	   phantasia	   offer	   a	   way	   to	   resolve	   this	   ambiguity?	   As	   I	  emphasized	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  akratic’s	  complex	  process	  of	  deliberation,	  the	  failure	  of	  
phantasia	   is	  “triggered”	  when	  the	  akratic	  perceives	  the	  sweet	  as	  present	  and	  available.	  Indeed,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  "καὶ	  διὰ	  τὸ	  μὴ	  καθόλου	  μηδ’	  ἐπιστημονικὸν	  ὁμοίως	  εἶναι	  δοκεῖν	  τῷ	  καθόλου	  τὸν	  ἔσχατον	  ὅρον	  καὶ	  
ἔοικεν	  ὃ	  ἐζήτει	  Σωκράτης	  συμβαίνειν·	  οὐ	  γὰρ	  τῆς	  κυρίως	  ἐπιστήμης	  εἶναι	  δοκούσης	  παρούσης	  γίνεται	  τὸ	  πάθος,	  οὐδ’	  αὕτη	  περιέλκεται	  διὰ	  τὸ	  πάθος."	  NE	  1147b	  14-­‐19	  212	  De	  Ins	  459b	  28-­‐33.	  213	  Charles	  1984,	  p	  91-­‐96	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she	   believes	   that	   everything	   sweet	   is	   pleasant,	   and	   she	   also	   mistakenly	   sees	   every	   sweet	   as	  desirable	  and	  good.	  This	  interpretation	  seems	  to	  cohere	  with	  paragraph	  5),	  where	  Aristotle	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  pathos	  ,	  or	  the	  akratic’s	  psychophysical	  upheaval,	  arises	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Moreover,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  premise	  the	  akratic	  "has	  and	  doesn't	  have"	  is	  the	  minor,	  the	  one	  that	  indicates	  that	  this	  particular	  thing	  is	  sweet	  and	  that	  everything	  sweet	  is	  pleasant.	   Indeed,	   the	  akratic	  knows	  that	   this	   is	  sweet	  and	   that	  everything	  sweet	   is	  pleasant.	  Yet,	  this	  belief	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  wrong	  generalization	  and	  by	  a	  mistaken	  phantasia.	  To	  clarify	  her	  failure	  further	  ,	  however,	  we	  must	  turn	  to	  paragraph	  4),	  where	  Aristotle	  envisages	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  akratic	  can	  ignore	  the	  minor	  premise.	  Some	  akratics	  "don’t	  have	  it".	  Others	  have	  it	  in	   way	   that	   makes	   them	   only	   “say	   the	   words	   of	   knowledge”.	   These	   remarks,	   then,	   seem	   to	  suggest	  that	  these	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  akratics	  suffer	  from	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  failures.	  	  The	  view	  that	   the	  akratic’s	   ignorance	   is	  a	   failure	  of	  phantasia,	  however,	  allows	  one	  to	  see	   that	  their	   failure	   is	   the	   same,	   although	   it	   manifests	   itself	   in	   two	   different	   ways.	   Both	   akratics	  misrepresent	   the	   sweet	   thing	   as	   desirable	   and	   good.	   Hence,	   in	   a	   way,	   they	   do	   not	   have	  knowledge.	   In	  one	   case,	   this	  misrepresentation	   causes	   a	   strong	  desire	  which	   causally	   “masks"	  the	  akratic’s	  correct	  reasoning.	  This	  is	  the	  predicament	  of	  impetuous	  akratics,	  who,	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	   “don’t	  wait	   for	  reason,	  because	   they	   tend	   to	   follow	  phantasia”214.	  Even	   in	   the	  case	  of	  the	   impetuous	   akratic,	   however,	   the	   failure	   of	   phantasia	   is	   not	   tantamount	   to	   an	   intellectual	  failure:	   the	   workings	   of	   the	   intellect	   are	   simply	   causally	   masked	   by	   the	   malfunctioning	   of	  
phantasia.	   Impetuous	  akratics	  are	  so	  quick-­‐tempered	  that	  whenever	  phantasia	   individuates	  an	  object	   of	   desire,	   they	   reach	   for	   it	   without	   pausing	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	   possible	   blameworthy	  consequences	   of	   their	   action.	   In	   the	   second	   case,	   the	   akratic	   is	   still	   ignorant,	   because	   she	  misrepresents	  the	  sweet	  thing	  as	  good	  and	  strongly	  desirable.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  desire	  that	  arises	  from	  her	  misrepresentation	  is	  not	  as	  violent	  as	  the	  one	  of	  the	  impetuous	  akratic.	  Hence,	  she	  is	  able	  to	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  of	  her	  complex	  deliberation,	  and	  to	  choose	  to	  avoid	  the	  cake:	  her	  intellect	   functions	   correctly.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   misrepresentation	   of	   phantasia	   is	   enough	   to	  render	   this	   conclusion	   idle,	   and	   is	  unable	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   an	   action.	  The	  only	   thing	   she	   can	  do,	  then,	  is	  to	  say	  the	  words	  that	  come	  from	  her	  knowledge:	  (“I	  should	  avoid	  this!).	  This,	  then,	  is	  the	  predicament	  of	  the	  clear-­‐eyed	  akratic,	  the	  one	  that	  deliberates	  and	  chooses,	  but	  doesn’t	  abide	  by	  her	  choice.	  	  In	   the	   syllogistic	   account	   of	  akrasia,	   Aristotle	   compares	   the	   akratic	  with	   the	   sleeping	   and	   the	  drunk.	  In	  this	  section	  and	  in	  the	  second	  chapter,	  I	  tried	  to	  emphasize	  that	  this	  comparison	  is	  not	  necessarily	  meant	   to	  point	  out	   that	   the	  akratic	  undergoes	  an	   intellectual	   failure.	  Rather,	   it	   can	  suggest	  that	  the	  akratic,	  the	  drunk	  and	  sleeping	  all	  have	  mistaken	  phantasiai.	   Interestingly,	  the	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same	   point	   can	   be	   made	   about	   the	   other	   analogy	   Aristotle	   uses	   in	   order	   to	   clarify	   the	  characteristics	   of	   the	   akratic:	   the	   one	   that	   concerns	   the	   student	   who	   has	   just	   learned	   a	  demonstration,	  but	  still	  doesn’t	  know	  it	  because	  she	  hasn’t	  "internalized"	  it215.	  We	  can	  imagine	  the	   student	   demonstrating,	   for	   example,	   that	   an	   isosceles	   triangle	   has	   equal	   base	   angles.	   The	  student	  has	  just	  learned	  the	  lesson,	  and	  demonstrates	  the	  theorem	  using	  the	  correct	  Euclidean	  postulate.	   Nevertheless,	   instead	   of	   drawing	   an	   isosceles	   triangle,	   she	   always	   draws	   a	   scalene	  one.	  Her	  demonstration	  is	  correct:	  she	  follows	  and	  represents	  all	  the	  required	  steps.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  student's	  demonstration	  shows	  that	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  the	  lesson	  yet:	  there	  is	  still	  something	  wrong	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  pictures	  or	  represents	  it.	  The	  akratic,	  according	  to	  the	  interpretation	  I	  proposed,	  is	  guilty	  of	  a	  similar	  mistake.	  The	  steps	  she	  follows	  in	  her	  deliberations	  are	  sound	  and	  correct,	  but	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  her	  phantasia	   depicts	   the	   features	   of	   her	   evaluative	   outlook.	   The	   only	   difference	   between	   the	  student	  and	  the	  akratic,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  former	  is	  merely	  descriptive,	  whereas	  the	  failure	   of	   the	   latter	   is	   evaluative.	   Thus,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   akratic,	   the	   student	   doesn't	   have	   to	  worry	  too	  much	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  her	  mistakes	  on	  her	  desires	  and	  motivational	  states.	  	  4.4	  Conclusion	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  firstly	  analyzed	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  the	  practical	  syllogism.	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  major	   premise	   expresses	   the	   agent’s	   general	   wants,	   needs	   or	   desires,	   whilst	   the	   minor	  individuates	  the	  occasion	  in	  which	  these	  wants	  needs	  or	  desires	  can	  be	  satisfied.	  I	  also	  suggested	  that,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  emphasize	  the	  fact	  that	  choices	  are	  the	  efficient	  causes	  of	  actions,	  Aristotle’s	  views	   on	   the	   practical	   syllogism	   can	   be	   made	   compatible	   with	   his	   analysis	   of	   choice	   and	  deliberation.	  	  	  Second,	  I	  proposed	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  view	  that	  the	  akratic’s	  failure	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  phantasia.	  In	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  akratic’s	  failure	  arises	  when	  she	  states	   the	  minor	  premise	  of	   the	  practical	  syllogism,	   the	  one	  that	  concerns	   the	  particular	   situation	   in	  which	   her	   desires,	  wants	   or	   needs	   can	   be	   applied.	   This	   failure,	   in	   turn,	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  involve	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  or	  rational	  confidence	  in	  the	  minor	  premise	  or	  the	  conclusion	   of	   the	   practical	   syllogism.	   Rather,	   it	   consist	   in	   a	   valuational	   mistake	   due	   to	   the	  malfunctioning	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  phantasia.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  impetuous	  akratic,	  this	  mistake	  can	  cause	   a	   passion	   which	   is	   sufficient	   to	   causally	   “mask”	   the	   akratic’s	   deliberative	   process.	   The	  impetuous	   akratic's	   intellect	   is	   operative,	   but	   doesn't	   have	   enough	   time	   to	   carry	   forward	   the	  deliberation.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  weak	  akratic,	  the	  mistake	  doesn’t	  mask	  the	  deliberative	  process,	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but	   renders	   her	   choice	   to	   resist	   her	   blameworthy	   desires	   “idle”.	   I	   also	   emphasized	   that	   this	  reconstruction	   fits	   the	  comparison	  of	   the	  akratic	  with	  the	  drunk,	   the	  sleeping	  and	  the	  student,	  and	  that	  it	  can	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  enkrateia.	  	  If	   this	   interpretation	   is	   correct,	   it	   suggests	   some	   interesting	   ideas	   regarding	   the	   four	  protagonists	   of	   Aristotle’s	   ethics:	   the	   virtuous,	   the	   vicious,	   the	   enkratic	   and	   the	   akratic.	   The	  virtuous	  and	  the	  vicious	  agent	  share	  a	  similar	  cognitive	  framework:	  their	  reflective	  beliefs	  and	  their	   phantasiai	   cohere	  with	   each-­‐other.	   Nevertheless,	   they	   differ	   in	   that	   the	   virtuous	   agent’s	  evaluative	  outlook	  is	  wholly	  correct,	  and	  the	  vicious	  agent’s	  evaluative	  outlook	  is	  wholly	  wrong.	  The	  virtuous,	   then,	  have	  achieved	  perfect	  phronesis,	  or	  prudence,	  whilst	   the	  vicious	  are	  wholly	  ignorant.	   The	   cognitive	   framework	   of	   the	   akratic	   and	   the	   enkratic,	   in	   turn,	   is	   similar	   because	  their	  reflective	  beliefs	  and	  phantasiai	  do	  not	  cohere	  with	  each	  other.	  Their	  evaluative	  outlook	  is	  also	  similar,	   for	  they	  both	  have	  correct	  beliefs	  and	  mistaken	  phantasiai.	  Hence,	  with	  respect	  to	  practical	  knowledge,	  they	  are	  both	  to	  some	  extent	  ignorant.	  Nonetheless,	  they	  differ	  because	  the	  enkratic	   agent	   has	   learnt,	   or	   is	   able,	   to	   cope	   with	   this	   cognitive	   dissonance	   and	   evaluative	  dissonance,	  and	  the	  akratic	  agent	  hasn’t.	  	  This	   brief	   characterization	  of	   the	   virtuous,	   the	   vicious,	   the	   enkratic	   and	   the	   akratic,	   if	   correct,	  leaves	   us	   with	   an	   open	   question:	   can	   the	   akratic	   ever	   rid	   herself	   of	   her	   ignorance,	   achieve	  wisdom	   and	   become	   virtuous?	   We	   know	   that	   her	   ignorance,	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   sleep	   and	  drunkenness,	  can	  be	  temporarily	  resolved.	  Nevertheless,	  she	  will	  revert	  to	  making	  her	  mistake	  whenever	  she	  is	  be	  confronted	  with	  an	  occasion	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  her	  mistaken	  phantasiai.	  Since	  her	  mistaken	  appearances	  are	  non-­‐doxastic,	  and	  not	  dependent	  on	  reason,	  we	  know	  that	  trying	  to	  convince	  her	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  them	  is	  not	  effective.	  Her	  mistake	  is	  not	  intellectual,	  and	  she	  cannot	  be	   “talked	   out	   of	   it”.	   Nevertheless	   she	   can	   perhaps	   be	   persuaded	   to	   cope	   with	   her	   mistake,	  learning	   the	   preventative	   strategies	   adopted	   by	   the	   enkratic.	   But	   learning	   to	   cope	   with	   her	  mistake	   will	   not	   make	   her	   virtuous:	   significantly,	   the	   enkratic	   only	   acts	   in	   accordance	  with	  prudence	   (κατὰ	  τὸν	  ὀρθὸν	  λόγον),	   but	   not	  with	   prudence	   (μετὰ	   τοῦ	   ὀρθοῦ	   λόγου)216.	   	   The	  
Nicomachean	   Ethics	   '	   account	   of	   moral	   habituation,	   understood	   as	   a	   form	   of	   “cognitive	  behavioural	  therapy”,	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  puzzle.	  We	  may	  think	   that	   if	   the	   akratic	   practiced	   and	   acted	   against	   her	   appearances	   consistently,	   she	  would	  eventually	  manage	  to	  rid	  herself	  of	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  may	  suppose	  that	  by	  being	  enkratic	  and	   acting	   in	   accordance	   with	   prudence	   for	   a	   sufficiently	   long	   amount	   of	   time,	   we	   may	  eventually	  achieve	  an	  integrated	  and	  correct	  moral	  outlook.	  However,	  this	  interpretive	  strategy	  encounters	  the	  difficulty	  of	  extrapolating	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  habituation	  as	  a	  moral	  therapy	  in	  the	  
Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  Habituation	  seems	  to	  be	  extremely	  important	  for	  a	  good	  upbringing,	  but	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  NE	  1144	  b25	  and	  NE1151	  a	  20	   	  
	  	   	   74	  
is	  less	  clear	  that	  it	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  corrective	  tool	  for	  grown	  up	  agents.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  understand	  how	  exactly	  habituation	   could	  provide	   the	   “gestaltic	   switch”	   that	   allows	   the	  agent	  not	  only	  to	  act	  according	  	  to	  prudence,	  but	  also	  to	  have	  it.217	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  Overall	  Conclusion	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  considered	  the	  alleged	  tension	  between	  Aristotle's	  motivational	  conflict	  account	  and	  his	   ignorance	  account	  of	  akrasia.	   I	  argued	  that	   this	   tension	  can	  be	  resolved	   if	  we	  consider	  the	  akratic's	   failure	  as	  a	   failure	  of	  phantasia.	   In	   the	   first	   chapter,	   I	   criticized	  other	  attempts	   to	  resolve	   this	   tension,	   and	   I	   categorized	   them	   under	   the	   label	   of	   desire-­‐based	   accounts	   and	  Socratic	   accounts.	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   desire-­‐based	   account	   mistakenly	   identifies	   the	   akratic	  ignorance	   with	   a	   desiderative	   failure,	   while	   the	   Socratic	   accounts	   render	   clear-­‐eyed	   akrasia	  impossible.	  	  In	   the	  second	  chapter,	   I	  presented	   the	   thesis	   that	   the	  akratic	   failure	   is	  a	   failure	  of	  phantasia.	   I	  argued	  that	  the	  akratic's	  ignorance	  consists	  in	  a	  mistaken,	  non-­‐doxastic	  representation,	  which	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  akratic's	  blameworthy	  desire.	  This	  interpretation	  resolves	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  motivational	   conflict	   account	   and	   the	   ignorance	  account	  because	   it	   envisages	   the	   akratic's	  ignorance	  as	   the	  source	  of	  her	  conflict	  of	  desires.	   I	   concluded	   the	  chapter	  by	  arguing	   that	   this	  interpretation	   can	  also	  make	   sense	  of	   the	  distinction	  between	   the	   enkratic	   and	   the	   akratic,	   as	  well	  as	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  akrasia	  discussed	  by	  Aristotle.	  In	  the	  third	  chapter,	  I	  clarified	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  akratic's	  failure	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  phantasia	  by	  discussing	  Aristotle's	  theory	  of	  desire	  formation	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  account	  of	  phantasia.	  I	  argued	  that	  Aristotle	  presents	  a	  cognitivist	   theory	  of	  desire	   formation,	  according	  to	  which	  desires	  can	  be	  based	  either	  on	  beliefs	  or	  on	  phantasiai.	  I	  emphasized	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  phantasiai	  and	  beliefs	  is	  that	  the	  former,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  latter,	  do	  not	  require	  reflective	  assent	  and	  are	  not	   responsive	   to	   rational	  persuasion.	   I	   then	  analyzed	   the	   consequences	  of	   this	   interpretation	  for	  Aristotle's	   tripartite	   theory	   of	   desires.	   In	   conclusion,	   I	   argued	   that,	   in	  Aristotle's	   theory	   of	  desire	  formation,	  the	  difference	  between	  rational	  and	  irrational	  desires	  has	  evaluative,	  and	  not	  descriptive	   significance.	  The	  discussion	  of	  Aristotle's	   cognitivism	  helped	  me	  clarify	   the	   reason	  why	   akrasia	   with	   respect	   to	   thumos	   is	   less	   blameworthy	   than	   akrasia	   with	   respect	   to	   bodily	  desires.	  	  In	  the	  fourth	  chapter,	  I	  considered	  Aristotle's	  syllogistic	  account	  of	  akrasia.	  I	  first	  suggested	  that	  Aristotle's	   theory	  of	   the	  practical	   syllogism	   is	   coherent	   in	   the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	   in	  De	  Motu	  
Animalium	   and	   in	  De	   Anima.	   Second,	   I	   argued	   that	   Aristotle's	   view	   that	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	  practical	  syllogism	  is	  an	  action	  is	  coherent	  with	  his	  analysis	  of	  choice	  and	  practical	  deliberation.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  analysis	  of	  Aristotle's	  practical	  syllogism,	  I	  provided	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  syllogistic	   account	   of	   akrasia	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   akratic	   is	   a	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failure	   of	   phantasia.	   I	   then	   argued	   that,	   if	   this	   analysis	   is	   correct,	   it	   can	   clarify	   further	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  virtuous,	  the	  enkratic,	  the	  akratic	  and	  the	  vicious	  in	  Aristotle's	  Ethics.	  In	  conclusion,	   I	   noted	   that	  my	   view	   leaves	   open	   the	   question	  whether	   Aristotle's	   akratic	   can	   be	  cured	  by	  means	  of	  moral	  habituation.	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